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ABSTRACT 
This thesis surveys a number of topics related to 
the grammar of infinitival for-phrases. 'We begin by no- 
- 
ting syntactic and semantic distinctions among three types 
of infinitive complements, which are called purpose 
clauses, objective clauses, and rationale clauses. It is 
shown that these complements must be analyzed as for- 
-
phrases with sentential objects. 
Next, semantic relations between NP's and for- 
-
phrases are discussed, and the relevance of these rela- 
tions to the analysis of control phenomena in the three 
clause types is considered. It is demonstrated that 
"object deletion" in infinitival for-phrases is subject to 
conditions on the semantic relations obtaining between the 
controller NP and the for-phrase. 
- 
Basic semantic differences between gerundives, for- 
-
phrases and infinitival for-phrases are characterized. Both 
are descriptive of motivations for the action,depicted in 
the matrix clause. However, gerundive for-phrases char- 
- 
acterize motivating factors which are semantically prior 
to the action depicted in the matrix clause, while infini- 
tival - for-phrases describe intentions which are semantically 
posterior to the action characterized by the matrix clause. 
In addition, complement subject control in gerundive for- 
-
phrases is examined. 
"Object deletion" in purpose clauses is considered 
with respect to the sentential nature of this type of 
complement. It is shown that if we analyze the object of 
for in this case as a reduced sentence, "object deletion" 
-
in purpose clauses does not violate certain plausible con- 
ditions on rules. Following a discussion of tough-p~edicates, 
the hypothesis is considered that the complements to the 
degree modifiers too and enough are for-phrases with re- 
- duced sentential objects. 
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CHAPTER I 
A TYPOLOGY OF SOME INFINITIVE PHRASES 
1. The distinction between infinitival relative clauses and 
infinitival purpose clauses. 
In this section we will describe an ambiguity in sen- 
tences like (1) with respect to the underlined infinitive 
phrase. 
1. Carol bought a rack to hang coats on- 
The ambiguity of (1) involves the fact that the expression 
which refers to or designates the object of purchase is an- 
biguously construed: It can either be a rack or a rack to 
hang coats on. Otherwise put, the ambiguity of (1) involves 
the optional interpretation of the infinitive phrase as a 
component of the description of the object which Carol 
bought. As is commonly recognized, the infinitive phrase, 
when construed as a component of the referring expression, 
functions as a relative clause modifier; and there is, in 
fact, an alternative version of sentence (1) on this read- 
ing, where the infinitive phrase is introduced by a Wh- 
phrase: 
2. Carol bought a rack on which to hang coats 
Observe that in (2), the infinitive phrase must be con- 
8 
strued as a component of the referring expression, and the 
sentence is unambiguous. 
With respect to sentences such as (1) we will say 
that the infinitive phrase functions as an infinitival rel- 
ative clause just in case the infinitive phrase is con- 
strued as part of the expression which refers or designates, 
and that the infinitive phrase (or the whole sentence) has 
an infinitival relative clause reading. When the infinitive 
phrase is not interpreted as part of the referring expres- 
sion, we will call it a purpose clause (or an infinitival 
purpose clause, to distinguish it from constructions which 
seem to serve related semantic purposes) and say that the 
infinitive phrase or the sentence as a whole has a purpose 
clause reading. 
That (1) is a genuinely ambiguous sentence can be seen 
from the fact that the validity of inferences made from it 
depends on whether we take the infinitive phrase to be a rel- 
ative clause or a purpose clause. For example, (3) is a 
valid inference from (1) only on a purpose clause reading of 
(1) : 
3. Carol intended to hang coats on the rack which she 
bought 
On the relative clause reading of (I), the inference repre- 
sented in (3) cannot be made: All we know is that Carol 
9 
baught an object described as a rack to hang coats on; and 
we know, in particular, nothing of what she intends to do 
with it. She could, for example, intend to hang her dres- 
ses on the rack, and we might add a purpose clause to (1) 
to this effect: 
4. Carol bought a rack to hang coats on to hang her 
dresses on 
Observe that, given the purpose clause in (4), (5) is a 
pa 
valid inEerence from (4) : 
5. Carol intended to hang dresses on the rack which 
she bought 
The kind of ambiguity illustrated by examples like (l), 
where we have the option of interpreting a certain adjunct 
P phrase as a component of a referring expression, is actually 
quite common. Take, for example, well-known cases like Jane 
wrote the letter on the table, where the phrase the letter 
I ** 
I 
on the table can be taken as the object of write or on the 
table can be taken as a place adverbial modifying the whole 
verb phrase write the letter. There is, however, a further 
I - -  aspect of the ambiguity of (1) that sets it apart from ex- 
~ amples like the one above and engages our interest. This is 
the fact that on the purpose clause reading of (l), the in- 
I 
finitival adjunct is used to assert something about the ob- 
I 
ject a rack. What is asserted is that the rack serves 
the purpose of being something to hang coats on. This par- 
ticular feature is shared by other constructions, as illus- 
trated by the following ambiguous examples: 
6. John wrote the story about the Alaskan pipeline 
7. Bill took the last picture of his wife 
8. Nicola retold the joke about an Italian 
(6) can simply be a statement of authorship; i.e., it can 
simply mean that John is the author of the story about the 
Alaskan pipeline; or it can mean, roughly, that the topic 
of the story that John wrote was the Alaskan pipeline. On 
the first reading, the story about the Alaskan pipeline is 
a referring expression; i.e., a description of what John 
wrote, the object of the verb write. On the second reading, 
tl* the story is a referrring expression (the object of write), 
and it is asserted to be about the Alaskan pipeline. That 
is, the fact that the topic of the story is the Alaskan pipe- 
line is part of what the sentence asserts on this reading. 
Similar ambiguities are observable in (7) and (8) , whose 
readings are indicated by the paraphrases in (9) and (10) 
respectively. 
9.a. Bill was the photographer of the last picture of 
his wife 
11 
9.b. the last picture Bill took was of his wife 
10.a. Nicola was the reteller of the joke about an 
Italian 
b. Nicola retold the joke as being about an Italian 
On the "b-readings" of (7) and (8), given as (9b) and (lob), 
the underlined prepositional phrases are not part of any 
referring expression. Further, as in the case of the pur- 
pose clause in (I), and the about-phrase in ( 6 ) ,  these ad- 
juncts are used to assert something about the direct objects 
of the sentences: In ( 7 ) ,  the subject of Bill's last pic- 
ture is asserted to be his wife; in (8), the subject of the 
joke in the version that Nicola told (on Nicola's rendition) 
is asserted to be an Italian. 
Constructions of this type should be given far more 
extensive treatment than we will give them here. Let me 
just add the further observation that there are other ad- 
verbial adjuncts which are used to assert something about 
either the subject or object of the sentence, adding thus, 
a further dimension to the kind of ambiguity we have exam- 
ined above. Consider, for instance, examples of the fol- 
lowing type: 
11. El Greco painted the Cardinal without his glasses 
12. The clown put the tie on upside down 
13. Alexander recited the poem without the usual 
soppiness ' 
12 
In (ll), it could either be the Cardinal or El Greco who is 
without his glasses; in (12), it could be either the clown 
or the tie that i~ upside down; in (13), it could be either 
Alexander or the poem itself that is without the usuaJ sop- 
piness. Thus, there seems to be a general problem of ad- 
juncts with apparent adverbial force which attribute some 
property or properties to a noun phrase in the containing 
sentence. The phenomenon of purposei&9ausesLis:a particu- 
lar instance of this general problem. 
Our task now is to demonstrate that the ambiguity of 
(1) (and of (6-8) ) is structural. Specifically, we wish 
to show that the infinitive phrase as an infinitival rela- 
tive forms a syntactic constituent with the nominal a rack 
to its left, while as a purpose clause it does not form a 
constituent with a rack. To bring out the structural nature 
of the ambiguity, we can rephrase the ambiguity as one in ' 
the construal of the object noun phrase of the verb buy: Is 
the object a rack or a rack to hang coats on? (The object 
NP of buy is, of course, a referring expression:) Consider, 
for example, the two possible passive versions of (1): 
14. a rack to hang coats on was bought by Carol 
15. a' rack was bought by Carol to hang coats on 
In (14), where the infinitive phrase is treated by the Pas- 
sive Pule as a constituent of the object NP, only a relative 
clause reading is possible; the infinitive phrase is inter- 
pretable only as a component of a referring expression. (15) 
on the other hand, has its infinitival adjunct unaffected by 
the Passive rule; it has not been taken as a constituent of 
the object NP which is preposed. In this situation, a rack 
is the referring expression (the object NP) and the infini- 
tival adjunct is interpreted as a purpose clause. It is 
possible that (15) is actually ambiguous, having a relative 
clause reading as well. We can account for this possibility 
by deriving (15) on the relative clause reading from (14) 
by the well-known rule of Extraposition from NP. Thus, we 
have two possible derivations f o ~  (1.53, allowing the infini- 
tive phrase to be interpreted either as a relative clause 
or a purpose clause. 
Consider next the following pseudo-cleft examples. 
16. what Carol bought was a rack to hang coats on 
17. what Carol bought to hang coats on was a rack 
(16) is quite straightforward: the infinitive phrase is part 
of the postcopular focus constituent and is interpretable 
only as an infinitival relative clause. On the other hand, 
the infinitive phrase in (17) is unambiguously interpreted 
as a purpose clause. Notice that if we substituteFfor the 
14 
infinitive phrase in (17) its "Wh-relative clause version", 
the sentence is ungrammatical: 
18. "what Carol bought on which to hang coats was a rack 
However one wishes to derive pseudo-cleft sentences, it is 
a fact about them that what appears in focus position cannot 
be an immediate constituent of a complex noun phrase. In the 
instance of (17) and (18), the relevant derivative observa- 
tion is that the heads of relative clause contructions can- 
not appear in focus position without the relative clause. 
Thus, in a sentence like 
19. what John ate that Sarah made was the cookies 
that Sarah made cannot be interpreted as a relative clause 
modifier of the cookies. In the familiar way.. in which pseu- 
do-cleft sentences are described, we would say that (19) 
does not "correspond to" the sentence, John ate the cookies 
that Sarah made (it is not even clear;that,(l9) is grammati- 
cal). One of the pseudo-cleft sentences which would rightly 
be said to "correspond to" this latter sentence would be, 
what John ate were the cookies that Sarah made. (For a ree 
cent, interesting discussion of the pseudo-cleft construction, 
see Higgins 1973. Higgins rejects the standard transforma- 
tional analyses for these sentences in favor of an analysis 
which virtually identifies the deep structures of pseudo-,, 
clefts with their surface structures.) 
From these observations, it follows (correctly) that 
(17) does not "correspond to" (1) on the relative clause 
reading of the latter. According to our observations, - a
rack and to hang coats on do not form a complex noun phrase 
at any stage in the derivation of (17). Like our observa- 
tions about the Passive, these facts indicate that the two 
readings for (1) are associated with different structural 
descriptions for the sentence. On the relative clause read- 
ing, a rack and to hang coats on form a single constituent; 
on the purpose clause reading, they do not. Now observe, 
incidentally, that the infinitive phrase in (I), interpreted 
as a purpose clause, can itself appear in focus position in 
a pseudo-cleft sentence: 
20. what Carol bought a rack for was to hang coats on 
(The - for which shows up in (20) will be dealt with later on.) 
The impossibility of a relative clause interpretation for 
the focus constituent~iof (20) can be seen when we substitute 
the "Wh-version" for it: 
* 21. what Carol bought a rack (for) was on which to hang 
coats 
TJe see, then, that pseudo-cleft constructions point up cku- 
cia1 syntactic differences between infinitival relAtives and 
infinitival purpose clauses. 
Let us pause to note that quite similar observations "- 
can be made for (6-8). Consider, for example, (7). The 
two possible passive versions are as follows: 
22. the last picture of his wife was taken by Bill 
23. the last picture was taken by Bill of his wife 
Each of these unambiguous examples has one of the possible 
readings ~ 6 f  ( 7 ) .  (22) has the reading corresponding to (9a) ; 
(23) has the reading corresponding to (9b) . In (22), of his 
wife is interpreted as part of the referring expression and 
is analyzed syntactically as a constituent of the surface 
subject NP which has been preposed by;the Passive rule from 
the position of the direct object of - take in (7). In (23), 
corresponding to (9b), of his wife does not form part of a 
referring expression and is unaffected by the Passive rule. 
In this case, the object of take is simply the last picture. 
(Incidentally, (23) does not seem to me to have an alterna- 
tive reading corresponding to the reading of (22), where the 
of-phrase at the end of the sentence could be taken as an 
- 
extraposed complement. Compare the ambiguous (15). The 
conditions under which an extraposed complement reading is 
in general available are, in any event, quite complicated and 
poorly understood.) 
Further, consider the following pseudo-cleft examples: 
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24. what Bill took was the last picture of his wife 
25. the one that Bill took the last picture - of was 
his wife 
( 2 4 ) ,  of course, has only the (9a) reading; the material to 
the right of the copula must be analyzed as a constituent, 
and this focus constituent forms a referring expression. The 
situation is different for (25). Here, the - of-phrase cannot 
be interpreted as the complement of picture, since there are 
severe restrictions on pseudo-clefting out of a complex noun 
phrase. (This observation can easily be translated in terms 
of your favorite theory of pseudo-clefts.) Thus, aside from 
the relative clause examples we discussed above, if we take 
a sentence like 
26. John is married to the woman next to Bill 
we find that it is impossible to have Bill in focus position 
in a "corresponding" pseudo-cleft sentence: 
27. *the one who John is married to the woman next to 
is Bill 
Also, reconsidering the ambiguity of the example 
28. Jane wrote the letter on the table 
where on the table can be understood either as a place ad- 
verbial modifying the verb phrase or as part of the referring 
expression the letter on the table, notice that only the . 
place adverbial reading for the - on-phrase is possible in the 
following pseudo-cleft: 
29. what Jane wrote the letter - on was the table 
The impossibility of pseudo-clefting the object of a PP 
nominal complement insures the non-ambiguity of (29). 
When the adjuncts are not construed as components of 
referring expressions (the infinitive phrase of (1) on the 
purpose clause reading; the prepositional phrases of (6-8) 
on their "b-readings"), the NP's to their left (the direct 
objects) can be replaced by pronouns, since they are under- 
stood to have reference by themselves, without the adjuncts. 
Observe the non-ambiguity of the following cases: 
30. Carol bought - it to hang coats on (cp. (1)) 
31. John wrote - it about the Alaskan pipeline (cp.(6)) 
32. Bill took - it of his wife (cp. ( 7 ) )  
33. Nicola retold - it about an Italian (cp. (8)) 
The fact that - it cannot form a constituent with the ad-junct 
to its right is quite clear. If we try, for example, to 
force a relative clause reading for the infinitive phrase in 
(30) by substitution with the "Wh-version", the result is 
ungrammatical. 
34, *Carol bought it on which to hang coats 
If we try to treat-.;ity'adjunct - .- as a constituent with respect 
to Passive or the demonstrative that + adjunct as the focus 
constituent in a pseudo-cleft sentence, the result is also 
ungrammatical. (We use the demonstrative that because the 
pronoun not a focus constituent. Cf. Carol 
bought that, what Carol bought was that; Carol bought it, 
*what Carol bouaht was it.) 
35. *it to hang coats on was bought by Carol 
36. *what Carol bought was that to hang coats on 
37. *it about the Alaskan pipeline was written by John 
38. *what John wrote was that about the Alaskan pipeline, 
etc. 
I n  semantic terms, the non-ambiguity of (30-33) makes sense: 
If the adjunct is interpreted as a nominal modifier, the head 
of the construction does not have reference by itself; rather, 
the whole expression, head + modifier, is what refers. 
Definite pronouns, which - are interpreted as having refer- 
ence, consequently cannot substitute for the heads of modi- 
fied nominal constructions. Thus, the adjuncts in sentences 
(30-33) do not form referring expressions with the nominal 
it to theiL left. Moreover, as examples (35-38) demonstrate, 
-
the adjuncts do not form syntactic constituents with the - ,  
2 0  
pronoun it, and this contrasts with the fact that when the 
- 
adjunct - is a component of the referring expression, the 
whole referring expresssion is treated syntactically as a 
constituent. The ambiguity of interpretation for (1) and 
(6-8), then, which revolves around the question whether the 
nbminal to the left of the adjunct has reference, correlates 
with an ambiguity of structure. Notice, incidentally, that 
the point of the discussion could have been made just as well 
if, instead of pronouns, we used NP's with deictic determin- 
ers (this/that rack) or with possessive determiners (his/Ma- 
ry' s rack) , etc. 1 
Finally, the fakt:that purpose clauses are not syntac- 
tically noun phrase complements(and, in particular, not rel- 
ative clauses) is shown by the fact that it is possible to 
"chop" NP's from them. In order to demonstrate this, how- 
ever, it is first necessary to digress briefly. So far in 
this discussion, we have examined purpose clauses where the 
deleted NP is an object (a direct object or the object of a 
preposition), but an interesting property of purpose clauses- 
one which we will consider much more extensively at a later 
point- is that this deletion operation is not restricted to 
object NP's. Subject NP's can also delete. Thus, contrast 
the following examples: 
39. a. we bought this dogi for our children to play 
with - 
b. we bought this dogi 
-i to play with our chil- 
dren 
40. a. John rented the airplanei to take i to 
Mongolia 
b. John rented the airplanei i to take him to 
Mongolia 
In this respect, then,ipurpose clauses resemble infinitival 
relative clauses: the NP missing in surface structure can 
be a subject, object, or object of a PP. 
Consider now the following example: 
41. Wolfgang bought this violin to play sonatas on j -1 
Suppose we relativize the NP sonatas in (41). What we get 
is an ill-formed noun phrase: 
42. *...the sonatasi which Wolfgang bought this vio- 
lin to play j on - 
-1 
However, the ill-formedness of (42) does not (necessarily) - 
reflect the impossibility of relativizing out of a purpose 
clause. The fact is that once an NP has been chopped out of 
a VP, no other NP can be chopped out of that VP. I believe 
this generalization was first observed by Bruce Fraser in 
connection with Tough-Movement examples. Thus, consider the 
sentence, 
43. it is easy to play sonatas on this violin 
Now, either sonatas or this violin can be moved to subject 
position to produce: 
44. sonatasi are easy to play i on this violin 
45. this violini is easy to play sonatas on - 
But once Tough-Movement (or its equivalent on some other 
theory) has applied either as in (44) or (45) , the remain- 
ing NP in the VP complement to the tough--type predicate 
cannot be chopped, as illustrated by the contrast of the 
following examples. 
46. a. the sonatasi which it is easy to play - i 
on this violin 
b. the violin which it is easy to play sonatas i 
on 
- i 
47. *th&;violin which sonatas are easy to play j i - 
48. *the.sonatas which this violini is easy to j 
I am not aware that any explanation of the ill-formedness 
of examples like (47) and (48) has been proposed2, but it 
seems plausible to conjecture that some difficulties in the 
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application of perceptual stragegies are involved here. But, 
whatever the explanation is, these facts indicate the diffi- 
culty of testing relativizability out of purpose clauses with 
examples like (42) and motivate the introduction, at this 
point in our discussion, of the "deletability" of purpose 
clause subjects (cf. the b-examples of (39) and (40)), since 
this property allows us to bypass the difficulty. 
Thus, notice that children in (39b) and MongoJia in 
(40b) can relativize successfully: 
49. the children that we bought this dogi - i to j 
play with 
-1 
50. the place that John rented the airplanei j - i 
to take him to 
-j 
Also, notice the grarnrnaticality of these cleft examples. > :  
(Clefting is another standard illustration of "chopping" 
phenomena.) 
51. it was our children that we bought this dog j i- i 
to play with - j 
52. it was Mongolia that John rented the planei j i 
to take him to 
-j 
Therefore, because of the grammaticality of (P9-52), we 
can conclude that the ill-formedness of (42) is due not to 
any prohibition against relativizing out of purpose clauses, 
24 
but rather to certain general conditions on chopping rules. 
The fact that purpose clauses can be "chopped" out of is 
clear evidence that they are syntactically distinct from 
relative clauses, since chopping out of relative clauses is 
a prime example of the violation of the Complex Noun Phrase 
Constraint (Ross dissertation, 1967), or its equivalent on 
some other theory (cf. e.g., Chomsky's (1973) recent discus- 
sion of adjacency.) 
On the basis of the evidence considered in the fore- 
going discussion, we conclude that the structural ambigu- 
ity of (1) is to be represented approximately as follows. 
(These deep structure proposals will be refined in the course 
of this thesis. Further, I do not wish to defend any parti- 
cular claims for the deep structure of relative clause con- 
structions, and represent the relative clause merely as a 
complement to a nominal. This seems to me to be a neutral 
way of doing things. ) (53) is the structure of (1) on the 
relative clause reading; (54) the structure on the purpose 
clause reading. 
In subsequent sectiolns, we will be concerned with a more 
detailed description of purpose clauses, and remarks about 
infinitival relatives will be limited principally to what- 
ever concerns their relation to purpose clauses. I should 
add that the kind of purpose clause under discussion, as dis- 
tingGished from infinitival relatives, has been recognized 
in traditional grammar. For example, Jespersen (Modern - - 
Erlglish Grammar, Volume V, 15.2-15.3; 16.49) discusses these 
clauses and refers to them as retroactive, meaning that they 
have passive sense without passive form; i.e., they allow 
"object deletion". He does not, sorfar as I know, consider 
subject dgletion in purpose clauses. 
2. Purpose clauses, rationale clauses, and objective clauses. 
In the last section, we isolated a type of infinitive 
cemplement which we called a purpose clause and discussed 
some of the ways in which it could be distinguished from an 
infinitival relative. Here, we extend our observations to 
distinguish between purpose clauses and what we will call 
rationale clauses and 6bjective clauses. The discussion 
will be exploratory; we will be considering mainly facts 
which we will need to understand before we can deepen our 
analysis at later points. Later on, we will attempt to sys- 
tematize our observations and discuss the theoretically inter- 
esting aspects of the topic. 
Consider the following example: 
1. Bill bought the pianoi for Mary to practice music 
2. Bill bought the pianoi for Mary to practice music 
In (I), we have a purpose clause with the deleted object of 
on anaphorically related to the piano, the object of buy. 
-
In (2), there is no deletion, and the sentence is word-for- 
word identical with (l), except that rather than a "deletion 
site" after on, we have a pronoun object it, which is 
- - 
anaphorically related to the.,piano, the object of - buy.
The infinitive phrases in these sentences serve dis- 
tinct semantic functions: In line with our previous obser- 
vations about purpose clauses, the purpose clause in (1) 
designates the purpose or function served by the piano; the 
piano serves as something for Mary to practice music on. 
Moreover, we should add that the purpose clause designates 
Bill's intentions for the piano. That is, !we understand 
from (1) that it is Bill who decides that the purpose of the 
piano is going to be what the purpose clause says it is. CRe- 
call the discussion of sentence (3) of the last section;) In 
(2), the infinitive phrase defines the reason for Bill's ac- 
tion; it answers the question, why did Bill buy the piana?, in 
the motivational sense. (2) would be appropriate, for exam- 
ple, to a situation in which Mary has refused to practice on 
a certain piano unless it were bought by Bill, so that Bill's 
purchase of the piano is motivated by his desire to have 
her practice on it. 
Infinitive phrases of the type occurring in (2) have 
been called traditionally result clauses. (Cf. Jespersen, 
MEG, Volume V, 16.54-16.6.) The matrix sentence defines a 
condition for obtaining the result specified in the infini- 
tive phrase. In this discussion, we will use the term 
rationale clause rather than result clause, for reasons which 
. - 
will be clearer after further discussion. The term 
rationale clause is justifiable, since such a clause desig- 
nates the motivation for the action depicted in the matrix 
clause. 
In the case of kationale clauses, there is no require* 
ment of coreferentiality between an NP in the rationale a 
clause and an NP in the matrix clause. 
3. Bill bought the piano for Mary to gain a fuller ap- 
preciation of keyboard music 
On the other hand, deletion of an NP in a purpose clause un- 
der identity with an NP in the matrix clause is obligatory. 
A further difference between rationale clauses and pur- 
pose clauses is that rationale clauses can be introduced 
by in order (for X )  to, while purpose clauses cannot: 
4. *Bill bought the pianoi in order for Mary to prac- 
tice on 
Bill bought the piano order for Mary to practice 
6. Bill bought the piano in order for Mary to gain a = 
fuller appreciation 6f keyboard music 
Other differences will be examined later on. 
Closely related to rationale clauses are what I will 
call objective clauses. Consider the ambiguity of the fol- 
lowing examples: 
7. the teacher sent the student to the office to annoy 
the principal 
8. John trains the new recruits to make a living 
9. Ned hired the lawyer to protect his son 
In (7-9) there is an ambiguity. The subject of the infini- 
tive phrase can be either the subject or object of the ma- 
trix sentence; i.e., the subject of annoy in (7) can be ei- 
ther the teacher or the student, r - and so on. On the inter- 
pretation where the subject of the infinitive phrase is the 
subject of the matrix sentence, the infinitive-phrases ar;e 
rationale clauses; on the other interpretation they are what 
I call objective clauses. 
The difference between rationale clauses and objective 
clauses is perhaps clearer from the following examples, in 
which the use of reflexive pronouns makes clearer the possi- 
bilities {in the interpretation of the subjects of the infin- 
itive complements.: 
10. a. John trains the new recruits to make a living for 
himself (rationale) 
b. John trains the new recruits to make a living for 
themselves (objective) 
11. a. Ann sent Alex to Toronto to spend some time by 
herself (rationale) 
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b. Ann s e n t  Alex t o  Toronto t o  spend some t i m e  by 
Himself ( o b j e c t i v e )  
Not ice  t h a t  o b j e c t i v e  c l a u s e s  ( l i k e  purpose c l a u s e s )  can- 
no t  be in t roduced by i n  o rde r  ( f o r  X )  t o .  Thus, compare ( 1 0 )  
and (11) wi th  (123: and (13)  below: 
1 2 .  a .  John t r a i n s  t h e  new r e c r u i t s  i n  o rde r  Co make 
a  l i v i n g  f o r  himself  
b.*John t r a i n s  t h e  new r e c r u i t s  i n  o rde r  t o  make a  
l i v i n g  f o r  themselves 
1 3 .  a .  Ann s e n t  Alex t o  Toronto i n  o r d e r  t o  spend some 
t ime by h e r s e l f  
-b.*Ann s e n t  Alex t o  Toronto i n  o rde r  t o  spend some 
t i m e  by himself  
Not ice  a l s o  how i n t r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  phrase  i n  o rde r  t o  d i s -  
ambiguates sen tences  ( 7 - 9 )  i n  favor  of t h e  r a t i o n a l e  c l a u s e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n :  
1 4 .  t h e  t eache r  s e n t  t h e  s t u d e n t  t o  t h e  o f f i c e  i n  
o rde r  t o  annoy t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
15.  John t r a i n s  t h e  new r e c r u i t s  i n  o rde r  t o  make 
a  l i v i n g  
1 6 .  Ned h i r e d  t h e  lawyer i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  h i s  son 
3. Relevant aspects of phrase structure. 
We argue in this section that rationale clauses have 
a different deep structure source from purpose clauses and 
objective clauses. The thesis here is that purpose clauses 
and objective clauses are generated as complements inside 
the VP, while rationale cdauses are generated as daughter 
constituents of PredP (or E, or however one wishes to label 
the node) -- i.e., outside the VP. 
The first argument for our contentions has to do with 
preposability. Chomsky (1965: pp. 102ff.) argued that only 
phrases outside the VP could be preposed to the beginning 
of the sentence. The preposing of constituents originating 
in the VP is acceptable only if the resulting sentence is 
given some sort of topicalization intonation. These ideas 
have been somewhat sharpened and elaborated in a very in- 
teresting paper by Williams (1971). 
Rationale clauses distinguish themselves from purpose 
clauses and objective clauses by their preposability. Con- 
sider the following objective-rationale clause pairs: 
1. a. Maryi hired John to protect heri (objective) 
b. Mary hired John to protect hersezf (zationale) 
2. a. Ann sent Ned to NY to spend some time by himself 
(objective) 
b. Ann sent Ned to NY to spend some time by herself 
(rationale) 
3. a. Sam trains the new recruits to make a living for 
themselves (objective) 
b. Sam trains the new recruits to make a living for 
himself (rationale) 
Observe that preposing the infinitive phrases is possible 
only in the case of rationale clauses: 
4. a. *to protect heri, Mary hired John i 
b. to protect herself, Mary hired John 
5. a. *to spend some time by himself, Ann sent Ned to NY 
b. to spend some time by herself, Ann sent Ned to NY 
6. a. *to make a living for themselves, Sam trains the 
new recruits 
b. to make a living for himself, Sam trains the new 
recruits 
Notice, also, that purpose clauses are not preposable. 
7. a. John bought the piano for Mary to practice on it 
(rationale) 
b. John bought the piano for Mary to practice on 
(purpose 
8. a. for Mary to practice on the piano, John bought it 
b. *for Mary to practice on, John bought the piano 
The second argument has to do with what we might term the 
degrees of "dependency" of the clause on the matrix verb. For 
any of the infinitive phrases we are dealing with, it seems 
incorrect to describe this dependency in terms of syntactic 
subcategorization. Rather, it seems that the relatiohship 
is better described in terms of semantic compatibility. 
Each clause type appears to have some inherent semantic func- 
tion which imposes conditions on the types of matrix predi- 
cates with which it is compatible. In the spirit of the 
analysis developed in Williams (1971), I will show that the 
compatibility conditions are more restrictive in the case of 
bbjective clauses and purpose clauses than in the case of 
rationale clauses. The reasoning here is that the tighter 
the dependency of the clause on the verb, the lower its lev- 
el of "embedding. (See Williams 1971: 10, where he dis- 
cusses the degree to which an item can subcategorize a verb.) 
In the case of rationale clauses, there are items other 
than the matrix predicate on which such a clause can be depen- 
dent. Basically, rationale clauses are compatible with vo- 
litional predicates, conditional predicates (necessary, - suf- 
ficient, need), and with some of the modals. If a modal or 
conditional predicate is present, the volitionality of the 
predicate-which follows it is irrelevant. These points are 
illustrated in the examples below: 
9. John ("accidentally) let the cats out of the room 
(in order) to have some peace and quiet 
3 4 
10. Max slept eight full hours last night (in order) to 
make sure he would be alert this morning, "although 
he had intended only to doze off for a few minutes 
11. *Ivan was tall (in order) to attract attention 
12. Ivan must2-be tall (in order) to attract attention 
13. Ivan needs to be tall (in order) to attract atten- 
tion 
14. it is sufficient for Ivan to be tall (in order) to 
attract attention 
In ( 9 ) ,  we are dealing with a willful action in the matrix 
clause, as we can see from the anomaly that results with the 
addition of the adverb accidentally. For (10) to be accept- 
able, we have to be able to infer that Max's sleeping eight 
hours was intentional. The point about the volitionality 
of the matrix predicate is that in sentences like (9) and (10) 
the rationale clause indicates the intent of the matrix ac- 
tion. As a result, the although-clause makes (10) anoma- 
lous, since it contradicts the implication of intentionality. 
In (ll), where Ivan can have no control over his height.+and, 
hence, where there can be no possibility of intent, the 
presence of a rationale clause results in an anomaly. But 
notice how in (12-14), with the addition of the modal must 
or the conditional predicates need, be sufficient, which 
serve to specify the predicate be tall as a condition on a 
result, the presence of a result clause is perfectly accept- 
able. ' (Recall the traditional term, result clause. ) 
Thus, when we attempt to identify the conditions which 
allow for rationale clauses, we find that they depend on 
the nature of the matrix predicate only in a ,!broad sense. 
In no way can we say that verbs select for rationale clauses. 
Turning to purpose clauses, we find that the -situation 
is rather different. For example, purpose clauses are com- 
patible with some, but not all volitional predicates. Thus, 
we may have sentences like 
15. Mary built the board to play chess on 
16. Mary bought the board to play chess on 
17. Harold made the stove to cook his meals in 
. L .  18. Harold used the stove to cook his meals in 
but not 
19. *Mary destroyed the board to play chess on 
20. *Mary repaired the board to play chess on 
21. *Harold painted the stove to cook his meals in 
. - 
22. *Harold cleaned the stove to cook his meals in4 
In general, purpose clauses are compatible with certain 
fairly broad classes of predicates in English. Among them 
are (1) predicates of transaction, such as give, buy, sell, 
- - -  
take, steal, borrow, lend, (2) transitive verbs of motion, 
-
such as send, bring, take, (3) verbs of creation, such as 
build, construct, devise, make, and (4) the verb - use. The 
conditions of compatibility with the main predicate are 
much more ~estrictive in the case of purpose clauses than in 
the case of rationale clauses. What I have termed objective 
clauses are usually complements to verbs of motion like send, 
bring, and - take. An objective clause characterizes an objec- 
tive which involves the passive or active participation of 
the individual or thing which is acted on in the matrix :- 
clause as in they sent him to the mountain to be crucified, 
they sent her to;the mountain to crucify him, the samples 
were taken to the hospital to be examined, the police were 
brought in to oversee the demonstration. 
We conclude, then, that for purpose and objective 
clauses, there is a much closer semantic association with 
the matrix predicate than for rationale clauses. 
A third argument for the thesis of this section has to 
do with relative order. Again, we draw on the results of 
Williams (1971). When both a purpose or objective clause 
and a rationale clause figure in the same sentence, the pur- 
pose clause or objective clause must always precede the 
rationale clause ,(discounting, of course, the possibility of 
preposing the rationale clause). 
23. a. Marc bought Fido to play with -(in order) to 
please Anita (Purpose clause precedes ration- 
ale clause) 
37 
23. b. *Marc bought Fido (in order) to please Anita - to 
play with (Rationale clause precedes purpose 
clause) 
24. a. Ben took Alice to Bston to amuse herself to 
-
please himself (Objective clause precedes 
rationale clause) 
b. *Ben took Alice to Boston to please himself to 
-
amuse herself (Rationale clause precedes 
objective clause) 
The relative order of the infinitive phrases is explained if 
the sources for purpose clauses, objective clauses, and ray 
tionale clauses are as we contend. If rationale clauses are 
generated as immediate constituents of PredP to the right of 
VP, then they will always be generated to the right of pur- 
pose clauses or objective clauses, which are generated as 
constituents of VP. 
A fourth argument concerns certain aspects of the control 
properties of the infinitive phrases under discussion. In 
considering Equi-NP deletion, Williams (1971: 13) puts forth 
the hyp~thesis~that "the deleting (or 'control' ) NP cannot be 
lower in the matrix tree than the clause containing the NP 
to be deleted. 11 5 
In the light of this plausible hypothesis, let's consid- 
er the following observations. Clearly, we have seen that 
the subject of an objective clause can be controlled by the 
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object of the matrix verb, while the subject of a rationale 
clause must be controlled by the matrix subject. 
25. Mort sent his robot to us to get the prize 
In ( 2 5 ) ,  when the subject of the infinitive complement is 
controlled by the robot (the object of send), the sentence 
has an objective clause reading; when the complement subject 
is controlled by Mbrt (the matrix subject), the sentence has 
a rationale clause reading. Since the matrix object is gen- 
erated lower in the matrix tree than the matrix subject, and 
since the matrix object cannot delete the complement subject 
of a rationale clause, we conclude that the objective clause 
is generated lower in the matrix tree than the rationale 
clause. Furthermore, since, according to Williams's cri- 
teria, the direct object is generated in the lowest level of 
the matrix tree, it follows from the hypothesis that the ob- 
jective clause must also be generated in the lowest level of 
the matrix tree. 6 
For purpose clauses, one NP in the infinitive phrase is 
controllable by the direct object of the matrix predicate, 
indicating that they, too, are constituents of the lowest 
VP-level of the matrix tree. Furthermore, consider the fol- 
lowing contrast between purpose clauses and rationale 
clauses. For purpose clauses, at least two control rules are 
needed: one which effects the deletion of an NP in the infin- 
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itive phrase under identity with the NP with which the pur- 
pose clause is "associated" (i.e., that NP to which the> ; 
purpose or function is ascribed) and a rule of Equi. Both 
rules are operative in the example below. 
26. a. Maryi bought a rag doll. J--i to play with 
-j 
when she had time off 
b. Maryi bought a rag doll i to play with it j - j 
when she had time off 
In (26a), with a purpose clause, we have two deletions as 
indicated. The deletion of the complement subject by the ma- 
trix subject Mary is effected by the Equi rule referred to 
above. In (26b), we have a rationale clause, and a similar 
Equi process deleting the complement subject under identity 
with the matrix subject Mary. However, the difference be- 
tween the Equi rule in (26a) and the Equi rule in (26b) is 
shown when we add indirect objects to the verb buy: 
-
27. a. Mary bought her daughteri a rag doll j - i 
to play with 
-j when she had time off 
b. Mary bought her daughter a rag doll i j - i 
to play with it when she had time off j 
In the case of the purpose clause, the introduction of an in- 
direct object changes the controller of the complement sub- 
ject; in the case of the rationale clause, the control of the 
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complement subject remains unaffected by the introduction of 
an indirect object. Since the indirect object controls the 
complement subject in (27a) but not in (27b) , it suggests 
that (1) the purpose clause is generated at the lowest VP- 
level, since the indirect object is presumably generated at 
that level. (The fact that the direct object also deletes 
into the purpose clause points to the same conclusion.); and 
(2) the fact that the indirect object cannot delete the sub- 
ject of a rationale clause could indicate that the rationale 
clause is generated at a higher level in the matrix tree, 
making its subject "inaccessible" to the indirect object of 
the matrix ~erb. 
The final argument that we will give here is that 
rationale clauses cannot form part of a verb phrase in focus 
position in pseudo-cleft sentences, while objective clauses 
and purpose clauses can. 
28. a. Sam read The Master and Margarita to amuse himself 
b. *What Sam did was read The Master and Margarita 
to amuse himself 
29. a. Alice played hookey to anger her parents 
b. *What Alice did was play hookey to anger her parents 
The b-examples of (28) and (29) demonstrate that rationale 
clauses cannot form part of the focus constituent. Contrast 
these paradigms with the following: 
30. a. Ben brought Alice home to amuse herself 
b. What Ben did was bring Alice home to amuse herself 
31. a. Marc bought Fido to play with 
b. What Marc did was buy Fido to play with 
The b-examples of (30) and (31) are grammatical, in contrast 
with those of (28) and (29). That is, the focal verb phrase 
constituents in the b-examples of (30) and (31) include res- 
pectively the objective clause and the purpose clause as sub- 
constituents. 
On the basis of the evidence considered in this section, 
we conclude that rationale clauses are generated on a higher 
level on the matrix tree than objective clauses and purpose 
clauses. Assuming that something resembling the following 
phrase-structure (PS) rules are correct for English, 
we hypothesize that rationale clauses are introduced by (32), 
expanding (=Pred P) , while objective clauses and purpose 
clauses are introduced by (33), expanding VP. In tree-diagram 
form, the structure is as follows. 
v N P  'S ( o b j e c t i v e  c l a u s e s ;  
purpose  clauses) 
FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER I 
1. It has been suggested to me by various people that pur- 
pose clauses as in (1) must really be treated as a special 
type of relative clause. The basis for this is the striking 
similarities between purpose clauses and relative clauses 
with respect to matters of control. But why assume that 
such control properties are restricted to relative clause 
constructions? As we have noted, in other crucial respects, 
purpose clauses and infinitival relatives differ vastly: 
Purpose clauses do not form constituents with the nominal 
that binds them; the nominal head of a relative clause con- 
struction does not refer by itself; etc. Thus, purpose 
clauses do not have the- syntactic properties and semantic 
functions in general that define relative clauses, The 
point about similarities in control properties will be 
taken up at length.: 
2. It has recently come to my attention that Ivonne 
Bordelois proposes an explanation for such data in her forth- 
coming dissertation. I am not familiar with the details 
of her proposal, but I know that she judges sentences like 
(47) to be more grammatical than sentences like (48). I 
agree with her judgments, although I do not find sentences 
like (47) totally acceptable. 
3. The relationship between volitionality and intention is 
more complicated than we have implied in the text. For 
example, consider the following question, 
i, what did John say to make Mary so angry? 
In this example, volitionality and intention are independent, 
for even though the act of saying something is volitional, 
it is not necessary that Mary's resultant anger represent 
any intent of John in saying what he did. Thus, in sen- 
tences like (i), where there'.is no implication of inten- 
tion (but, rather, of the actualization of a result), we 
get phrases like so or as he did and the like: 
-
ii. what did John say to make Mary as angry as he did? 
iii. what did John say to make Mary as angry as she is? 
Note also that the same kind of interpretation of the infini- 
tive phrase is possible withz- the modal must in its epis- 
temic sense: 
iv. John must have said some awful things to make Mary 
as angry as he did/ as she is 
There are, in addition, other cases where the implication of 
an actualized result is present. 
4 5  
v. John overslept yesterday, to make this the third 
day in a row that he hasn't shown up for work on time 
Two things are to be noted immediately about such sentences: 
(1) the infinitive phrase cannot prepose: 
vi. to make this the third day in a row he hasn't shown 
up on time for work, John overslept yesterday 
For (vi) to be acceptable, the preposed infinitive phrase 
must be understood as a designation of John's intention. 
(2) on the non-intention reading of (v) , the subject of the 
infinitive phrase is understood not as John but as John's 
having overslept yesterday or something of this sort. 
4. On the basis of such data, we could show that the dis- 
tribution of purpose clauses and infinitival rklatives dif- 
fer, though they overlap. E.g., in a sentence like 
1. Mary used a pan to fry eggs in 
the infinitive phrase can be interpreted either as a pur- 
pose clause or as an infinitival relative. But if we change 
the matrix predicate as in: 
ii. Mary displayed a pan to fry eggs in 
we eliminate the purpose clause reading. Thus, in (ii), a 
pan cannot be replace by a pronoun: 
-
iii. *Mary displayed it to fry eggs in 
Also, compare the array of pseudo-cleft sentences "correspond- 
ing to" (i) with the array of those "corresponding to" 
(iii) . 
iv.a.what Mary used was a pan to fry eggs in 
b.what Mary used to fry eggs in was a pan 
c.what Mary used a pan for was to fry eggs in 
v.a.what Mary dispJayed was a pan to fry eggs in 
b.*what Mary displayed to fry eggs in was a pan 
c.*what Mary displayed a pan for was to fry eggs in 
5 .  Williams notes a class of exceptions to this putative 
generalization, as in the sentence 
i. Bill hit John for stealing grapes (WilLiams's (54)) 
where, by cerkain of his criteria, the understood subject 
John of stealing grapes is generated lower in the matrix 
-
tree than the for-phrase complement. It is interesting to 
- 
note that if we add the modal must to (i) , the subject of 
stealing grapes becomes ambiguous. 
ii. Bill must hit John for stealing grapes 
On one reading of (ii), John's punishment for stealing 
grapes is being hit by Bill; on the other reading, Bill's 
punishment for stealing grapes is hitting John. See Chapter 
I11 and Faraci (1971) for further discussion. 
6. This may point up a problem in Williams's analysis, since 
the first or lowest level in the tree is reserved for the 
verb and those items for which it iS strictly subcategor- 
ized. 
CHAPTER I1 
SEMANTIC RELATIONS AND CONTROL. 
In this chapter, we will elaborate on the analysis of 
the clause types discussed in Chapter I. In the first section, 
I will argue that purpose, objective and rationale clauses 
are to be analyzed as - for-phrases; they are to be generated 
in deep structure as objects of the preposition - for. In the 
second section, I will introduce certain dkstinctions in 
semantic relations that exist between NP's and - for-phrases, 
and I will show, in the third section, the relevance of these 
distinctions to control phenomena. 
1. PARALLELS WITH FOR-PHRASES. 
- 
'The analysis of infinitive complements as - for-phrases 
has been traditional with predicates like wait, hope, anxious, 
etc. 
1. he was waiting for a good movie 
he was hoping for a good movie 
he was anxious for a good movie 
2. he was waiting to find a good movie 
he was hoping to find a good movie 
he was anxious to find a good movie 
The infinitive phrases and the - for-phrases in the examples 
above both characterize the object of anticipation for these 
1 
predicates. Note also that in psuedo-cleft sentences, in- 
finitive phrases can serve as pseudo-clefted objects of - for: 
We were hoping for Bill to come early, -- what we were hoping 
for was for Bill to come early. 
On the basis of such considerations, examples like those 
of (2) are generally derived from constructions like those 
in (3) : 
3. he was waiting [ for [to find a good movie] 1 
PP 
he was hoping [ for [to find a good movie] 1 
PP 
he was anxious [ for [to find a good movie] ] 
PP 
Here we are looking to extend this analysis to other infini- 
2 
tive phrases. 
Consider the following paradigms: 
4. John built a robot to entertain his guests 
a. what John built was a robot to entertain his guests 
b. what John built to entertain his guests was a robot 
c. what John did to entertain his guests was build 
a robot 
5. John built a robot for entertainment 
a. what John built was a robot for entertainment 
b. what John built for entertainment was a robot 
c. what John did for entertainment was buil& a robot 
As is evident from the pseudo-cleft examples, which serve to 
distinguish three possible readings for (4) and ( 5 ) ,  there 
is considerable similarity between the interpretations of 
the infinitive phrase and the interpretations of the for- 
-
phrase. In (4a,b) and (5a,b), the underlined phrases are 
interpreted as designations of the purpose or function of 
3 
the robot. In (4a) and (5a), the underlined phrases must 
be analysed as complements to a nominal, while in (4b) and 
(5b), they are constituents separate from the nominal. In 
(4c) and (5c ) ,  the underlined phrases designate the reason 
or rationale for John's action: John's building of the boat 
was to entertain his guests, John's building of the boat was 
for entertainment. 
From the discussion of the last chapter, it is clear 
that the infinitive phrase functions as an infinitival 
relative clause in (4a) , as a purpose clause in (4b), and 
as a rationale clause in (4c). The for-phrase in (5) can 
- 
serve the same semantic function as each of these clause 
types. 
Let us now examine the parallelism between objective 
clauses and - for-phrases. 
6. a. Ann sent John into town to get some groceries 
b. what Ann sent John into town for was to get 
-
some groceries 
7. a. Ann sent John into town for some groceries 
b. what Ann sent John into town - for was some 
groceries 
8. a. John went into town to get some groceries 
b. what John went into town - for was to get some 
groceries 
9. a. John went into town for some groceries 
b. what John went into town - for was some groceries 
The - for-phrases of the free relative clause subjects of the 
pseudo-cleft examples (6b) and (7b) are interpreted identi- 
cally, and the sentences show that either an infinitive phrase 
or an NP can qualify as the object of - for on such an inter- 
pretation. A comparison of (8b) and (9b) indicates the same. 
Furthermore, (6) and (8) are ambiguous; the in£ initive phrase 
can be interpreted either as an objective clause or a ration- 
ale clause. This is clearest in ( 6 ) ,  where either John or 
Ann - can be the understood subject of the infinitive comple- 
ment. Observe that there is a similar ambiguity in (7): the 
for-phrase can be interpreted as designating John's objective 
- 
in town, similar to Ann sent John into town after some gro- 
ceries, in pursuit of some groceries, or it can be inter- 
preted as designating Ann's reason for her action of sending 
John into town, similar to Ann sent John into town, intending 
to get some groceries in return. 
We might add one further case of parallelism of semantic 
function between infinitive phrases and - for-phrases. After 
verbs such as build and design, both infinitive phrases 
and - for-phrases characterize resultant qualities of the 
direct objects. Consider the following examples: 
10. a. we built the car for high durability at high 
speeds 
b. we built the car to look like an elephant 
11. a. we designed the machine for maximal effective- 
ness at low temperatures 
b. we designed the machine to operate noiselessly 
With the verb make, such complements are at best question- 
able, and with verbs like buy, they are impossible. 
-
12. a. ?we made the car for high durability at high 
speeds 
b. ?we made the car to look like an elephant 
*we bought the machine for makimal effectiveness 
at low temperatures 
b. *we bought the machine to operate noiselessly 
In (12) and (13) , the a- and b-examples have the same 
grammatical status, suggesting that the for-phrase and the 
- 
infinitive phrase are alike in their semantic function and 
eqnazby compatible or incompatible with the verbs of the 
4 
sentences. 
We have demonstrated, then, that non-clausal - for- 
phrases can take on the same semantic functions as each of 
the clause types examined in the last chapter (purpose, 
rationale, and objective). We will now show that the - for- 
phrases, on their various interpretations, have essentially 
the same distributional properties as their clausal counter- 
parts. Specifically, we will argue that the syntactic anal- 
ysis outlined in the last chapter must be revised to account 
for the distributional properties of non-clausal - for-phrases 
as well as infinitive phrases. (See pp.31 ff. of Chapter I.) 
First of all, we observed earlier that only rationale 
clauses could prepose to the beginning of the sentence. It 
is also the case that a - for-phrase can prepose only with a 
rationale interpretation. Thus, if the infinitive phrase of 
(4) is preposed, the sentence has only the reading para- 
phrased by (4c), assuming non-topicalization intonation 
contours. By the same token, if the - for-phrase of (5) is 
preposed, the sentence has only the reading paraphrased by 
(5c) : 
14. to entertain his guests, John built a robot 
C 
15. for entertainment, John built a robot 
Second, the various - for-phrases manifest the same kinds 
of dependency on the matrix predicate as do their corres- 
ponding clause types. Rationale - for-phrases are compatible 
with volitional actions, conditional predicates (necessary, 
sufficient, need), and some of the modals. (Cf. pp.3sff. of 
the last chapter.) 
16. John (*accidentally) let the cats out of the room 
for some peace and quiet 
17. *Bill was short for maximal effectiveness 
18. Bill must be short for maximal effectiveness 
19. Bill needs to be short for maximal effectiveness 
20. it is sufficient for Bill to be short for maximal 
effectiveness. 
In (16), the rationale - for-phrase is incompatible with the 
adverb accidentally, which implies lack of volitionality on 
the part of the subject. Rationale clauses and - for-phrases 
connote motivation and, hence, attribute volitionality to the 
matrix subject, making sentences like (16) coneradictory if 
the adverb accidentally is included. In (17), the subject of 
short is not understood as volitional. As a result, (17) is 
not acceptable in the same way that a sentence like *Bill 
was intentionally short is not acceptable. However, if we 
introduce the modal must, -as in (18) or? the conditional 
predicates, as in (19) and ( 2 0 ) ,  the resulting sentences 
are grammatical. In such sentences, the - for-phrase or 
infinitive phrase complement ("rationale"'c1ause) has a 
result interpretation: The - for-phrase or infinitive phrase 
designates a result which is dependent on a condition de- 
fined by the matrix clause in the case of examples like 
(18) or by the complements of the conditional predicates 
in the case of examples like (19) or (20) . 
Function-designating - for-phrases, like purpose clauses, 
show a tighter dependency on the matrix predicate. Thus, such 
for-phrases are compatible with many but not all predicates 
- 
denoting volitional actions. (See p.35 of Chapter I.) 
21. a. Mary built the board for her chess games 
b. Mary built the board for Spassky to play on 
22. a. Dlaxy boughtL the baardqfpr her chess games 
b,. Mary bought the board for Spassky to play on 
23. a. Harold made the stove for his gourmet cooking 
b. Harold made the stove for his chef to cook on 
24. a. Harold used the stove for his gourmet cooking 
b. Harold used the stove to cook on 
25. a. ??Nary destroyed the board for the bonfire she 
was makins 
25.>h. ??Mary destroyed the board for the scouts to burn 
repaired the board for her chess games 
b. ??Mary repaired the board for Spassky to play on 
27. a,* ??Harold painted the stove for his gourmet cooking 
b. ??Harold painted the stove for his chef to cook on 
28. a. ??Harold cleaned the stove for his gourmet cooking 
b. ??Harold cleaned the stove to cook on 
(Some of the a-examples in (25-28) may seem to be acceptable 
but on a different interpretation of the for-phrase than the 
- 
one we are considering in this discussion. For example, 
(27a) may be acceptable if interpreted roughly as, Harold 
painted the stove in preparation for his gourmet cooking. 
In this event, the for-phrase is not interpreted as a de- 
- 
signation of the purpose or function of the stove.) Pur- 
pose for-phrases are, in general, compatible with the same 
- 
broad classes of predicates as purpose clauses -- predicates 
of transaction, transitive verbs of motion, verbs of creation, 
the verb use, etc. (See p.35 of Chapter I.) 
Objective for-phrases like their clausal counterparts, 
- 
are complements to predicates of motion, such as send, bring, 
-
take, go, come, etc. 
- -  
29. John's parents sent him to Stangord for an 
education 
John's parents sent him to Stanford to get an 
education 
30. John went on;to Stanford for an education 
John went on to Stanford to get an education 
Other verbs, such as hire and train, also take for- phrase 
-
complements: they hired/trained him to do the job, they 
hired/trained him for the job. 
The facts concerning preposability and dependency on 
the matrix predicate argue that rationale for-phrases, as 
- 
opposed to objective for-phrases and purpose for-phrases, 
- - 
are generated outside the VP (perhaps as daughters of the 
S node; see note 5). Another supporting fact is that, ig- 
noring the possibility of preposing, purpose and objective 
for-phrases precede rationale for-phrases -- 
- - again, like 
their clausal counterparts. 
31. a. Harold used his stove for his gourmet cooking 
for the thrill of it (Purpose for-PP precedes 
- 
rationale for-PP.) 
- 
b. *Harold used his stove for the thrill of it for 
-
his gourmet cooking (Rationale for-PP precedes 
- 
purpose for-PP.) 
- 
32. a. Bernard took Julia to Lord and Taylor for her 
clothes for his own amusement (Objective 
precedes rationale for-PP.) 
- 
b. *Bernard took Julia to Lord and Taylor for his 
own amusement for her clothes (Rationale for-PP 
precedes objective for-FP.) 
- 
Yet a fourth consideration is that certain facts about 
complement subject control in these clause types, as dis- 
cussed on pp.37- 40 of the last chapter, seem to pattern after 
certain semantic relations that for-phrases enter into with 
- 
NP's in the sentence. For example, let's consider again sen- 
tence (25) of the last chapter, repeated here "for convenience 
as (33). 
33. Mort sent his robot to us to get the prize 
We observe, as before, that this sentence is ambiguous: On 
one reading, the subject of the infinitive phrase is understood 
to be the robot, and the infinitive phrase is an objective 
clause. On the other reading, the subject of the infinitive 
phrase is understood to be Mort, and the infinitive phrase 
-
is a rationale clause. Consider now the following sentence: 
34. Mort sent his robot to us for the prize 
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Sentence (34) is likewise ambiguous. On one reading, the for- 
-
phrase designates the robot's objective, so that there is a 
semantic relation established between the robot and for the 
prize. On the other reading, the for-phrase, as a rationale 
- 
phrase, is subject-oriented; it designates the motivation for 
Mort's action of sending the robot to us. Thus, the case 
where his robot is identified as the controller of the subject 
of the infinitive in (33) is matched by the case where his 
robot bears a particular semantic relation to the for-phrase 
in (34) -- the relation of individual to objective. Also, 
the case where Mort is identified as the controller of the 
complement subject in (33) is matched by the case where a 
particular semantic relation obtains between the subject Mort 
and the for-phrase in (34) -- the relation of an agent to a 
- 
motivation. 
Turning to purpose clauses, recall that when a purpose 
clause appears without an explicit (lexically specified) sub- 
ject as a complement of the verb buy, the complement subject 
-
is controlled by the matrix indirect object or the matrix 
subject, if there is no indirect object. (We are ignoring 
the case where the matrix direct object controls the comple- 
ment subject, limiting ourselves to the case where the matrix 
direct object controls a complement object node.) Consider 
the following examples : 
35. Mary bought her daughteri a beautiful doll j- i 
to make the others jealous with 
- j 
bought a beautiful doll to make the 
others jealous with 
- j 
In contrast, the subject of a rationale clause is controlled 
by the matrix subject even when an indirect object is present: 
37. Maryi bought her daughter a beautiful doll i to 
make the others jealous 
38. Maryi bought a beautiful doll i to make the 
others jealous 
Consider now the following example with a for-phrase: 
- 
39. Mary bought her daughter a set of rosary beads for 
penance 
40. Mary bought a set of rosary beads for penance. 
(39) and (40) are ambiguous: the phrase for penance des- 
cribes either the purpose of the set of rosary beads or the 
reason for the act of buying them (the purpose of the action). 
~hus, for penance can be interpreted either as a purpose phrase . 
or a rationale phrase. (It can also be interpreted as a 
component of the phrase a set of rosary beads for penance, 
but we will not : consider this possibility.) Now observe the 
parallels with the controh phenomena discussed above: When 
~ 
the for-phrase in (39) is interpreted as a purpose phrase 
- 
(designating the function nf the direct object, a set of 
rosary beads), penance is associated with the indirect object 
her daughter: i.e., it i the daughter's penance that is 
pretation, it is Mary's that is being talked about. 
being referred to; and in 
On the other hand, when t e for-phrase is interpreted as a h - 
(40), on a purpose phrase inter- 
rationale phrase, penance 
subject, in both (39) and 
control facts for sentences like (35-38) are intimately 
is associated with Mary, the matrix 
(40). (39) and (40) can, on the 
The examples discussed h e ~ e  strongly indicate that the 
for-phrases enter into wikh various NP's, as described in 
- 
the discussion of (39) ani (40). In the next section we will 
connected with some facts 
explore certain aspects 04 these relations between NP's and 
about semantic relationships which 
alJ.&ls . between phrases and for-phrases to jus- 
- 
,- 
tify the analysis types discussed in the last 
for-phrases. For now, we 
- 
chapter as in£ initival f od-phrases. 
- 
are still simply pointing out the par- 
I 
A final analogy that we will draw with previous obser- 
vations about the various clause types is that a for-phrase 
- 
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forming part of a VP focus constituent in a pseudo-cleft 
sentence cannot be interpreted as a rationale phrase. (See 
Chapter I, p.40 . ) 
41. Sam read The Master and Margarita for his own 
amusement 
a*' what Sam did for his own amusement was read The 
-
Master and Margarita 
b. *what Sam did was read The Master and Margarita 
for his own amusement 
42. Alice played hookey for revenge 
a. what Alice did f o ~  revenge was play'hookey 
b. *what Alice did was play hookey for revenge 
In (41) and (42) , the b-sentences cannot paraphrase the a- 
sentences. Consider further that if we take an example where 
the - for-phrase can be interpreted either as a rationale phrase 
or an objective phrase, the inclusion of the - for-phrase in 
the focus constituent serves to isolate the objective-phrase 
reading: 
43. Marc brought his boss home for a turkey dinner 
a. what Marc did for a turkey dinner was bring his 
boss home 
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43. b. what Marc did was bring his boss home for a 
turkey dinner 
(43a) and (43b) cannot be interpreted as paraphrases. The 
for-phrase in (43b) has only the objective sense, and we 
- 
understand that Marc's boss is a dinner guest. In (43a) we 
understand that Marc's compensation for bringing his boss 
home is a turkey dinner, an interpretation quite different 
from (43b). Recall the parallel for objective and rationale 
clauses: only the objective clause can form part of the 
focus VP constituent. Thus, if we take an ambiguous example 
such as, Marc broughtlhis .boss *home .to:observe his--wifeCs 
behavior, where either Marc (rationale-clause reading) or his 
-
boss (objective-clause reading) can be understood as the com- 
plement subject, we find that the relevant pseudo-cleft 
example is unambiguous: 
44. what Marc did was bring his boss home to observe 
his wife's behavior 
(44) has only the reading where his boss is the understood 
complement subject: i.e., it has only the objective-clause 
reading. 
Like objective for-phrases, purpose for-phrases can 
- - 
form part of the VP focus constituent. 
45. John made a recorder for his music lessons 
a. what John made for his music lessons was a 
recorder 
b. what John did was make a recorder for his 
music lessons 
The for-phrase in (45b) has the same interpretation as the 
- 
far-phrase in (45a). (Again, there is the further possi- 
- 
bility of interpreting a recorder for his music lessons as 
a phrase. In this case, the for-phrase designates purpose 
- 
or function, but it is a nominal complement, rather than a 
purpose for-phrase.) 
- 
To sum up, we have observed in some detail the number 
of significant parallels in syntactic and semantic properties 
between non-clausal for-phrases and the clause types isolated 
- 
in the discussion of Chapter I. Accordingly, I propose the 
following revisions in the PS rules given as (32) and (33) 
in the last chapter. 
6 
4 6 .  VP.-3 AUX 
Rationale phrases (clausal and nnn-clausal) are intro- 
duced by Rule ( 4 6 ) ;  objective and purpose phrases are in- 
troduced by Rule (47) . Rule (48) provides the underlying 
structure for rationale, purpose, and objective clauses 
(infinitival for-phrases). In tree diagram form, we get 
- 
the following: 
AUX 
- rationale for- 
-
Xause 
,- 
objective, purpose for- 
-
phrase 
1 S - objective, purpose clau 
A Thus, on this analysis, the syntax of English distin- 
guishes two positions for for-phrases in deep structure, pro- 
I - 
vided by Rules (46) and (47) . Furthermore, the for-phrases 
- 
* 
can either be clausal or non-clausal. (Gerundive for-phrases 
- 
will be discussed in the next chapter.) The higher-generated 
for-phrase is variously interpreted as a designation of cause, 
- 
7 
motivation, or result, etc., depending on a variety of factors. 
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Lower-generated for-phrases also show a great deal of lati- 
- 
tude in their interpretation (purpose, objective, resultant 
quality, etc. ) . 
In the next section, we will consider further certain 
distinctions between purpose phrases and objective phrases 
which will provide the basis for an analysis of control 
phenomena in pupose clauses and objective clauses to be 
considered in the last parts of the chapker. 
2. On semantic relations between NP's and for-phrases. 
- 
In this section, I will consider certain facts related 
to the interpretation of lower-generated for-phrases. Spe- 
- 
cifically, we will give an intuitive description of various 
ways in which certain NP's can be semantically related to 
for-phrases. Consider the following examples. 
- 
1. we bsought the horse to the stables for some hay 
2. Bill stopped by Henry's for a rubdown 
3. Bill brought John to Henry's for a rubdown 
The underlined NP's are semantically related in some way with 
the for-phrases of their respective sentences. In (I), 
- 
this relation allows for the inference that our intention 
is for the horse to get some hay. The association between 
Bill and the for-phrase of (2) seems to be the same as the 
- 
association between John and the for-phrase of (3): In 
- 
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( 2 ) ,  we infer that Bill is to get the rubdown; in (3), we 
infer that John is to get the rubdown. Of course, the two 
cases are distinct in that we infer from (2) that Bill has 
volition with respect to his getting a rubdown, whereas, in 
( 3 ) ,  there is no implication of volition on John's part. 
In fact, in (3), volition is attributed to Bill with respect 
to John's; getting a rubdown. Thus, Bill is the volitional 
individual in both (2) and (3), but, aside from the matter 
of volition, Bill bears a certain semantic relation to the 
for-phrase in (2) that is equivalent to the semantic rela- 
- 
tion that John bears to the for-phrase in (3). Moreover, 
this semantic relation is intuitively the same as the seman- 
tic Zelation between the horse and the for-phrase in (1). 
- 
Observe that, as with John in (3), there is no implication 
of volition on the part of the horse with respect to its 
getting some hay. In fact, as with (2) and (3) volition 
is attributed only to the subject of the sentence. 
There is reason to believe that the semantic relations 
noted above are tied up with the system of thematic rela- 
tions developed by Gruber (1965) and elaborated by ' 
Jackendoff (1972). (See their works for relevant defini- 
tions and discussion. I will assume familiarity with their 
system of thematic relations in what follows.) Notice 
that the underlined NP's in (1-3) all bear the relation of 
Theme to the verbs of their respective sentences. Also, 
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the subjects of the sentences bear the relation of Agent. 
We can therefore identify the semantic relation between the 
underlined NP'S and the - for-phrases as semantic relations 
between the Themes of the sentences and the - for-phrases. 
Also, we can s9y that the Agency of the subjects of the sen- 
tences accounts for their volitionality with respect to the 
intentions depicted by the - ,  for-phrases. In the case of ( 2 j : ,  
Bill is both Theme and Agent of the sentence and according- 
ly both bears the relevant semantic relation to the - for- 
phrase and is volitional with respect to the intention that 
the - for-phrase depicts. 
Observe, incidentally, that the sentences (1-3) are 
ambiguous; the - for-phrase is also interpretable as what we 
have termed a rationale phrase. The rationale phrase read- 
ings are brought out if the - for-phrases are preposed. 
4. for some hay, we brought the horse to the stables 
5. for a rubdown, Bill stopped at Henry's 
6. for a rubdown, Bill brought John to Henry's 
We understand.that the Agent subjects of the sentences are 
compensated for their actions by being given some hay in the 
case of (4), and by being given a rubdown in the case of 
(5) and (6). Observe that there are no Theme-for-phrase  
relations here of the type discussed above; the horse is 
not understood to be getting the hay in (4) and John is 
not understood to be getting a rubdown in (6). (The 
connection between Bill and the - for-phrase in (5) does not 
involve the fact that Bill is Theme.) This is precisely what 
we would expect given our syntactic analysis of rationale 
phrases. Since they are generated outside the VP and bear, 
consequently, no grammatical relation to the verb, we would 
expect them not to be involved in the network of semantic 
relations tied to the system of thematic relations. Of - . ,  
course, as we have already seen, the presence of such 
phrases requires the attribution of Agency to the subjects 
of the sentences in which they occur, but this is the sort 
of Agency that is attributed to derived subjects, as can be 
seen from the acceptability of a sentence like, for some hay, 
my horse would be whipped by anyone. 8 
The interpretation of the relation between the Theme 
of the sentence and the - for-phrase is subject to variation. 
Contrast, for example, the following cases: 
7. John brought the maid to the restaurant for some- 
thing to eat 
8. John sent the maid to the restaurant for some- 
thing to eat 
In (8), in contrast to ( 7 ) ,  it is possible to interpret the 
for-phrase as a designation of the maid's objective; i.e., 
- 
we can infkr responsibility and volitionality on the part of 
the maid with respect to John!s intention. (The relation 
7 0 
here is similar to the relation of responsibility to be 
discussed in Appendix A of this chapter.) The contrast 
between (7) and (8) is brought out in the examples below: 
9. a. John brought the maid to the drugstore for 
something to heal herself with 
b. *John brought the maid to the drugstore for 
something to heal himself with 
10. a. John sent the maid to the drugstore for some- 
thing to heal herself with 
b. John sent the maid to the drugstore for some- 
thing to heal himself with 
In (lob), the maid is understood to be some sort of agen- 
tive intermediary in John's acquisition of something to 
heal himself with. 
Clearly, the various semantic ielations will have to 
be given a more systematic and illuminating analysis. I 
will limit myself here to pointing out an important dis- 
tinction that any theory of such semantic relations will 
have to provide. 9 
Consider the differences between the natural inter- 
pretations of the sentences below. 
11. John brought Mary home for dinner 
12. John brought the pizza home for dinner.: 
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Mary and the pizza are the Themes of their respective sen- 
tences, but their semantic relations to the phrase for dinner 
are distinct. Notice that the semantic relation between 
the pizza and the for-phrase in (12) is the same as in the 
- 
copuJar sentence, $he pizza, is --for-<idinner. On the other - , 
hand, the sentence, Mary is for dinner certainly does not 
manifest the same Theme-for-phrase  that (11) does, on its 
natural interpretation.10 We will say that the Theme of 
(12) has a functional relation to the - for-phrase. The for- 
-
phrase can be said to designate the function of the Theme, 
in the sense that the Theme is understood to be an object 
intended to serve a certain purpose as designated by the 
for-phrase. ((12) thus has what we have identified pre- 
- 
viously as a purpose phrase interpretation. Here, in- 
stead of talking about the interpretation of the for- 
-
phrase, we are talking in terms of the interpretation of 
the relation between the Theme and the for-phrase.) The 
- 
Themes of the following examples all have a functional rela- 
tion to their - for-phrases. 
13. a. John bought a new car for his trip out west 
b. the new car is for John's trip out west 
14. a. Tom kept the box for his sewing material 
b. the box ig for Tom's sewing material 
15. a. Seymour used the knife for slicing salamis 
b. the knife is for slicing salamis 11 
The grammar of English will somehow have to account for 
the distinctions in semantic relations between NP's and for- 
-
phrases that have been noted in this section, since they are 
important in the characterization of ambiguities and of dif- 
ferences between the interpretations of sentences. 
3. On control in infinitive for-phrases. 
- 
We can see from the last section that lower for- 
-
phrases can be Theme-oriented in the sense that they define 
some intention that the Agent has in mind for the Theme. 
The   he me-orientation of the for-phrase is reflected in 
- 
the fact that the Theme controls the complement subject 
when the for-phrase is infinitival. Compare (1-3) of the 
- 
last section ( p . 6 6  ) with the following: 
1. we brought the horse - to'the stables to be groomed 
and fed 
2, Bill stopped by Henry's to get a rubdown 
3. Bill brought John to Henry's to get a rubdown 
In each case, it is the Theme of the sentence (the under- 
lined NP) that is the understood subject of the infinitive 
complement. Thus, we understand from (1) that the horse is 
to be groomed and fed; from (2) that Bill is to get a rub- 
down; and from (3) that John is to get a rubdown. We ana- 
lyze the infinitive complements Q£ (1-3) as for-PP's, as 
- 
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below: 
4. we brought the horse to the stables [pp for IS to 
be groomed and fed]] 
5. Bill stopped by Henry's [pp for [ S  to get a rub- 
clown] ] 
6. Bill brought John to Henry's [pp for to get a 
rubdown] 1 
The analysis of these infinitve complement as for-phrases is 
essential to the analysis of the control problem. Examples 
like (1-3) indicate that the facts of complement subject con- 
trol reflect the semantic connection between Theme-NP's and 
for-phrases, which is observable independently. Thus, the 
- 
semantic connection between the Theme and the for-phrases 
- 
ensures that the Theme is identified as controller of the 
complement subject. Notice that there is no such semantic 
connection in the case of rationale phrases, and the Theme 
does not function as controller. For example, if the infini- 
tive phrase in (3) is interpreted as a rationale clause, John 
is not its understood subject: 
7. to get a rubdown, Bill brought John to Henry's 
The subject of the rationale clause is understood as Bill. 
We have already noted that there is no semantic connection 
between the Theme and a rationale for-phrase. 
- 
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In the last section, we observed how the interpre- 
tation of the connection between the Theme and the for- 
phrase could vary. I would like now to discuss a parti- 
cular way in which such vakiation is relevant to matters 
of control. 
The most interesting treatment that I am aware of of 
the relationship between semantic relations and control in 
infinitive complements is in Jackendoff (1972). (See Chap- 
ter Five of that work, especially pp. 214ff.) Offering an 
analysis of the control problem, Jackendoff argues that 
when the subject of an infinitive complement to a verb is 
obligatorily controlled, the position of the controller 
in the matrix clause is defined on thematic relations. Con- 
sider the following examples: 
8. John promised to leave after the first act 
9. John promised Bill to leave after the first act 
10. John got to leave after the first act 
11. John got Bill to leave after the first act 
Promise and get require obligatory control of their comple- 
-
ment subjects. For promise, ( 8 )  and (9) show that the con- 
troller is the matrix subject (in this case, John) whether 
or not the indirect object (in this case, Bill) is present. 
Get assigns control differently; the controller is the ob- 
-
ject of get, if present, or the subject of get, if there is 
- -
no object. Jackendoff demonstrates that although there is 
a shift in the position of the controller NP with - get and 
other verbs, the thematic relation of the controller to the 
verb remains constant. John is the Theme of sentence (lo), 
but Bill is the Theme of sentence (11). Thus, we can say 
that for the verb get, the controller of the complement is 
-
the Theme of the matrix sentence. 
For promise, the controller of the complement subject 
is the Source of the matrix sentence. Since the position 
of the Source is always the subject in the case of promise, 
the position of the controller does not change when an in- 
direct object is added to (8) to form (9). Promise con- 
trasts with permit, which allegedly has the same corre- 
spondence of thematic relations and grammatical relations as 
promise. However, in the case of permit, the complement 
subject controller is the Goal of the matrix clause. Com- 
pare (9) with (12). 
12. John permitted Bill to leave after the first act 
Bill, rather than John, is the understood complement sub- 
ject in (12). 
Jackendoff's analysis assumes a control rule with two 
essential arguments: (1) the uncontrolled subject of the in- 
finitive complement and (2) the NP in the matrix sentence 
bearing the relevant thematic relation as specified in the 
lexical entry of the matrix verb. The semantic relations 
relevant to control in this theory are thematic relations, 
i.e., semantic relations between constituents and the verbs 
they subcategorize. A thematic relation is the semantic 
interpretation of a grammatical relation. 
Our discussion of - for-phrases suggests that NP's enter 
into semantic relations with constituents other than the 
verbs they subcategorize and that these semantic relations 
are relevant to the analysis of control phenomena. While 
these semantic relations are not independent of the network 
of thematic relations, they are clearly not thematic rela- 
tions themselves. l2 (See Appendix A.) 
Let us consider once more a distinction in Theme-for= 
phrase relations which we have already commented on. 
13. Tommy brought the chicken horn for supper 
(13) is ambiguous; the relationship between the chicken and 
the for-phrase can be understood in two ways. On one inter- 
- 
pretation, it is inferred that the chicken is to get some- 
thing to eat for supper. The role that the chicken is to 
play in the realization of Tommy's intentions is an active 
one. On the other interpretation, it is inferred that the 
chicken is to be used as something to make the meal from. 
The role that the chicken is to play in the realization of 
Tommy's intentions is here a functional one. That is, the 
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chicken is taken to be an object which is intended to serve 
a certain purpose. The particular purpose it is to serve 
is characterized by the - for-phrase. 
When the - for-phrase is infinitival, the ambiguity of 
the relation between the Theme and the for-phrase is matched 
- 
by an ambiguity of control. 
14. Tommy brought the chicken home to eat 
a.Tommy brought the chicken home i - i to eat 
b.Tornrny brought the chickeni home to eat - 
As (14a) and (14b) indicate, the chicken can be understood 
as either the subject or object of eat. Each of the read- 
-
ings of (14) reflects one of the possible readings of (13), 
with (14a) corresponding to the non-functional reading of 
(13) and (14b) corresponding to the functional reading of 
(13). Furthermore, notice that just as the copular sentence, 
the chicken was for supper isolates the functional inter- 
pretation of the Theme-for-phrase  relations, the copular 
sentence, the chicken was to eat isolates the "object- 
deletion" interpretation of the infinitive; i.e., the chick- 
en is understood uniquely as the object of eat, when the 
- -
infinitive phrase figures as a predicative for-phrase in 
- 
a copular sentence. 
Note, however, that the functional relation between the 
Theme and the for-phrase does not correlate only with object 
- 
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deletion. We saw in the first chapter that the NP in the 
purpose clause controlled by the Theme of the matrix sen- 
tence is not limited to any particular syntactic position 
such as subject or object of the complement. Consider, in 
this regard, the ambiguity of the following examples: 
15. the usheri is there - to receive the tickets 
16. the undercover agentsi are here - to screen 
out undesirables 
17. the accountanti is here - to look over the books 
The semantic relations between the matrix subjects and the 
infinitival - for-phrases of the above examples can be either 
a functional relation or what we might term an intentional 
relation. A clue to the ambiguity of these examples lies in 
the ambiguity of the term purpose, which can mean either 
intention or function. We can speak of someone's purpose 
*(say, in making such and such a statement), or we can speak 
of the purpose of an object, such as a chair. The infini- 
tive phrases in the examples (15-17) designate purposes in 
the sense of functions on one kind of reading and in the 
sense of intentions on the other kind of reading. Thus, the 
infinitive phrase in (15), for example? designates either 
the purpose of the usher or the usher's purpose. On the for- 
mer interpretation, there is a functional relation between 
the usher and the infinitive phrase, and the infinitive 
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phrase is what we have been calling a purpose clause. (Ob- 
serve, incidentally, that the ambiguity of (15) is analogous 
to the ambiguity of the question, what is the usher there 
for?) 
NOW observe that when the sbbjects control non-subject 
NP's in the infinitive phrases, the sentences are unambig- 
uous, with only a functional relation possible between the 
su5ject and the infinitive phrases. 
18. the usheri is there for the people to give their 
tickets to 
- 
19. the undercover agents are here for criminals to i 
confess to 
- 
20. the accountanti is here for the students to take 
lessons from 
- 
Let us consider what happens when a functional relation does 
not obtain between the Theme and the for-phrase. Notice that 
- 
the ambiguit.~ of (21) is parallel to the ambiguity of (15). 
21. the usher is there for moral support 
(21) implies either that the usher seeks moral support (the 
for-phrase designating the usher's puapose in being there) 
- 
or that the usher provides moral support for others (the 
for-phrase designating the usher's function). 
YII 
l3 If we change 
the main verb from be to go, a functional relation between 
- - 
the usher and for moral support is not possible. 
22. the,t.usher goes there for moral support 
The - for-phrase in (22) unambiguously denotes the usher's 
purpose, not the purpose of the usher. In parallel fashion, 
if - go substitutes for - be in (15), the Theme-for-phrase  rela- 
tion is disambiguated: 
23. the usher goes there to receive the tickets 
Furthermore, the substitution of go for be in (18) results 
- -
in an ungrammatical sentence. 
24. *the usher goes there for the people to give their 
tickets to 
These data clearly show that operation of the rule which in- 
terprets or deletes an NP in a purpose clause under iden- 
tity with the Theme of the matrix clause depends on the ap- 
propriate semantic relation obtaining between the Theme and 
the infinitival for-phrase. 
- 
We can illustrate the point further with the adjective 
ready. 
25.  the patientilis ready for the doctor to operate 
on himi 
26.  the patienti is ready for the doctor to operate 
I n  ( 2 5 ) ,  ready i s  a  psychologica l  p r e d i c a t e ,  much l i k e  
eage r ,  anx ious ,  wai t  and hope (which a l s o  t a k e  - for-phrase  
complements),  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  psychologica l  s t a t e  of i t s  sub- 
j e c t  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  event  desc r ibed  i n  t h e  
for -phrase  complement. S ince  ready i s  a  psychologica l  pred- 
- 
i c a t e  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i t s  s u b j e c t  must be an animate NP, g iven 
t h a t  we can t a l k  about psychologica l  s t a t e s  only  wi th  regard  
t o  animate N P ' s .  Thus, we cannot have sen tences  l i k e ,  
27. * the  tumor i s  ready f o r  t h e  doc to r  t o  ope ra t e  on it 
28. * t h e  cadaver i s  ready f o r  t h e  doc to r  t o  ope ra t e  on . -  
it 
Of course ,  t h e  f a c t s  a r e  t h e  same f o r  t h e  o t h e r  psycholog- 
i c a l  p r e d i c a t e s  r e f e r r e d  t o  above. 
I n  ( 2 6 ) ,  ready i s  no t  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  psychologica l  
p r e d i c a t e ;  r a t h e r ,  it i s  d e s c r i p t i v e  of t h e  s t a t e  of a  phys- 
i c a l  o b j e c t  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  some p roces s  it i s  t o  undergo, 
a s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  - for -phrase ;  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  an i -  
macy of t h e  s u b j e c t  of ready i s  i r r e l e v a n t .  Compare ( 2 7 )  
wi th  ( 2 8 ) .  
2 8 .  t h e  tumor i s  ready f o r  t h e  doc to r  t o  ope ra t e  on 
t h e  cadaver i s  ready f o r  t h e  doc to r  t o  ope ra t e  on 
Psychological  p r e d i c a t e s  do no t  t a k e  complements wi th  d e l e t e d  
o b j e c t s .  
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29. *the patient is anxious for the doctor to operate 
on 
*the patient is waiting for the doctor to operate 
*the patient is eager for the doctor to operate on 
Observe now that the ambiguity associated with ready is 
independent of the control phenomena connected with the fore- 
going examples. Compare (25) and (26 )  with the ambiguous 
( 3 0 )  . 
30. the patient is ready for the operation 
Ready in this example can have either of the senses of the 
predicate illustrated in ( 2 5 )  and (26). The possibility of 
an alternative to the psychological-predicate interpretation 
allows for examples like, the cadaver is ready for the oper- 
ation. Of course, the other psychological predicates men- 
tioned above take non-infin2tival for-phrase complements: 
-- 
anxious for an operation, eager for a storm, wait for a ca- 
tastrophe, hope for a revelation. However, they do not man- 
ifest the ambiguity that ready does. l4 ~rucially, psycho- 
logical predicates do not allow for a semantic relation be- 
tween their subjects and their for-phrase coraplements that 
- 
correlates with the possibility of complement object dele- 
tion. 
The semantic relation associated with the predicate 
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ready on its non-psychological interpretation does not seem 
to be the same as the semantic relation between a Theme and 
a purpose - for-phrase. (However, perhaps a more enlightening 
analysis would identify the two Theme-for-phrase  relations, 
factoring out differences in the semantic functions of pur- 
pose - for-phrases and - for-phrase complements to adjectives 
like-: ready.) Nevertheless, like the functional relation 
between Theme and purposetfor-phrase, - this semantic relation 
clearly correlates with the possibility of deleting the com- 
plement object. (This relation also allows for complement 
subject deletion, as in, the cadaver is ready to be operated 
on, the soup is ready to be served. Note the ambiguity of, 
- 
the patient is ready to be operated on. Thus, the rule in- 
volved here works like the purpose clause rule in that the 
complement NP to be deleted or interpreted is not fixed at 
a pqrticular syntactic position like subject or object.) 
Let us consider the correlation a little further. No- 
tice, for example, that the verb ready has only the non- 
psychological sense in (31). 
31. the nurse readied the patient for the operation 
the patient was readied for the operation by the 
nurse 
(31) is unambiguous. We would predict, then, that deletion 
of the complement object should be possible, and we find that 
this is indeed the case. (We find, in fact, that it is + 
obligatory. ) 
32. the nurse readied the patient for the doctor to 
operate on 
*the nurse readied the patient for the doctor to 
operate on him 
Contrast this with the verb prepare which seems to have 
both a psychological and non-psychological sense. Thus, 
33. the nurse prepared the patient for the operation 
is ambiguous; we could continue it with a phrase like, by 
-
describing to him the triviality of the procedure, compat- 
ible with the psychological interpretation, or with a phrase 
like, by washing him and giving him a preliminary sedative, 
compatible with the non-psychological interpretation. (For 
some reason, the passive version of (33) seems natural only 
on the non-psychological interpretation. I have no explana- 
tion for this intuition.) Predictably, both object-deletion 
and full sentence complements are compatible with the verb 
prepare. 
34. the nurse prepared the patient for the doctor to 
operate on 
the nurse prepared the patient for the doctor to 
operate on him 
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 he psychological readying is associated with the second sen- 
tence of (34). (Note incidentally that the passive version 
of the second sentence seems unacceptable: *the patient was 
prepared (by the nurse) for the doctor to operate on him. 
This is in line with the observation made above that the 
passive is compatible with prepare only on its non-psycho- 
logical interpretation.) 
Notice now that prepared, as an adjective, has only the 
psychological-predicate sense. Consider (35), with prepared 
as an adjective (as distinct from the interpretation of (35) 
as a passive sentence). 
3 5 .  the patient was prepared for the operation 
Given (35) with this particular interpretation, we cannot 
substitute a non-animate NP for the sbbject: *the tumor 
was prepared for the operation. With the adjective prepared, 
as with the other psychological predicates, an object-dele- 
tion complement is ruled out. 
3 6 .  the patient was prepared for the doctor to operate 
on him 
*the patient was prepared for the doctor to operate 
on 
Finally, the nominalization readiness has only a psycho- 
logical reading. 
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3 7 .  the readiness of the patient for the operation was 
astounding 
*the readiness of the cadaver for the operation was 
astounding 
the patient's readiness for the operation was a- 
stounding 
*the cadaver's readiness for the operation was 
astounding 
As we would predict, the noun readiness cannot take object- 
deletion complements. 
38. the readiness of the patient for the doctor to op- 
erate on him was astounding 
*th& readiness of the patient for the doctor to op- 
erate on was astounding 
the patient's readiness for the doctor to operate 
on him was astounding 
*the patient's readiness for the doctor to operate 
on was astounding 
For a final illustration, let us consider some facts-: 
about the verb send. In ( 3 9 ) ,  the - to-phrase can be inter&- 
preted either as a dative phrase or a directional phrase. 
39. John sent Fido to the librarian 
On the dative-phrase reading, (39) is equivalent to, - John 
sent the librarian Fido. Now, if an objective phrase is ad- 
ded to (39), the - to-phrase is unambiguously interpreted as 
a directional phrase. 
40. a. John sent Fido to the librarian for his books 
, b. *John sent the librarian Fido for his books 
(40a) is unambiguous, the impossibility of a dative-phrase 
interpretation being reflected in the ungrammaticality of 
(40b). (40b), however, may be grammatical if - for is taken 
to mean ?in exdhange for". 
Consider (41) : 
41. a. John sent his son to the librarian for an 
assistant 
b. John sent the librarian his son for an 
assistant 
The - for-phrase of (41a) is interpretable either as a purpose 
phrase or as an objective phrase. On the purpose phrase 
reading, there is a functional relation between the Theme, 
his son, and the - for-phrase. On the objective-phrase read- 
ing, there seems to be in this case an intentional relation 
between the Theme and the - for-phrase; the son is to seek out 
an assistant. The objective-phrase interpretation of the 
-phrase correlates with the directional-phrase interpreta- 
tion of the - to-phrase. Thus, if the - to-phrase is unambigu- 
ously directional, as in, John sent his son to Boston for an 
assistant, the - for-phrase is unambiguously an objective . - +  
phrase. With a dative-phrase interpretation of the - to- 
phrase, only a purpose-phrase interpretation of the - for- 
phrase is possible. In (41b), where the librarian can be 
only a dative, the - for-phrase is understood only as a pur- 
pose phrase. Observe, incidentally, that the dative phrase 
blocks not only an intentional relation bekween the Theme 
and the objective phrase; other Theme-objective-for- 
phrase relations are blocked as well: John sent the papers 
to Bill for approval, *John sent Bill the papers for approval. 
(The latter sentence is good only if the - for-phrase is 
taken as a rationale phrase, equivalent to, for approval, 
John sent Bill the papers. ) 
Observe the aonsequences for infinitival - for-phrases. 
Take examples of objective clauses, such as 
42. a. John sent his son to the librarian to get some 
help 
b. John sent his son to the librarian to be 
properly trained 
If we force a dative interpretation, the sentences are 
ungrammatical: 
43. a. *John sent the librarian his son to get some 
help 
b. *John sent the librarian his son to be proper- 
ly trained 
(These sentences, particulargy (43a), would be acceptable on 
rationale-phrase interpretations. One might even stretch 
things and say that the sentences are acceptable on pug-_ 
pose-clause interpretations. (43a), for example, might be 
improved as follows: John sent the librarian his son to 
get some help for her, implying that the librarian was in 
need of someone to get some help for her. But clearly, the 
sentences of (43) are at best awkward on such interpreta- 
tions. ) 
On the other hand, if we force a directional phrase 
interpretation, a purpose-clause complement is impossible-* 
44. a. John sent Rover to Bill for his children to play 
with 
b. John sent Bill Rover for his children to play 
with 
c. *John sent Rover to Boston for the children there 
to play with 
(44a) is acceptable, if to Bill is understood as a dative 
phrase; (44c) seems ungrammatical to me, as we would expect, 
although the judgment is somewhat delicate. 
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These examples serve as a further illustration of the 
dependency of the control rule effecting complement object 
deletion or interpretation on the proper semantic relation 
obtaining between the antecedent NP and the phrase con- 
taining the NP to be deleted or--interpreted. In (44a) , 
Rover can control the complement object because the inter- 
pretability of the - to-phrase as a dative phrase allows for 
a functional relation between Rover and the infinitival - for- 
phrase. In (44c), there is no functional relation between 
Rover and the infinitival - for-phrase, and the control rule 
is blocked. 
To sum up, we have examined the relevance of particular 
semantic relations between Themes of sentences and - for- 
phrase complements to the operation of an interesting kind 
of control rule which interprets or deletes NP's in certain 
types of infinitive complements under identity with the NP's 
serving as Themes of the matrix clauses in which the comple- 
ments are embedded. The rule operates in purpose clauses 
and in infinitive complements to predicates like ready (on 
a non-psychological interpretation). It effects the dele-: 
tion or interpretation of either a complement subject or a 
complement object. In the last chapter, we will speculate 
on the nature of this rule. 
4. Chapter summary. 
In the first section of the chapter, we gave evidence 
that the clause types described in Chapter I are infinitival 
for-phrases. That is, they are generated in deep structure 
- 
as sentential objects of the preposition - for. In the next 
section, we pointed out certain kinds of semantic relations 
that obtain between Themes of sentences and for-phrase corn- 
- 
plements generated inside the VP. The discussion of that 
section did little more than to point out the existence 
of such semantic relations and was by no means intended 
as a definitive analysis of them. In the third section, 
the relevance of these semantic relations to the analysis 
of control phenomena was noted. Here, we made use of the 
analysis of purpose and objective clauses as infinitival 
for-phrases. We pointed out that the "Theme-orientation'' of 
- 
certain kinds of - for-phrase complements somehow accounts for 
the fact that the matrix Theme functions as a complement KP 
controller with respect to both objective clauses and pur- 
pose-clauses. We then discussed how the availability of 
particular semantic relations between Theme-NP's and for- 
-
phrase complements governs the applicability of a control 
rule which deletes or interprets complement NP's generated 
in various syntactic positions. 
APPENDIX A 
A DIFFERENT KIND OF NP-FOR-PHRASE RELATION 
 
Another kind of NP-for-phrase relation is discern- 
 
ible in examples like the following: 
1. I asked Marie for an invitation 
2. we screamed to Nixon for an end to the bombing 
3. she begged the committee for a ruling on the 
matter 
The underlined NP's are understood to have a role of re- 
sponsibility with respect to the implementation of the 
objective characterized by the for-phrase. 
- 
Jackendoff (1972: 34ff.) considers some similar ex- 
amples and proposes a theory of secondary thematic relations 
to account for the relevant semantic relations. He consi- 
ders sentences in which the objects of for are conc~ete 
-
objects, as in 
4. Bill asked Alice for a pencil 
5. Joe begged Pete for a duckling 
(These sentences are not taken from Jackendoff.) Modeling 
our analysis of such examples on Jackendoff's, we would break 
down the meanings of (4) and (5) into composite transactions: 
In ( 4 ) ,  we would have a transfer of information (a request) 
from Bill to Alice. Thus, - ask would be said to mark its 
subject (in this case, Bill) as Source and its indirect 
object (in this case, Alice) as Goal. On Jackendoff's 
analysis, there is a secondary transaction, with the pencil 
being transferred from Alice to Bill. Accordingly, the 
for-phrase is marked as Secondary Theme; Alice is marked 
- 
as Secondary Source; and - Bill is marked as Secondary Goal. 
An analogous analysis would be given for (5). 
In actual fact, there is nothing in the sentence which 
implies a secondary transfer. Suppose, for example, that 
Alice and Pete are magicians who have mastered the art of 
pulling objects out of thin air. They ask people in the 
audience what objects they would like to see appear. (4) 
and (5) would certainly be appropriate to such situations, 
and there would be no implication of a possessional trans- 
fer of the pencil or the duckling. It is, however, implicit, 
that Alice and Pete-.are responsible for responding to the 
requests that the - for-phrases embody. 
Many examples that Jackendoff's analysis is supposed 
to account for fall the same way, suggesting that his anal- 
ysis reads factual assumptions about the world into semantic 
descriptions. To take another example, Jackendoff intro- 
duces his discussion of secondary thematic relations with a 
consideration of the following sentence: 
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6. Esau traded his birthright to Jacob for a mess of 
pottage 
He maintains that there is a primary transfer of Esau's 
birthright from Esau (Source) to Jacob (Goal) and a secon- 
dary transfer of a mess of pottage from Jacob (Secondary 
Source) to Esau (Secondary Goal). But this account is incor- 
rect. For example, it is not at all necessary to assume 
that Jacob gives the mess of pottage to Esau. To appreciate 
this, consider the fo&lowing modification of ( 6 ) .  
7. Esau traded his birthright to Jacob for a modicum 
of self-respect 
Jacob in (7) has no- active.involvement in Esau's acquiring 
a sense of self-respect. 
In examples like (2) and (3) it does not make sense to 
speak of Nixon and the committee as Secondary Sources, or 
of we and she as Secondary Goals. It makes more sense to 
- -
speak of the - for-phrases as designating objectives of the .* 
subjects of the sentences and to speak of the underlined NP's 
as individuals responsible for the implementation of the 
objectives. 
This is in effect what Jackendoff does in the case of 
infinitival for-phrases with his notion of "assignment of 
- 
responsibility". (However, he does not analyze the infini- 
tive complements as for-phrase and does not consider the 
- 
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similarity between the infinitive and non-infinikkve cases. 
The focus of his discussion is the role of "assignment of 
responsibility" in the identification of the complement sub- 
ject controller.) 
He suggests that when the complement subject is option- 
ally controlled, the selection of a controller should be 
free within the constraints imposed by pronominalization. 
He discusses this hypothesis in relation to the verbs 
scream and shout, which point up the existence of further 
parameters in the determination of the complement subject 
controller. Consider these examples: 
8. *I screamed to go 
9. I screamed to Bill to go 
10. Idscreamed to Bill for Harry to go 
11. I screamed to be allowed to go 
12. I screamed to Bill to be allowed to go 
13. I screamed to Bill for Harry to be allowed to go 
(10) and (13), which have lexically specified complement sub- 
jects, show that the complement subject is not obligatorily 
controlled in the case of scream. This means that, accord- 
ing to Jackendoff's hypothesis, either I or Bill should be 
- 
able to control the complement subject. Notice, however, 
that I cannot control the complement subject in (8) and (9), 
- 
while Bil1:cannot control the complement subject in (12). 
The examples clearly show that the controller in the matrix 
clause is not fixed for the verb scream; yet in (9) and (12), 
there is no ambiguity of control. 
Jackendoff argues that a verb can mark a particular NP 
in the matrix clause as Agent of the infinitive complement. 
When the complement already has an Agent subject, the "ma-- 
trix Agent", as marked by the verb, is understood as the 
indirect Agent of the complement, i.e., as an individual who 
influences the action of the complement temporally or 
causally prior to the efforts of the Agent subject of the 
complement. In (lo), e.g., Bill is understood to be-in a 
position to do something to br,$ng it about that Harry will 
go. In this way, Bill is identifiable as an indirect object. 
If an empty complement subject is Agentive, it is con- 
trolled by the NP marked as matrix Agent by the verb, as in 
( 9 ) .  (To account for the impossibility of (8), it must be 
specified that, for verbs like scream and shout, an Agent 
complement subject can be controlled only by the NP in the 
matrix sentence marked as Agent of the complement by the main 
verb. This is not the case with all verbs: If pay or beg 
- -
is substituted for scream in (8)) the sentence becomes gram- 
matical.) If the Subject of the complement is non-Agentive, 
it cannot be controlled by the matrix Agent, as in (12). 
When we speak of the Agency of the complement subject, we 
do not mean deep Agency (a thematic relation), but the Agency 
I ! ~ l , , . / , , , . , , ,  i " l l  I , , , ,  ,I . I , , ,  
which is attributable to derived subjects. In a sentence 
like (14) 
14. 1 screamed to Bill to be examined by a competent 
physician 
control of the complement subject can go to - Bill, and perhaps 
also to - I. (I personally find it very difficult to get 
clearcut judgments about sentences with scream, including 
examples like (14) and the paradigm (8) - (13) . )  The subject 
of be examined can optionally be interpreted Agentively, 
as in Bill managed/intended to be examined by a competent 
physician. This allows for the case where - Bi1l:is complement 
subject controller in (14). It may also be possible that 
I can control the complement subject in this sentence, tor- 
- 
relating with a non-Agentive interpretation of the complement 
subject. If it is in fact the case that - I cannot control the 
complement subject, then we must stipulate that, in the 
presence of the matrix Agent, the complement subject must be 
interpreted Agentively if it is possible for it to be so 
interpreted. Note that we must say, "in the presence of the 
matrix Agent," because the sentence, I screamed to be exam- 
ined by a competent physician is grammatical, with - I, of 
course, the complement subject controller. 
Verbs of the scream-type take - for-phrase complements. 
If we analyze the infinitive complements in the paradigm 
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(8)-(13) as - for-phrases, we could recast the concept of 
"matrix agent" as a relation between a matrix NP and a - for- 
phrase complement, thereby accommodating examples like 
5 Thus, in both of the sentences below 
15. we screamed to Nixon for an end to the bombing 
16. we screamed to Nixon for the generals to end 
the bombing 
there is the implication that Nixon is assumed to be in a 
position to do something to bring about an end to the bomb- 
ing. 
Compare further the a- and b- sentences of (17-19): 
17.<>a. I asked Marie for an invitation 
b. I asked Marie to invite me to the party 
18. a. she begged the Committee for a ruling on the 
matter 
b. she begged the Committee to be allowed to speak 
her mind 
19. a. they shouted to me - for a pail of water 
b. they shouted to me - to get them a pail of water 
In these examples, the underlined NP's are assumed to be in a 
position to respond to the--requests characterized by the 
for-phrases. 
- 
A P P E N D I X  B 
REMARKS ON EQUI I N  PURPOSE CLAUSES 
Aside from t h e  c o n t r o l - r u l e  d i scussed  i n  t h e  main p a r t  
of t h e  c h a p t e r ,  t h e r e  i s  a  r u l e  of Equi which o p e r a t e s  i n  
purpose c l a u s e s ,  when t h e  ma t r ix  theme c o n t r o l s  a  complement 
o b j e c t .  This  Equi r u l e  o p e r a t e s  i n  example ( 2 ) ,  
1. P e t r  r e n t e d  t h e  planei  f o r  S a s h a + t o  t a k e  - t o  
Moscow 
2 .  P e t r  r e n t e d  t h e  planei  t o  t a k e  t o  Moscow j -j - 
making P e t r  t h e  understood s u b j e c t  of t h e  complement. 
W e  observed e a r l i e r  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a l s o  an Equi r u l e  f o r  
r a t i o n a l e  c l a u s e s  and t h a t  it opera ted  d i f f e r e n t l y  from t h e  
Equi r u l e  f o r  purpose c l a u s e s :  The c o n t r o l l e r  N P  i n  r a t i o n -  
a l e - c l a u s e  Equi i s  always t h e  mat r ix  s u b j e c t ,  whi le  t h e  con- 
t r o l l i n g  NP i n  purpose-clause Equi i s  sometimes t h e  mat r ix  
s u b j e c t ,  sometimes t h e  ma t r ix  i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t .  Compare: 
3 .  P e t r i  r e n t e d  t h e  p lane  - t o  t a k e  it t o  Moscow i 
4 .  P e t r i  r e n t e d  Sasha t h e  p lane  - t o  t a k e  it t o  
Moscow 
5. P e t r i  r en t ed  t h e  p lane  - t o  t a k e  a<* to  MOSCOW 
6 .  P e t r  r en t ed  Sashai t h e  p l ane  - t o  t a k e  $,"to 
Moscow 
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The operation of the complement subject control rule for 
rationale clauses remains unaffected by the introduction of 
the indirect object. (See (3) and ( 4 ) ; )  On the other hand, 
the controller of the subject of the purpose clause shifts 
to the indirect object when it is added. (See ( 5 )  and (6) . )  
In the purpose clause examples above, the complement 
subject is an Agent. Now, in the matrix sentence, there is 
generally some NP which designates the individual responsible 
for the carrying out of the intention characterized by the 
for-phrase. Thus, in a sentence like, John gave the tent to 
- 
Bill for hunting trips, it is understood that Bill makes 
use of the tent in hunting trips. When the Agent-subject of 
a purpose clause is not lexically specified, it is understood 
as coreferential with the matrix NP designating the respon- 
sible individual. This is reminiscent of the matching prin- 
ciple proposed by Higgins in his dissertation. (Higgins 
(1973 : 182-3) ) l5 
Since the Source-Goal transference in the possessional 
sense is essentially a transference of control over the 
Theme, the Goal NP is typically identified as the understood 
complement subject. Thus, consider the following examples: 
7. Bill promised Johni the blue fountain pen - to 
do his homework with 
8. Billi borrowed the blue fountain pen from John - 
to do his homework with 
1 0 1  
9. B i l l  l e n t  t h e  b l u e  f o u n t a i n  pen t o  Johni i 
t o  do h i s  homework w i t h  
Now, t h e  s u b j e c t  o f ' t h e  purpose  c l a u s e  i s  unders tood  t o  be 
e x e r c i s i n g  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  b l u e  f o u n t a i n  pen,  i n  t h a t  t h e  
s u b j e c t  m a n i p u l a t e s  t h e  pen a s  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  w i t h  which he  
does  h i s  homework. The-way t h e  Equi  o p e r a t i o n  works h e r e  i s  
t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  NP which e x e r c i s e s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  f o u n t a i n  
pen i n  t h e  purpose  c l a u s e  ( t h e  complement s u b j e c t )  w i t h  t h e  
UP i n  t h e  m a t r i x  c l a u s e  which i s  u n d e r s t o o d ,  on t h e  b a s i s  of 
t h e  t h e m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s ,  t o  be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  u s e  of 
t h e  f o u n t a i n  pen w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by t h e  purpose  c l a u s e .  When t h e  s u b j e c t  of  t h e  purpose  
c l a u s e  i s  l e x i c a l l y  s p e c i f i e d ,  t h e  m a t r i x  NP i s  unders tood  
a n  a n  i n d i r e c t  Agent:  
10 .  B i l l  borrowed t h e  f o u n t a i n  pen from John f o r  .. 
S a l l y  t o  do  h e r  homework w i t h  
B i l l  i s  a n  i n d i r e c t  Agent i n  ( 1 0 ) ;  he i s  unders tood t o  b r i n g  
it a b o u t  t h a t  S a l l y  c a n  do h e r  homework w i t h  t h e  f o u n t a i n  pen. 
Now l e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  some f u r t h e r  examples:  
11. a .  I s o l d  my f i l e  c a b i n e t  
b.  *I s o l d  my o l d  f i l e  c a b i n e t  t o  keep p e r s o n a l  p a = .  
p e r s  i n  
c .  I s o l d  B i l l  my o l d  f i l e  c a b i n e t  
1 0 2  
11. d .  I s o l d  B i l l  my o l d  f i l e  c a b i n e t  t o  keep per-  
sona l  papers  i n  
( l l b )  i s  o u t  because t h e  ma t r ix  c l a u s e  does n o t  provide an 
N P  which i s  understood t o  e x e r c i s e  c o n t r o l  over t h e  Theme 
wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  purpose c l a u s e .  This  N P  could only  be 
t h e  Goal of - s e l l ,  s i n c e  t h e  a c t  of s e l l i n g  involves  t h e  
r e l i n q u i s h i n g  of c o n t r o l  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  over t h e  so ld  
o b j e c t .  The s i t u a t i o n  i s  remedied i n  ( l l d ) ;  t h e  i n d i r e c t  
o b j e c t  of s e l l  f u n c t i o n s  a s  Goal and i s  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  t h e  
understood complement s u b j e c t .  But t h e r e  i s  a  problem here :  
I f  t h e  Equi r u l e  i s  o p t i o n a l  ( i . e . ,  i f  t h e  purpose c l a u s e  
s u b j e c t  can be l e x i c a l l y  s p e c i f i e d ) ,  we might expect  ( l l b )  
t o  become grammatical i f  we add a  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  purpose 
c l a u s e ,  assuming t h a t  ( l l b )  i s  o u t  f o r  l ack  of a  s u i t a b l e  
c o n t r o l l e r  f o r  t h e  complement s u b j e c t .  This  expec t a t i on ,  
however, i s  n o t  borne o u t :  
1 2 .  *I s o l d  my f i l e  c a b i n e t  f o r  B i l l  t o  keep h i s  
pe r sona l  papers  . i n  
Fu r the r  more, n o t i c e  t h a t  we can have a  l e x i c a l l y  s p e c i f i e d  
s u b j e c t  i n  t h e  purpose c l a u s e  i n  t h e  fol lowing c a s e ,  where 
t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a  ma t r ix  Goal: 
13.  I s o l d  B i l l  my o l d  f i l e  c a b i n e t  f o r  h i s  s e c r e -  
t a r y  t o  keep h i s  pe r sona l  papers  i n  
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Thus, it appears  t h a t  t h e  presence of a  purpose c l a u s e  makes 
o b l i g a t o r y  t h e  presence of an i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t  f o r  s e l l .  
Compare s e l l  w i th  t h e  v e r b  o f f e r ,  which a l s o  has an Agent- 
Source s u b j e c t  and a  Goal i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t .  
1 4 .  a .  *Mary o f f e r e d  her  o l d  h a t  
b. *Mary o f f e r e d  her o l d  h a t  t o  s e l l  
c .  Mary o f f e r e d  u s  he r  o l d  h a t  
d .  Mary o f f e r e d  u s  her  o l d  h a t  t o  s e l l  
(14a) i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  o f f e r ,  l i k e  g i v e ,  r e q u i r e s  an i n d i r e c t  
P
o b j e c t .  Thus, (14b) i s  o u t ,  i t  would appear ,  both because 
o f f e r  has  no i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t  and because t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  
complement has  n o t  s u i t a b l e  c o n t r o l l e r .  The a d d i t i o n  of 
t h e  i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t  u s  i n  (14d) remedies both  t h e s e  d e f e c t s .  
-
Not ice ,  however, t h a t  t h e  fol lowing sen tence  i s  grammatical: 
15.  Mary o f f e r e d  her  o l d  h a t  f o r  t h e  l a d i e s  t o  s e l l  
That i s ,  when o f f e r  t a k e s  a  purpose c l a u s e  complement, t h e  
requirement  of an i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t  i s  suspended; an i n d i r e c t  
o b j e c t  i s  o p t i o n a l :  
1 6 .  Mary o f f e r e d  u s  her  o ld  h a t  f o r  t h e  l a d i e s  t o  
s e l l  
Thus, (14b) is  ungrammatical only  f o r  t h e  l a c k  of a  s u i t a b l e  
c o n t r o l l e r  f o r  t h e  complement s u b j e c t .  This  c o n t r a s t  between 
o f f e r  and s e l l  ho lds ,  a s  we would expec t ,  even i f  t h e  purpose 
phrase  i s  a  n o n - i n f i n i t i v a l  - for -phrase :  
17. a .  Mary o f f e r e d  her  c a r  f o r  t h e  needed t r a n s -  
p o r t a t i o n  
b. Mary o f f e r e d  them her  c a r  f o r  t h e  needed t r a n s -  
p o r t a t i o n  
c .  *Mary s o l d  he r  c a r  f o r  t h e  needed t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
d .  Mary s o l d  them he r  c a r  f o r  t h e  needed t ranspor -  
t a t i o n  
What we f i n d ,  t hen ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  p a t t e r n s  of themat ic  
r e l a t i o n s  work t o  d e f i n e  some ma t r ix  N P  a s  an Agent over t h e  
purpose c l a u s e .  An uncon t ro l l ed  Agent complement s u b j e c t  
i s  matched wi th  t h i s  ma t r ix  Agent, a s  i n  examples ( 7 - 9 )  above. 
I t  appears  t h a t  some ve rbs  l i k e  s e l l  r e q u i r e  t h e  presence 
of a  r e s p o n s i b l e  Agent over  t h e  purpose c l a u s e .  (Con t r a s t  
( I l b )  wi th  ( l l d )  and (17c) wi th  (17d) . )  This  requirement 
i s  independent of t h e  need f o r  a  s u i t a b l e  c o n t r o l l e r  f o r  t h e  
s u b j e c t  of t h e  purpose c l a u s e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  some ve rbs  l i k e  
o f f e r  r e q u i r e  e i t h e r  a  Goal phrase  o r  a  purpose phrase ,  and 
t h e s e  can cooccur.  (Thus, (14a) i s  o u t ,  bu t  (14c) and (15) 
a r e  i n . )  Give does no t  behave l i k e  o f f e r  i n  t h a t  t h e  pres -  
ence of a  purpose phrase  does no t  suspend t h e  requirement  of 
an i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t :  I gave B i l l  my c a r  f o r  Johnny t o  d r i v e ,  
P I  gave my c a r  f o r  Johnny t o  d r i v e .  I t  i s  conceivable  t h a t  
1 0 5  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e s e  two ve rbs  i s  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e -  
ment of  an i n d i r e c t  o b j e c t  i s  a  ma t t e r  of semant ics  f o r  
o f f e r  and a  m a t t e r  of syntax f o r  g ive .  That i s ,  o f f e r  
r e q u i r e s  a  phrase  of a  c e r t a i n  semantic t ype ,  whi le  g i v e  
i s  subca tegor ized  f o r  t h e  o b l i g a t o r y  presence of an i n d i r e c t  
o b j e c t  N P .  
I n  any even t ,  t h e  Equi r u l e  f o r  purpose c l a u s e s  works 
a s  we have desc r ibed  -- matching t h e  uncont ro l led  Agent 
s u b j e c t  of t h e  purpose c l a u s e  w i th  t h e  ma t r ix  Agent of t h e  
purpose c l a u s e  de f ined  on t h e  themat ic  p a t t e r n s  of t h e  
ma t r ix  sen tence .  16 
FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER I1 
1. Notice that in the examples with wait the for-phrase ' - 
and infinitive phrase are ambiguous in identical fashion; 
they each can characterize either the object of the wait 
or the reason or rationale for the act of waiting. Thus, 
consider the parallel ambiguities of we waited patiently 
for a large sum of money and we waited patiently to make 
up for what we had done. The rationale reading is brought 
out if the for-phrase and infinitive phrase are preposed: 
- 
for a large sum of money, we waited patiently; to make up 
for what we had done, we waited patiently. We will be 
considering a number of such parallels in the interpreta- 
tion and syntactic behavior of infinitive phrases and for- 
-
phrases throughout this section. 
2. Recall that we noted in passing in the last chapter that 
when purpose clauses are pseudo-clefted, the preposition 
for shows up in the free relative subject of the pseudo- 
-
cleft sentence: 
i. what Carol bought a rack for was to hang coats 
-
This is clearly evidence for the analysis we are advancing 
in this section. In addition, consider the following facts. 
It has been observed, e.g., by Emonds, that sentential com- 
plements cannot be clefted. Consider the following examples: 
ii. a. John intended for Mary to leave late 
b. *it was for Mary to leave late that John 
intended 
iii. a. Max promised to be a good boy 
b. *it was to be a good boy that Max promised 
iv. a. Julia said that the cops were harrassing her 
b. *it was that the cops were harrassing her that 
Julia said 
However, at least for a significant number of speakers of 
English, purpose clauses and rationale clauses are accept- 
able in focus position in cleft sentences. 
v. a. Sally bought the piano for Todd to practice on 
b. it was for Todd to practice on that Sally 
bought the piano 
vi. a. Sally bought the piano to persuade Todd of her 
affections 
b. it was to persuade Todd of her afEections that 
Sally bought the piano 
If these observations are accepted as correct, a plausible 
explanation for the difference between (ii-iv) and (v-vi) 
might be that the infinitive complements in (v-vi) are under- 
lyingly prepositional phrases and not simply sentential com- 
plements. This explanation works whether we account for the 
facts in (ii-iv) by appealing to ~monds's analysis of 
cleft sentences (Emonds (1970: 113-114; 163-172) ) or to 
Ross's condition blocking structures with internal S nodes 
exhaustively dominated by NP's. 
Objective clauses, incidentally, do not seem accept- 
able in cleft focus position. 
vii. a. John sent Ann to buy herself some new shoes 
b. *it was to buy herself some new shoes that 
John sent Ann 
viii. a. Ann sent John home to take care of the baby 
h. ?it was to take care of the baby that Ann 
sent John home 
But it seems that in general objective for-phrases (which 
- 
will be discussed below) are questionable in cleft focus 
position. 
ix. a. John sent Ann for some new shoes 
b. *it was for some new shoes that John sent Ann 
x. a. Ann sent John home for the baby's bottle 
b. ?it was for the baby's bottle that Ann sent 
John home 
To pursue the matter of clefting just a bit further, 
consider the fact that (vb) and (vib) are ungrammatical if 
for is added at the ends of the sentences: 
-
xi. *it was for Todd to practice on that Sally bought 
the piano for 
xii. *it was to persuade Todd of her affection that 
Sally bought the piano - for 
With - for-phrases, either the object of - for or the entire - for- 
phrase can be clefted: 
xiii. a. Sally bought the piano for Todd's practice 
sessions 
b. it was Todd's practice session'that Sally bought 
the piano for 
c. it was for Todd's practice sessions that Sally 
bought the piano 
xiv. a. Sally bought Todd the piano for her own amuse- 
ment 
b.?it was her own amusement that Sally bought Todd 
the piano for 
-
c. it was for her own amusement that Sally bought 
Todd the piano 
If purpose clauses and rationale clauses are introduced by 
the rule PP -3 P Sf the ungramaticality of (xi-xii) is 
110 
accounted for by the prohibition against clefting sentential 
complements, however this is to be stated. (If Ross's 
formulation is accepted, the phrase structure rule must 
be changed so that an NP dominates the sentential comple- 
ment: (a) PP+ P NP, (b) NP+ S. ) In (xi-xii) , the senten- 
tial objects of - for, rather than the entire - for-phrases, 
have been clefted. 
3. When the - for-phrases and infinitive phrases designate 
the purpose or function of some object, they can be predi- 
cated of that object: 
i. the robot was for entertainment 
ii. the robot was to entertain guests 
(i), notice, is a valid inference from (5 arb) and (ii) a 
valid inference from (4 a, b) . 
4. Notice that the ungrammaticality of (13a) can be reme-. 
died if we add the possessive pronoun its before maximal 
-
effectiveness: 
i. we bought the machine for its maximal effective- 
ness at low temperatures 
But in such a case, the for-phrase is interpreted quite dif- 
- 
ferently: in (i) , rather than designating a resultant 
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quality, the - for-phrase describes a quality-sf the machine 
that motivates its purchase. If we alter (10a) and (lla) 
in the same way, the sentences become ungrammatical: 
ii. *we built the car for its durability at high 
speeds 
iii. *we designed the machine for its maximal effec- 
tiveness at low temperatures. 
Such examples will come up again at a later point. 
5. Observe that these phrases (both the infinitive phrase 
and the - for-phrase), on a rationale interpretation, can be 
interposed between the subject and the verb: 
i. John, to entertain his guests, built a robot 
ii. John, for entertainment, built a robot 
Tanya Reinhart (personal communication) has informed me that 
according to Jackendoff (1972), such facts indicate that 
the phrases are generated as daughters of the S node. (See 
Jackendoff (1972, Chapter Three).) In the syntactic analysis 
of the last chapter, we generated rationale clauses as 
daughters of the node (=PredP). If Jackendoff's analysis 
is correct, our syntactic analysis will have to be according- 
ly revised. However, absolutely nothing in my arguments 
hangs on-this paint. In the last chapter, as here, I have 
wanted only to establish that rationale clauses and - for- 
phrases are generated outside the VP, at some higher level -- 
be it Pred P or S. 
6. See Note 5. 
7. The causal interpretation of the - for-phrase is evident 
in examples like, for no-apparent reason, the plant withered 
away. Motivation, of course, seems intimately connected 
with causality, adding the element of will on the part of 
an agent. The result interpretation of the for-phrase oc- 
curs, as we have seen before, with modals and the condition- 
al predicates. 
Observe, incidentally, that the phrase in order (for x) 
to can introduce infinitives of result only on the root 
-
sense of the modal. Thus, consider the root-epistemic 
ambiguity of the following. 
i. Ben must be quite handsome to attract a girl like 
Mary 
The epistemic interpretation of the modal can be brought out 
if we add a phrase like, as much as he has to the sentence: 
ii. Ben must be quite handsome to attract a girl like 
Mary as much as he has 
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If we add in order to, we disambiguate (i) and make (ii) 
unacceptable: 
iii. Ben must be quite handsome in order-to attract 
a girl like Mary 
iv. *Ben must be quite handsome in order to attract a 
girl like Mary as much as he has 
Must, in (iii), can only have the root sense. 
8. In this sentence, would (in the sense of "be willing1') 
also marks the subject as Agent. 
9. Sentences of the following type seem interesting: 
i. the judges chose the chihuhua for first prize 
This sentence is clearly ambiguous. On one reading, it is 
understood that the chihuhua is being given as a prize, as 
in the chihuahua is first prize, or even, the chihuahua is 
for first prize. On the other reading, it is understood that 
the chihuahua is to be awarded first prize. Somehow, the 
grammar must provide for this ambiguous interpretation of 
the semantic relation between the chihuahua and the - for- 
phrase. Notice that with other verbs, the relation is not 
ambiguous. Consider, e.g., (ii) and (iii) . 
ii. the judges used the chihuahua for first prize 
iii. the judges bought the chihuahua for first prize 
In both of these examples, it is understood that the chihua- 
hua is being given as first prize, and the alternative inter- 
pretation of the relation available for (i) is not possible 
here. Furthermore, a proper theory of semantic relations i 
will have to allow for further nuances such as appear in 
iv. the judges took the chihuahua for first prize 
(iv) is ambiguous; take can be interpreted literally or 
figuratively. On the literal interpretation (cf. the judges 
grabbed the chihuahua for first prize), the relation between 
the chihuahua and the - for-phrase is similar to the relation 
in (ii) and (iii) in that it is understood that the chihuahua 
is intended to be a pkize, but intuitively there are dif- 
ferences. On the figurative interpretation, (iv) can be 
paraphrased roughly as, the judges took the chihuahua to, 
be first prize. (Cf., the judges mistook the chihuahua 
for first prize.) 
10. It is important to say, "on its natural interpretation." 
Notice that there is an unlikely, but perfectly possible, 
interpretation for (11) on which the semantic relation be- 
tween Mary and for dinner is the same as in the sentence, 
Mary is for dinner. On this reading, we would infer that 
the diners are cannibals. On this interpretation of (ll), 
the Theme-for-phrase  relation is the same as in (12); in 
both cases the relation is functional. (See text above.) 
The ambiguity that (11) has is perhaps shown more plaus- 
ibly with the following example: 
i. John brought some chickens home for something 
to eat 
It can be understood either that the chickens are to do the 
eating (cf. the first interpretation of (11)) or that the 
chickens are to be eaten (cf. the functional interpretation 
of (11)). 
11. See Faraci (1973) for a reconsideration of use-con- 
- 
stxuctions. I argue there that the infinitive phrases of 
many of the famous sentences of Lakoff (1968) are to be 
analyzed as purpose - for-phrases. 
Obviously, - for-phrases which serve as predicates 
in copular sentences are not always interpreted as function- 
designating. Benefactive - for-phrases, for example, can 
also be predicative: I built the house for Alex, the house 
is for Alex. Perhaps it will turn out that benefactive and 
purpose - for-phrases share specific features of their inter- 
pretation, that allow them both to be predicative. 
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12. Actually, the possibility is implicit in some of Jacken- 
doff's discussions that semantic relations between certain 
matrix NP1s and the infinitive complement are relevant 
ko3the control problem. He suggests at various points that 
infinitive complements bear thematic relations to the verbs 
that take them, but he does not explore the possible rami- 
fications of this idea. 
Conkider the following passage from his book 
(Jackendoff (1972:215) ) . 
Toward [a theory of the difference between promise 
and - get with respect to complement subject control], 
notice the similarity in the following sets of 
examples. 
(5.136) Joe got to Philadelphia 
Frank got Joe to Philadelphia 
(5.137) Joe got furious at Henry 
Frank got Joe furious at Henry 
(5.138) Joe got to wash the dishes 
Frank got Joe to wash the dishes 
(to7 
(5.139)?Joe kept 
Frank kept Joe in his room 
(5.140) Joe kept at the job 
Frank kept Joe at the job 
(5.141) Joe kept working on the problem 
Frank kept Joe working on the problem 
The interesting thing about these examples is that 
the switching of understood complement subjects in 
(5.138) and (5.141) is exactly parallel to the 
switching of attribution of the adjectives and 
locatives in the rest of the examples. And this 
swit~hing~in turn is exactly parallel to the switch- 
ing of attribution of motion in (5.142). 
(5.142) The ~ o c k  rolled away 
Bill rolled the rock away 
In other words, we appear to be dealing with a mani- 
festation of the system of thematic relations intro- 
duced in Chapter 2. 
In the last sentence, Jackendoff is clearly handwaving. His 
account raises a number of puzzling questions. For example, 
he goes on to assert that the PP of (5.136) and the AP of 
(5.137) bear the thematic relation ,of Goal to - get. In 
(5.139) and (5.140) , the PP's are analyzed as Locatives. 
What bearing does this have on the attribution of adjectives 
and locatives in these sentences? Are we to infer that the 
infinitive complement in (5.138) is a Goal and that the 
participial phrase in (5.141) is a Locative? If so, does 
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t h i s  have any b e a r i n g  on t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  under-  
s t o o d  complement s u b j e c t ?  C e r t a i n l y ,  it would n o t  seem 
p o s s i b l e  t o  have a  v e r b  which i s  l i k e  - g e t  i n  t h a t  t h e  i n f i n i -  
t i v e  complement f u n c t i o n s  as  a  Goal p h r a s e  b u t  u n l i k e  - g e t  
i n  t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  complement i s  n o t  c o n t r o l l e d  by 
t h e  Theme of  t h e  m a t r i x  c l a u s e .  I t  i s  c o n c e i v a b l e ,  t h e n ,  
t h a t  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  complement sub- 
j e c t  c o n t r o l l e r  i s  d e f i n e d  on t h e m a t i c  p a t t e r n s ,  i . e . ,  on 
semant ic  r e l a t i o n s  which a r e  themse lves  d e f i n e d  on t h e m a t i c  
r e l a t i o n s .  The i n t e r p l a y  of  t h e m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e i r  
p a t t e r n s ,  and r u l e s  of a t t r i b u t i o n  and c o n t r o l  i s  never  made 
c l e a r  i n  J a c k e n d o f f ' s  d i s c u s s i o n .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  he  does  
n o t  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  r e l e v a n c e  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  problem 
of  a s s i g n i n g  t h e m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  i n f i n i t i v e  complements. 
13 .  I w i l l  ment ion  h e r e  i n  p a s s i n g  a  f u r t h e r  ambigu i ty .  
The s e h t e n c e ,  t h e  guard  i s  h e r e  f o r  your  p r o t e c t i o n ,  can  
imply e i t h e r  t h a t  t h e  guard  i s  a  p r o t e c t o r  ( f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a -  
t i o n  between Theme and - f o r - p h r a s e )  o r  t h a t  t h e  g u a r d ' s  be ing  
h e r e  e n s u r e s  t h a t  one i s  p r o t e c t e d ,  ana lagous  t o ,  t h e  l i o n  
i s  i n  h i s  cage  f o r  your  p r o t e c t i o n .  The ambigu i ty  i s  s t r u c -  
t u r a l ,  a s  c a n  be  seen  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  f o r - p h r a s e  i s  
- 
p r e p o s a b l e  on t h e  second r e a d i n g :  f o r  your  p r o t e c t i o n ,  t h e  
guard  is h e r e ;  f o r  your  p r o t e c t i o n ,  t h e  l i o n  i s  i n  h i s  cage .  
1 4 .  T h e r e L i s  a  t h i r d  p o s s i b l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f o r  ready,  
d e f i n i n g  some i n h e r e n t  s t a t e  of i t s  s u b j e c t .  ( I n  t h e  
o t h e r  non-psychological  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of ready,  t h e r e  i s  
an imp l i ca t ion  of some kind o f , p r e p a r a t i o n  of t h e  s u b j e c t  
of ready wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  what i s  def ined  by t h e  - for -phrase . )  
I n  t h e s e  k inds  of examples, on ly  complement s u b j e c t  con- 
t r o l  i s  p o s s i b l e .  Relevant examples a r e ,  t h e  f lowers  a r e  
ready t o  bloom, her  t e e t h  a r e  r e a d y f o r  a  c l e a n i n g ,  t h e  tumor 
i s  ready t o  be opera ted  on, t h e  soup i s  ready t o  be served.  
Note t h a t  t h e  l a s t  two examples a r e  ambiguous; a s i d e  from 
t h e i r  " i n h e r e n t  s t a t e "  r ead ings ,  they  a r e  a l s o  i n t e r p r e t -  
a b l e  a s  p a s s i v e  v e r s i o n s  o f ,  t h e  tumor i s  ready t o  o p e r a t e  
on and t h e  soup i s  ready t o  s e r v e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  There a r e  
-
f u r t h e r  examples l i k e ,  John i s  ready t o  q u i t  h i s  job, which, 
a s i d e  from t h e  psychologica l -pred ica te  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  d i s -  
cussed i n  t h e  t e x t ,  have another  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which i s  
brought o u t  i n  conkexts  l i k e ,  John g o t  s o  angry a t  h i s  boss 
t h a t  he was ready t o  q u i t  h i s  job. Here, ready means a. 
roughly,  "on t h e  verge  of do ing . . . " .  
15 ,  I t  has been observed Ie .g . ,  Jackendoff (1972) and Higgins 
(1973) )  t h a t  t h e  understood s u b j e c t  of t h e  complement of a  
nomina l iza t ion  must be determined on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  thema- 
t i c  p a t t e r n s  i n  t h e  sen tence .  Thus, cons ider  t h e  sen tences  
below (Jackendoff  (1972: 2183; Higgins (1973: 1 8 2 ) ) .  
i. Mary gave Alex permission to go 
ii. l~lary gave Alex a promise to go 
Here, the underlined nominalizations function as Themes. 
In (i), the understood complement subject is Alex, the Goal, 
while in (ii), the understood complement subject is - Mary,
the Source. As is well known, the subject of the complement 
of permit is controlled by the Goal of permit, and the sub- 
ject of the complement of promise is controlled by the 
Source of promise. What appears to be needed, then, to 
correctly account for the control relationships in (i),and 
(ii) is a way of matdhing up thematic relations within the 
nominalizations with thematic relations in the sentence. 
Higgins (1973: 182-3) formulates the needed matching 
principde as follows: "To each of the understood noun 
phrases of the noun phrase whose head is the nominalization 
there must correspond a noun phrase in the sentence which 
bears the same thematic relation to the verb as that noun 
phrase bears to the nominalization." By this principle, the 
complement subject in (i), which bears the thematic relation 
of Goal to permission is correctly matched with Alex, which 
bears the thematic relation of Goal to give. Similarly for 
(ii), the complement subject, which bears the thematic rela- 
tion of Source to promise, is matched up with Mary, which 
bears the thematic relation of Source to give. 
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In examples (8) and (9) in the text above, the mani- 
pulator of the delkbed object is matched with the manipula- 
tor of the antecedent of the deleted object. 
16. The control rule for the subject of infinitival rela- 
tive clauses works in essentially the same way as the con- 
trol rule for infinitival purpose clauses. That is, the 
subject NP of the relative clause, which exercises control 
over the NP deleted under identity with the head, is matched 
with the NP exercising control over the whole NP in the 
matrix sentence. Thus, the same principle is at work. 
An incidental interesting fact about the matching 
of themati~.~relations within a nominalization with the thema- 
tic relations of the sentence is that, is some instances, 
there seems to be no single controller of the complement, 
and there is, in fact, some problem in determining what the 
interpretation of the complement subject is. consider, 
e.g=, 
i. permission to leave was transferred from John to 
Bill 
It is unclear what the understood subject of to leave is. 
Observe how this works with respect to reflexivization: 
ii. permission to indulge himself was transferred from 
John to Bill 
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iii. *permission to indulge oneself was transferred 
from John to Bill 
From,: these examplqs, we may conclude that the subject is not 
interpreted as Unspecified. But consider what happens if 
one of the persons in the examples is female: 
iv. *permission to indulge himself was transferred 
from John to Agnes 
v. "permission to indulge himself was transferred 
from Agnes to John 
vi. "permission to indulge herself was transferred 
from John to Agnes 
vii. "permission to indulge herself was transferred 
from Agnes to John 
The sentences are also out if oneself replaces himself/hera 
self. 
CHAPTER 111 
A DIGRESSION ON GERUNDIVE FOR-PHWSES 
- 
1. The prior-posterior distinction. 
Consider now - for-phrases whose objects designate a qual- 
ity or attribute of someone or something. Contrast: 
1. I designed the car for endurance at highA,speeds 
2. I bought the car for its endurance at high speeds 
In both (1) and (2) , the object of for designates an at- 
-
tribute of the car, but there is a crucial difference: 
In (I), the property of have endurance at high speeds is 
a result of the action of designing. This is because design 
designates a creative action; its object is understood as 
being created or constructed by the action. By contrast, 
the cause-effect relationship between the matrix verb and 
the for-phrase is reversed in (1). The buying of the car is 
- 
motivated by its quality of enduring at high speeds. The 
matrix predicate describes a subjective reaction to the at- 
tribute of the car in (2), and the car's endurance at high 
speeds is understood to be semantically prior to the act of 
buying the car. 
In the presence of a motivational for-phrase if the 
- 
kind in ( 2 ) ,  the main verb describes some appropriate re- 
action inspired by the attribute of the object character- 
ized in the for-phrase. This description seems to do for 
- 
cases like (2), where there is a Theme-Goal relationship 
between the object and the subject -- i.e., with verbs 
of volitional acquisition like buy, take, and get and also 
-- -
with verbs of covetous emotions like want, lave, and admire. 
--
But the semantic relationship between the for-phrase and 
- 
the matrix predicate is much more complicated, as can be 
seen If we contrast (2) with 
3. I sold the car for its endurance at high speeds 
In (3), the for-phrase is understood as a facilitating 
- 
factor in the transaction; the speaker is understood to be 
using the car's attribute of endiiring at high speeds to 
effect the sale. Nevertheless, in (3), as in (2), the for- 
phrase is understood to be-semantically prior to the matrix 
P" action. 1 
There are some facts which may be taken to indicate a 
structural difference between (1) and (2), although con- 
clusive evidence seems hard to find. We suggested in an 
earlier discussion that resultative for-phrases like the 
- 
one in (1) are sister constituents of the direct object. 
Verbs which take both purpose phrases and resultative phrases, 
like build, cannot have them co-occurii~g: 
4. a. I built this car for the race next Tuesday 
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4. b. I built this car for endurance at high speeds 
c. *I built this car for the race next:Tuesday for 
endurance at high speeds 
*I built this car for endurance at high speeds for 
the race next Tuesday 
This situation is explicable if we assume that verbs like 
build take a - for-phrase which, depending on context, lexi- 
cal content, etc., can have a purpose or resultative inter- 
pretation. Thus, only one - for-phrase complement is possible, 
and its interpretation varies. By contrast, the - for-phrase 
in (2) is compatible with the presence of a purpose phrase, 
the principal restriction being that the purpose phrase must 
precede the motivational phrase: 
5. I bought this car for Sunday drives for its 
endurance at high speeds 
*I bought this car for its endurance at high : 
speeds for Sunday drives 
This restriction indicates (a la Williams) that the motiva- 
tional phrase is generated higher in the matrix tree than 
the purpose phrase. 
The prior-posterior distinction in the semantic rela- 
tionship between - for-phrases and the matrix predicate seems 
to be of some~importance. (See, e.g., Chapter I1 of 
Bresnan (1972) . )  I would like to consider how this distinc- 
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tion interacts with the ability of - for to take an infinitive 
phrase or gerund phrase object in various contexts. 
To start with, we must point out a crucial distinc- 
tion in the interpretation of gerunds. Wasow and Roeper 
(1971) draw the distinction between nominal gerunds, which 
have the internal structure of NP1s, and verbal gerunds, 
which have the internal structure of sentences. (Cp. John's 
hunting of the snark and John's hunting the snark.) They 
correlate obligatory subject control with verbal gerunds and 
absence of subject control with nominal gerunds, and demon- 
strate how this correlation can be explained within the 
lexicalist framework on the basis of the fact that S 1 s  but 
not NP1s have an obligatory subject position. The absence 
of a subject in verbal gerunds can be effected only through 
Equi-NP deletion. (See their paper for discussion.) 
Later on in their paper, Wasow and Roeper (henceforth, 
W & R )  discuss some counter-examples to their hypothesis. 
One interesting class of cases involves yerbal gerunds 
whose missing subjects are not controlled by any NP in the 
matrix sentence. Examples they give are as follows (See 
p. 12 of their paper): 
6. I disapprove of shouting loudly 
7. the law forbids shooting deer 
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Following a suggestion of Postal's, W & R suggest that in 
such examples, the underlying subject of the gerund is the 
generic pronoun - one, which is deleted by an ad hoc transform- 
ation: 
8. I disapprove of one's shouting loudly 
9. the law forbids one's shooting deer 
The - one-deletion rule converts (8) and (9) to (6) and (7) 
respectively. 
It seems to me that there are cases where such a solu- 
tion will not work. Consider examples like the follawing: 
10:-aeqBill talked to the boys about his seeing pink 
elephants after excessive drinking 
b. Bill talked to the boys about their seeing pink 
elephants after excessive drinking 
c. Bill talked to the boys about one's seeing pink 
elephants after excessive drinking 
11. Bill talked to the boys about seeing pink elephants 
after excessive drinking 
The gerunds in (lo), with overt subjects, seem to me to have 
a factive interpretation; they designate actual states of 
affairs (I do not think,however, that they are precisely 
paraphrased by the fact that S construction.) 
Notice now that (11) seems to be three ways ambiguous: 
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t h e  unders tood  s u b j e c t  of t h e  gerund can  be B i l l  o r  theyboys  
o r  n e i t h e r  of t h e s e .  ~ h u s ,  i t  seems t h a t  t h e  unders tood  sub- 
j e c t  of t h e  gerund i n  (11) i s  i d e n t i f i e d  by some r u l e  of 
p r o n o m i n a l i z a t i o n ,  and we can  p o s i t  PRO o r  A a s  t h e  s u b j e c t  
of  t h e  ge rund ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  two r e a d i n g s  where 
t h e  gerund s u b j e c t  i s  c o n t r o l l e d  by one of  t h e  m a t r i x  NP's .  
For  t h e  t h i r d  r e a d i n g ( w i t h  t h e  " u n s p e c i f i e d "  s u b j e c t  r e a d i n g ) ,  
W & R would p o s i t  one a s  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  s u b j e c t  of t h e  ge r -  
-
und, i . e . ,  t h e y  would d e r i v e  (11) on t h i s  t h i r d  r e a d i n g  
il from (10c)  t h r o u g h  t h e  d e l e t i o n  of  one .  
-
Such a  d e r i v a t i o n  i s  dub ious  t o  my mind. (10c)  and 
(11) on t h e  t h i r d  r e a d i n g  a r e  n o t  synonymous. A s  I have 
p1 p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h e  gerund i n  (10c)  h a s  a f a c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
and t h i s  i s  l a c k i n g  i n  (11) on t h e  t h i r d  r e a d i n g ,  where 
t h e  gerund p h r a s e  seems t o  d e s c r i b e  some h y p o t h e t i c a l  exper-  
i e n c e .  Compare, f u r t h e r ,  examples l i k e ,  
12 .  t h e  d o c t o r s  w e r e  unhappy a b o u t  o n e ' s  having g o t t e n  
p r e g n a n t  on t h e i r  p i l l  s o  o f t e n  
13.  t h e  d o c t o r s  w e r e  unhappy a b o u t  hav ihg  g o t t e n  preg-  
n a n t  on t h e i r  p i l l  s o  o f t e n  
The s u b j e c t  of  t h e  gerund i n  (12)  c a n n o t  d e l e t e  t o  g i v e  
(13)  ; (13)  h a s  no g e n e r i c  r e a d i n g  f o r  i t s  s t h j e c t .  The 
s u b j e c t  of  t h e  gerund i s  o b a i g a t o r i l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  
-
L d o c t o r s .  Thus, W & R ' s  t r e a t m e n t  of  t h e s e  counterexamples  
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to their proposals is flawed by-he fact that the distrib- 
utibn of verbal gerunds with one as their subject differs 
from the distribution of verbal gerunds with uncontrolled 
subjects. It is far from clear how to state the context 
in which their rule would be applicable. It is conceiv- 
able that we can impose conditions on the ad hoc - one-dele- 
tion rule to accouht for the discrepancies, but, even so, 
such an analysis fails to take account of the differences 
between the interpretation of the two types of verbal gerunds. 
Consider one further pair of examples: 
14. Jonathan contemplated having only 30 years to live 
in Saudi Arabia 
15. Jonathan contemplated one's having: only 30 years 
to live in Saudi Arabia 
(14) is an ambiguous sentence: On one reading, the subj- 
ject of the gerund is understood to be Jonathan, and it means 
roughly that Jonathan contemplated that he would have only 
30 years to live in Saudi Arabia. On the second reading, 
there is no. controller for the subject of the gerund, and 
we understand that Jonathan is abstractly contemplating the 
hypothetical situation of having only 30 years to live in 
Saudi Arabia. Note that this reading is not equivalent to 
the reading of (15). In (15), Jonathan is contemplating a 
factual situation, viz. that one has only 30 years to live 
in Saudi Arabia. This is quite distinct from the second 
reading of (14). 
It seems to me that a more viable approach to this 
pgoblem is to posit two structurally distinct types of ver- 
bal gerunds. One type, as W & R suggest, is verbal gerunds 
which have the internal structure of sentences. The other 
type is gerunds which have no lexically specified subject and 
no subject controller and a non-factive interpretation, 
and which have the internal structure of VP's. In other 
words, verbal gerunds can have either the structures of S's 
dominated by NP's or the structure of VP's dominated by 
NP's. Of course, the full elaboration of this theory 
would have to account for the distributional differences 
between the two types of gerunds. For example, the permis- 
sibility of the VP-gerunds correlates with certain possibil- 
ities in the interpretation of nominal gerunds. In (16), a 
VP-interpretation of the gerund is allowed, while in (17) it 
is not: 
16. I was thinking about hunting the snark 
17. I was glad about hunting the snark 
In (17), the subject of the gerund is obligatorily under- 
stood as I; in (16), on the other hand, the gerund can op- 
- 
tionally have a subjectless interpretation. Consider now 
the following: 
13 1 
18. I was thinking about the hpnting of the snark 
19. I was glad about the hunting of the snark 
The nominalization in (18) can be understood to desig- 
nate either a hypothetical endeavor or an actual event; 
only the latter interpretation is possible in (19). 
I have raised these issues here because I wish to dis- 
tinguish the interpretation of gerunds as objects of pur- 
pose - for-phrases from their interpretation as objects of 
"upper" motivational - for-phrases. It seems that only nom- 
inal gerunds and VP-verbal gerunds can serve as objects in 
a purpose - for-phrase. Consider the following paradigm: 
20. I bought this knife for the hunting of the snark 
(*with) 
21. I bought this knife for hunting the snark with 
22. I bought this knife for hunting the snakk,, 
23. *I bought this knife for Bill's hunting the snakk 
with 
24. *I bought this knife for Bill's hunting the snark 
25. I bought this knife for Bill's hunting (of the 
snark) (*with) 
(21) and (22) show that verbal gerunds can serve as objects 
to the purpose - for-phrase, with the gerund phrase optional- 
ly being a semantically open expression; both (21) and (22) 
are good. This shows gerund phrases to,be different from 
infinitive phrases as objects of a purpose - for-phrase, since 
infinitive phrases must, in these circumstances, be open 
sentences. 2 
(23) and (24) show that gerund phrases with specified 
subjects cannot serve as objects of a purpose phrase inde- 
pendently of the question of open sentences. (This fact 
will be brought up again in the next chapter.) I suggest 
that the anomaly of these examples is a result of the incom- 
patibility of the factive element in the interpretation of 
sentential gerunds with the intentional meaning of the - for- 
phrase. Non-sentential verbal gerunds (i.e., VP-verbal 
gerunds), which lack this factive element in their inter- 
pretation, are not in conflict with the intentional meaning 
of the - for-phrase and, hence, can serve as objects of the 
purpose phrase. ~ominal gerunds are compatible objects of 
purpose phrases, but, as (20) and (25) show, they cannot 
be interpreted as open expressions. 
Now, when a for-phrase is associated with a matrix 
- 
predicate which describes a reaction to a purpose or thing 
such that the for-phrqse designates the reason for the re- 
- 
action, a gerund phrase is a possible object of for, but 
-
an infinitive-:phrase is not. Consider, e.g., the verbs 
blame and admire and the adjective proud: 
26. Bill blamed John for leaving the garden unattended 
Bill admired John for having courage in the face 
of doom 
Bill was proud of John for rebelling against the 
Establishment 
*Bill blamed John to leave the garden unattended 
*Bill admired John -to have courage in the face of 
doom 
*Bill was proud of John to rebel against the Estab- 
lishment 
The - for-phrases in (26) are understoad as semantically prior 
to the matrix predicates: John's blaming Bill is predicated 
on the garden's having been left unattended; Bill's admira- 
tion for John is based on John's show of courage; Bill's 
pride in John is based on John's rebellion. This is what I 
mean by calling these predicates reactive; the cause-effect 
chain leads from the for-phrase to the matrix predicate. 
- 
Notice that the gerunds here are interpreted as describing 
actual states of affairs and that the gerund subjects are 
controlled by the objects of the matrix predicates. Their 
interpretation is, thus, substantially different from the 
interpretation of the gerund objects of purpose phrases. 
As the*-examples of (27) indicate, infinitive phrases are 
unacceptable in this context; in characterizing motivations 
for what goes on in the matrix predicate, infinitive phrases 
. . . I 8 '  Ill1 I , 4 7 ' 1  . , I < l 8 , .  8 I "  .I 1 i l l  I . - , I 
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can only represent intentions and are understood as seman- 
tically posterior to the matrix predicate. In other words 
the cause-effect chain proceeds in the opposite direction, 
from the matrix predicate to the - for-phrase. Thus, in a 
sentence like 
28. Bill blamed John for leaving the garden unattended 
to throw any suspicion off himself 
both - for-phrases represent, in some sense, motivations for 
the action of blaming, but whereas the act of blaming John 
is predicated on the garden being left unattended, the re- 
moval of suspicion from Bill is predicated on the act of 
blaming. Thus, the first - for-phrase is semantically prior 
tothe act of blaming, while the act of blaming is in turn 
prior to the second - for-phrase (i.e., the rationale clause). 
Put another way, the - fpr-phrase complement to a reactive 
predicate like blame is interpreted as motivational and non- 
intentional, actualized; it repreGents an actual event or 
state of affairs. This precludes infinitive phrases as 
objects of such phrases, because of their intentional, 
non-actualized interpretation. 
There are some cases, however, in which an infinitive 
phrase can have a non-intentional, actualized interpreta- 
tion, as in 
29. I am glad to be feeling well again 
30. I am proud to present you with this award 
In these examples, the infintive phrase represents the 
"Goal" of the reaction, much as John is the "Goal" of the 
reaction in the examples of (26). The infinitive phrases 
in (29) and (30) arc motivational, in the sense that they 
respresent the situations that call forth the emotional 
reaction of gladness or pride. Bresnan (1972~79) cites 
some further cases where both gerund for-phrases and infini- 
- 
tive phrases have non-intentional interpretations and are 
understood as motivations for moral judgments. However, 
in most of these cases, as in (29) and (SO), it is un- 
likely that the infinitive phrases are objects of the prep- 
osition for: 
-
31. I am glad of/*for that 
32. I am proud of/*for that 
In general, infinitive phrase objects of for have a non- 
-
actualized, intentional interpretation, and are understood 
as semantically posterior to the matrix predicate. Gerund 
phrase objects of fdr have an actualized interpretation and 
-
are understood as semantically prior to the matrix predicate. 
Thus, the distributions of infinitive phrases and gerund 
phrases as objects of for seem to be nearly complementary, 
-
with the exception of the non-factive gerunds which can 
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occur as objects of purpose - for-phrases as well as infini- 
tives. 3 
We have seen that sentential gerunds, which are fac- 
tive as object of - for4, are unacceptable as objects of 
purpose - for-phrases. They are, likewise, unacceptable as 
objects of objective phrases and of the - for-phrase com- 
plements of psychological predicates, which have an inten- 
tional interpretation: 
33. Jon sent Fred to get his books 
*John sent Fred for getting his books 
34. Jim was eager to see his first snowstorm 
*Jim was eager for seeing his first snowstorm 
35. Amanda was anxious to get away 
*Amanda was anxious for getting away 
One further demonstration of the differences in the 
interpretation ~f infinitives and gerunds as objects t~ 
for involves nominals taking for-phrase complements like 
- - 
permission, grant, chance, need, excuse, desire, etc. - Per- 
mission differs from its verb counterpart permit in several 
ways: The nominalization takes no indirect object, while 
the verb does: 
36. permission to leave-.came yesterday 
"permission to/of John to leave came yesterday 
they permitted John to leave yesterday 
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The verb takes a direct object and an optional indirect 
object but no - for-phrase. The nominalization takes only a 
for-phrase and not a direct object: 
- 
37, they permit visits 
they permit John visits 
*they permit (John) for visits 
permission for a visit/*of a visit 
Also, while there is optional control of the subject of an 
infinitive complement to the nominalization permission, the 
subject of an infinitive complement to the verb permit is 
obligatorily contrdlled by the Goal: 
38. they gave the US permission to withdraw 
they gave the US permission for the troops to 
withdraw 
they permitted the US to withdraw 
permitted the US for the troops to withdraw 
The verb excuse also differs crucially from its nominaliza- 
tion excuse. Both take for-phrase complements: an excuse 
for my bad behavior, she excused me for my bad behavior. 
However, the nominalization can take both infinittval and 
and gerundive - for-phrase complements while the verb can 
take only gerundive - for-phrase complements: excuse to leave, 
excuse for leaving, *she excused me to leave, she excused me 
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for leaving. Also, the verb can take a simple direct object 
while the nominalization cannot: she excused the error, 
she excused my leaving, *excuse of the error, *excuse of my 
leaving. 
Now, the interpretation of the nominalization is dif- 
ferent when it takes a gerund - for-phrase from when it takes 
an infinitival - for-phrase. The infinitive complement repre- 
sents an intention, and the nominalization excuse to X is 
interpreted, roughly, as some sort of justification that is 
required before the intention can be carried out. On the 
other hand, the gerund phrase represents some already exist- 
ing state of affairs or an action which has already been ac- 
complished, or is in the process of being accomplished. 
Notice, for example, that a nominalization like excuse for 
being tall or excuse for having no checking account is pos- 
sible while *excuse to be tall is not permitted. The latter 
nominalization is excluded because of the intentional meaning 
the infinitive. Intentionality implies volitionality 
and control over an action, and, thus, to be tall does not 
qualify as a proper complement. On the other hand, a 
gerund complement is not interpreted as intentional with 
respect to excuse. Excuse for V-ing means justification for 
something ongoing or something which already is the case. 
There are other aspects of the difference between the 
two. In comparing the phrases John's excuse for leaving and 
John's excuse to leave, note that John is understood as the 
Agent-Source of excuse only in the first case. That is, in 
John's excuse for leaving, John is understood to be providing 
the justification for his actions. In John's excuse to leave, 
John is simply the Goal of excuse; excuse here denotes-- 
some external factor or circumstance which allows John to 
P realize his intention. We can see this difference in com- 
parison of the following sentences: 
39. a. John's excuse for leaving wasn't exactly bril- 
liant 
b. *John's excuse to leave wasn't exactly brilliant 
c. John's excuse to leave came when his wife phoned 
The difference between the examples of (39a) and (39b) is 
analogous to the difference between: 
40. a. John's attempt wasn't exactly brilliant 
b. *John's death wasn't exactly brilliant 
In this contexk, only a nominalization with an agent sub- 
ject is possible. ~otice, in addition, that excuse here 
must be interpreted as a communicable product of John's 
efforts. Compare: 
41. John gave the hostehs an excuse for leaving early 
the candidate gave his committee an attempt to 
solve the mind-body problem as a dissertation 
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41. *the general gave ~ i x o n  an attack on a Vietnamese 
village as a justification for his promotion 
The phrase an attack on a Vietnamese village cannot be 
interpreted as a communicable product, and the last sen- 
tence of (41) is excluded. 
Consider now the difference between the follawing: 
42. I gave the hostess an excuse for leaving the 
party 
43. I gave the hostess an excuse to leave the party 
The subject of leave in (42) is - I, while the subject of 
leave in (43) is the hostegs. Thus, excuse with a gerund 
for-phrase marks its Agent-Source as controller of the gerund 
- 
subject, and this is matched with the Agent-Source of the 
matrix sentence by Higgin's matching principle. On the 
other hand, excuse with an infinitival for-phrase complement 
- 
marks its Goal NP as controller of the complement subject, 
and this is matched with the Goal NP of the matrix sentence. 
In this way, the difference between (42) and (43) seems 
parallel to thekrdifference between (44) and (45) : 
44. I gave the hostess a promise to leave the party 
45. I gave the hostess permission to leave the party 
The parallel is far from exact, however, because (42) is 
actually ambiguous: there is a reading on which the subject 
of leave is understood to be the hostess; this is brought 
out more clearly in sentences like 
46. My presence gave the hpstess an excuse for leav- 
ing the party 
I (my presence) gave the hostess an excuse for 
ordering me off the premises 
It seems to me that on this second reading of (42), the 
sentence is paraphrasable by (47a): 
47. a. I gave the hostess a means of excusing herself 
< <  I 
from the .party 
b.*I gave the hostess a means of excusing myself 
from the party 
c. My presence gave the hostess a means of excusing 
herself from the party 
Notice, incidentally, that the sentence I excused myself for 
drinking heavily last night is ambiguous. On one reading, 
it is comparable to I excused John for drinking heavily last 
night, with myself simply replacing John. On the second 
reading, myself is a bound occurrence of the reflexive. 
There is an expression excuse oneself which has properties 
different from the simple verb excuse. Principal among the 
differences is the fact that excuse oneself can take a 
to-phrase: 
- 
48. I excused myself to Mary for drinking heavily 
last night 
*I excused John to Mary for drinking heavily last 
night 
One pair of sentences which further demonstrates the dif- 
ference in the interpretation of the nominalization excuse 
with each of its two possible sentential complements is as 
follows: 
49. my excuse to leave was my wife's telephone call 
my excuse for leaving was my wife's telephone 
call 
Tn the first sentence, my wife's telephone call is understood 
as the factor which allows me to leave; in the second sen- 
tence, it is understood as the substance of the excuse I 
offer for the fact that I am leaving or have left. 
The noun reason is quite similar to excuse, but there 
are interesting differences. Like excuse, reason can take 
either a gerund - for-phrase or an infinitive - for-phrase 
complement: reason to leave the party, reason for leaving the 
party. Unlike excuse, however, the infinitive complement 
-
does not have an intentional interpretation. . Compare, e.g., 
reason to have left, *excuse to have left, reason to hate 
Nixon, *excuse to hate Nixon. Nevertheless, the infinitive 
QI complement must represent something which is controllable: 
reason for being tall, *reason to be tall. 
As with excu.se, the gerund phrase is interpreted as 
designating an existing state of affairs, and the phrase 
reason for V-ing is descriptive of an underlying causal 
factor. With an infinitive phrase complement, the head 
noun reason-indicates a causal factor which is semantically 
prior to the instantiation of the infinitive phrase. It 
is interesting to note that reason with an infinitive phrase 
complement differs from excuse in not being able to take a 
definite determiner: 
50. the excuse to leave came when his answering ser- 
vice telephoned 
his excuse to leave was his answering service's 
telephone call 
*the reason to leave came when his answering ser- 
vice telephoned 
*his reason to leave was his answering service's 
telephone call 
Consider now the analogs to ( 4 2 )  and ( 4 3 ) .  
51. I gave the hostess a reason for leaving the party 
52.  I gave the hostess a reason to leave the party 
1 4 4  
A s  w i th  ( 4 3 ) ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  i n f i n i t i v e  phrase  i s  un- 
ambiguously t h e  h o s t e s s .  And, a s  wi th  ( 4 2 ) ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  
of t h e  gerund phrase  i s  e i t h e r  I o r  t h e  h o s t e s s .  However, 
- 
t h e r e  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e :  I n  (511, t h e  mat r ix  p r e d i c a t e  can- 
no t  be an i n t e n t i o n a l  a c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  mat r ix  
s u b j e c t  - I i f  t h e  h o s t e s s  i s  understood as  s u b j e c t  of t h e  
i n f i n i t i v e .  Thus, (53) i s  f i n e :  
53. my presence  gave t h e  h o s t e s s  a  reason f o r  l eav ing  
t h e  p a r t y  
bu t  compare t h e  fo l lowing:  
54 .  B i l l  had t h e  nerve t o  g i v e  t h e  h o s t e s s  an excuse 
f o r  t a k i n g  h i s  l eave  
B i l l  had t h e  nerve t o  g i v e  t h e  h o s t e s s  an excuse 
f o r  t a k i n g  her  l eave  
B i l l  had t h e  nerve t o  g i v e  t h e  h o s t e s s  a reason 
f o r  t a k i n g  h i s  l e a v e  
* B i l l  had t h e  nerve t o  g i v e  t h e  h o s t e s s  a  reason 
f o r  t ak ing  her  l e a v e  
I t h i n k  t h i s  has t o  do wi th  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  an excuse bu t  no t  
a  reason  i s  c o n t r o l l a b l e  i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  
gerund phrase  has t h e  o p t i o n  of applying it: 
55. the hostess has an excuse for leaving, if she wants 
*the hostess has a reason for leaving, if she wants 
Compare the following: 
56. the hostess has a reason to leave,-'if she wants 
to/*it 
the hostess has an excuse to leave if she wants 
to/*it 
In sum, we find that gerund phrases in these contexts are 
interpreted as factive and semantically prior to the nominal 
head; infinitive phrases are interpreted as semantically 
posterior to the nominal head. Some nouns can take comple- 
ments of only one or the other type. Examples of nouns 
taking only gerundive complements are the following: motive 
(motive for murder, motive for murdering someone, *motive to 
murder someone), justification (justification for that act, 
justification for acting that way, *iustification to act that 
way) (cf. I am justified to act that way/*for acting that 
way/ *for that action. The infinitive phrase here is not a 
for-phrase.), apologies (apologies for his bad behavior, 
- 
apologies for behaving so badly, *apologies to behave so 
badly.) Examples of nouns taking only infinitive complements 
are: urge (urge for an ice cream cone, urge to have an ice 
.,. 
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cream cone, *urge for having an ice cream cone), desire 
(desire for that, desire to do that, *desire for doing that) 
and cause (cause for alarm, cause to.cry/*for crying). 
2. Observations on control in higher-generated for-phrases. 
- 
We have discussed before mechanisms by which the sub- 
jects of rationale clauses and lower-generated infinitival 
for-phrases are uniquely determined; the subject. of a 
- 
rationale clause, when not overtly present, is controlled 
by the matrix subject. For clauses of the type discussed 
in Appendix A of the last chapter, the subject is controlled 
by that NP which the main verb designates as Agent of the 
complement, a la Jackendoff. Thus, in examples like 
1. John paid me to waste my time 
the subject of the infinitive phrase is the matrix sub- 
ject John, if the infinitive phrase is interpreted as a 
rationale clause, and me otherwise. Let us compare sub- 
-
ject control for gerundive for-phrases. With verbs like 
- 
blame and admire, the object NP is designated as controller 
of the gerund phrase, i.e., as the NP which is understood 
as representing the individual responsible for the event 
described in the gerund phrase: 
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2 .  I blamed Johni for - letting the cat out of the 
bag 
I admire Johni for - not speaking until he is 
spoken to 
Actually, there are differences between these two verbs. The 
verb admire requires that the - for-phrase complement designate 
something specifically about its object -- some quality or 
action or activity for which the object bears direct respon- 
sibility. With blame, on the other hand, the object can 
have direet or indirect responsibility. Consider: 
3. I admire my parents for an inability to procras- 
tinate 
4. I blame my parents for an inability to procras- 
tinate 
In ( 3 ) ,  we are talking only of an inability on the part of 
parents to procrastinate. In (4), the inability to pro- 
crastinate can be attkibuted either to the parents or to 
the speaker: 
5. I admire my parents for their inability to pro- 
crastinate 
*I admire my parents for my inability to procras- 
tinate 
6. I blame my parents for their inability to procras- 
tinate 
6. I hlame my parents for my inability to procras- 
tinate 
With gerund objects of for, this contrast between admire and 
-
blame is reflected in obligatory vs. optional subject con- 
trol. 
7. I admire Gopali for - daring to question the 
Guru 
?I admire Gopali for hisi dating to question the 
Guru 
*I admire Gopal for Sanchi's daring to question 
the Guru 
*I admire Gopal for daring to question the 
- 
Guru 
8. you can blame Johni for not getting out on 
time 
youi can blame John for not getting out on 
- 
time 
you can blame Johni for hisi not getting out on 
time 
you can blame John for your/Billls not getting out 
on time 
Nevertheless, even with blame, the matrix object is inter- 
preted as Agent of the for-phrase. Thus, when the gerund 
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describes an Agent-controlled action, subject control must 
go to the object of blame. (Compare the scream-cases dis- 
cussed in Chapter 11, Appendix A.) 
9. we blamed Johni for killing the .pig 
*we blamed John for i killing -the pig 
(This is, of course, exclusive of cases like, we blamed John 
for hurting ourselves, which have only the well-known 
"accidental" reading.) 
The verb punish works like the verb admire. The sub- 
ject of the gerund phrase is obligaforily controlled by the 
object of punish. 
10. she punished Maxi for 
- i making a mess 
?she punished Maxi for his making a mess i 
*she punished Max for the dog's making a mess 
The verbs compensate and pay are interesting in that they 
-
allow ambiguous control of the gerund phrase subject. Thus, 
there is a contrast between the case where pay takes a 
-
lower - for-phrase complement, where there is a matrix 
Agent, and the case where pay takes a gerund for-phrase. 
- - 
Consider 
11. Max paid me to waste my time 
Max paid me for wasting my time 
12. Max compensated me for wasting my time 
The control of the complement subject is unambiguously as- 
signed to me - on the lower - for-phrase reading of the first 
sentence of (ll), but in the second sentence, the subject 
of wasting my time can be either Max or me. It is possible 
- -
that the sentence has different structures on each reading, 
but I am not positive about the status of the relevant 
data. If sentences like, Max paid me for fixing his gold 
watch for wasting my time or for wasting my time, Max paid 
me for.fixing his gold watch are grammatical, then we can 
argue that the for-phrase is generated at a higher level in 
the matrix tree in the case where the subject of the gerund 
phrase is understood to be Max. It is qaite possible that 
-
more than two levels of structure will be required to gener- 
ate all the complement types. (See Williams (1971) . ) In 
the case of compensate, the analogous examples do not seem 
grammatical; for-phrases with gerund objects cannot be 
- 
stacked: *Max compensated me for making the cookies for 
wasting my time; *for wasting my time, Max compensated me for 
making the cookies. ) 
Like rationale for-phrases with infinitive objects, 
gerundive - for-phrases can function semantically as comple- 
merits to modals. Compare: 
13. the soldier punished his son for falling asleep 
on guard duty 
14. the soldier had to punish his son for falling 
asleep on guard duty 
The subject of the gerund phrase in (13) is uniquely inter- 
preted as his son, in line with our previous observations. 
However, the complement subject in (14) is ambiguous; it can 
be understood as either the soldier or his son. On the 
reading where the soldier is understood as the subject of 
the gerund phrase, the - for-phrase is interpreted as a 
complement to the modal. The modals which--allow for gerund 
for-phrase complements are those which involve a sense of 
- 
obligation: must, should, ought to, have to. The gerund - for- 
phrase describes what motivates the obligation on the part, 
of the matrix subject. Thus, in (141, falling asleep on 
guard duty incurs an obligation on the part of the soldier 
to punish his son. Observe that - for-phrase complements to 
modals are generated higher in the matrix tree than the - for- 
phrase complement to punish: 
15. the soldier had to punish his son for playing 
hookey for falling asleep on guard duty 
Notice that it is impossible to interpret the first - for- 
phrase as the complement to the modal, which would allow 
the soldier to be understood as the subject of playing 
I-' 
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hookey. Also, when an infinitival - for-phrase is complement 
to the modal, the matrix subject cannot, of course, be the 
controller of the gerund phrase subject of the first - for- 
phrase: 
16. Judge Carswell had to punish the lady witness for 
perjuring herself 
Judge Carswell had to punish the lady witness for 
perjuring himself 
Judge Carswell had to punish the lady witness for 
perjuring herself to stay on the bench 
*Judge Carswell had to punish the lady witness for 
perjuring himself to stay on the bench 
The only way the last sentence of (16) can be grammatical 
is for the infinitive phrase to be interpreted as a rationale 
clause within the gerund phrase. 
Finally, observe that with the verb get, the Goal NP 
-
is interpreted as understood subject of the gerund phrase, 
as in 
17. Bill got the brush for cleaning the room so well 
Bill got Mary the brush for cleaning the room so 
well 
Similarly, with give, buy, etc.: 
- -
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18. B i l l  gave Mary t h e  brush f o r  c l ean ing  h i s  room 
so  w e l l  
B i l l  bought Mary t h e  brush f o r  c l ean ing  h i s  room 
s o  we l l  
Ih ( 1 7 )  and (18)  , t h e  under l ined  NP ' s a r e  t h e  Goals, which 
a r e  understood a s  t h e  s u b j e c t s  of t h e  gerund phrases .  To 
be c l e a r ,  t h e  Goal i s  understood s u b j e c t  of t h e  gerund phrase ,  
when t h e  ma t r ix  p r e d i c a t e  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  rewarding o r  
p u n i t i v e  r e a c t i o n  t o  what i s  descr ibed  i n  t h e  - for -phrase .  
Not ice  t h a t  i n  t h i s  s ense ,  t h e  Agent of - buy, even when it i s  
t h e  ma t r ix  Goal, cannot  c o n t r o l  t h e  gerund phrase  s u b j e c t :  
1 9 .  # B i l l  bought t h e  brush fo r  c l ean ing  h i s  room so  
w e l l  
Compare t h i s  wi th :  
20 .  B i l l  r e ce ived  t h e  brush f o r  c l ean ing  h i s  room so  
w e l l  
where B i l l  i s  Goal bu t  no t  Agent. However, t h e  gerund f o r -  
-
phrase  can be understood a s  t h e  mot iva t ion  f o r  some compensa- 
t o r y  a c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  ma t r ix  Agent, i n  which case  
t h e  ma t r ix  Agent s u b j e c t  does  c o n t r o l  t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  
gerund ph rase ,  a s  i n  
21. Bill gave Mary an ice cream cone for having 
wasted her time the day before 
Bill bought Mary an ice cream cone for having 
wasted her time the day before 
(I think the control is ambiguous in these examples.) The 
verb compensate allows for both construals of the motiva- 
tional phrase (a rewarding for action on the part of the 
matrix Goal or compensation for some debt-incurring action 
on the part of the matrix Agent); hence, control is ambigu- 
ous. Once again, it is possible that the ambiguity of the 
sentences of (21) is structural, but clear evidence seems 
quite hard to find. 
What all this shows is that, in the case of gerund - for- 
phrases, the control of the complement subject is free but 
subject to the influence of various aspects of the inter- 
pretation of the relationship between the - for-phrase and 
the matrix predicate. (At least from this point of view, 
sentences like John hit Bill for stealing grapes (See Note 
5 of the first chapter) present no real problem for Williams' 
analysis. (Williams (1971)) The assignment of control of 
the subject of the gerund phrase works essentially like 
pronominalization, so that we would not expect it to be any 
more sensitive to the relative position of the for-phrase 
and the controlling NP than any other kind of pronominaliza- 
tion. ) 
As far as infinitival rationale clauses are concerned, 
excluding now the case where they are complements to a modal 
or to a conditional predicate, etc., the matrix predicate 
is interpreted as a volitional action on the part of the 
subject; the rationale clause describes the intention of 
that action and is semantically posterior to the matrix 
predicate; hence, the matrix subject is understood as an 
Agent with respect to the rationale clause. Thus, even 
when the matrix predicate is passive, it has to be inter- 
preted as subject to the volition of the matrix subject with 
respect to the intention depicted in the rationale clause: 
22. Sam was arrested in Dallas to make a name for 
himsely . 
Most passive examples are, I think, dubious. (Note, inci- 
dentally, that the possibility of a volitional interpretation 
is an important difference between the construction seem + 
predicate and the construction seem + infinitive; for me, 
the sentence, Sam seemed cool to throw suspicion off himself 
acceptable, while Sam-seemed to be cool to throw:suspi- 
cion off himself is not. 
Compare the two constructions as complements to voli- 
tional verbs like try or appear: Sam tried to seem (*to be) 
Sam appeared to seemp (*to be) cool. 
It is possible, however, to find interesting cases 
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where the subject of the rationale clause is not understood 
to be the matrix subject. In examples like 
23. Kennedy was killed by certain unknown agents to 
prevent curtailment of the CIA's powers 
Tom was put in the driver's seat to confuse the 
police 
the matrix subjects are not understood as Agents, and the 
subject of the rationale clause seems to be the matrix 
predicate itself: 
24. Kennedy's being killed by certain unknown agents 
prevented curtailment of the CIA's powers 
Kennedy's being assasinated by unknown agents 
was to prevent curtailment of the CIA,!s powers 
Tom!s being put in the driver's seat confused the 
police 
Tom's being put in the driver's seat was to con- 
fuse the police 
(The second sentence of (23) has, of course, an objective 
clause-reading which we can ignore.) Further, this kind 
of situation arises also in cases where the rationale 
clause is complement to a modal or a conditional predicate: 
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25. Oswald had to be arrested by the police to prevent 
suspicion from arising in the minds of the people 
it was necessary for Oswald to be arrested by the 
police to prevent suspicion from arising in the 
minds of the people 
These facts need more thorough study. 
FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER I11 
1. All of this is not to mention contrasts like 
i. I bought the car for its bucket seats 
ii; I took the car apart for its bucket seats 
In (i), the bucket seats are understood as the attribute 
of the car that attracted the speaker and prompted the pur- 
chase. There is the possibility of understanding (i) in 
such a way that we infer that the speaker is interested 
only in the bucket seats, not in the whole car, and buys 
the car so that he can have access to them. This brings 
us closer to the way (ii) must be understood; in (ii), 
we understand that the action of taking the car apart is 
aimed at getting the bucket seats. Thus, while the object 
of for in a sentence like (i) can be anything designating 
-
a positive attribute, the motivating attribute in (ii) must 
involve a concrete object. Contrast: 
iii. I bought the car for its bright color 
I bought the car for its smooth and easy ride 
iv. *I took the car apart for its bright color 
*I took the car apart for its smooth and easy ride 
- ~ l l  of this, of course, goes to show that the factors influ- 
r" 
encing the interpretation in all these examples are numes- 
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ous and complicated in th8.way they interrelate and, for the 
most part, not readily subject to formalization. 
2. Relevant judgments are not always clearcut. With a verb 
like buy, I judge semantically closed infinitive phrases as 
-
unacceptable objects of the purpose phrase (i.e., as unaccept- 
able purpose clauses). That is, the rule of deletion or 
interpretation which applies in purpose clauses seems to be 
obligatory. 
i. :I bought this knife to hunt the snark with 
ii. ?I bought this knife to hunt the snark 
When the infinitive phrase has a lexically specified sub- 
ject, the difference seems to me to be sharper: 
iii. I bought this knife for Karin to hunt the snark 
with 
iv. *I bought this knife for Karin to hunt the snark 
(iv) seems to me acceptable only with a rationale clause in- 
terpretation. The matter is complicated by the fact that 
the verb use uniquely accepts infinitive phrases of both 
-
types : 
v. I used this knife to hunt the snark with 
vi. I used this knife to hunt the snark 
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I assume that the infinitive-phrase in (vi) is not strictly 
speaking a purpose clause. (It would be nice if I could 
find a genuine ambiguity in the interpretation of non-clausal 
for-phrase complements to use which would correlate with 
- -
this, but I haven't come up with anything convincing.) 
Note too that when purpose clauses figure in copular sen-- 
tences, the infinitive phrase must be "open": 
vii. this knife is to hunt snarks with 
??this knife is to hunt the snark 
this knife is for Bill to hunt the snark with 
*this knife is for Bill to hunt the snark 
I am inclined to take the most rigid position and claim that 
purpose clauses must be open sentences, which leaves me with 
the task of accounting for the difference between infinitive 
phrase objects and gerund phrase objects. (There is the 
further difference that infinitival purpose clauses can have 
lexically specified objects.) Notice (whether or not this 
has anything to do with the problem at hand) that there are 
a number of additional differences between gerunds and infini- 
tive phrases. Compare, for instance: 
viii. I chose this knife to hunt with 
I chose this knife for hunting with 
I chose this fox to hunt 
??I chose this for hunting 
In these examples, it seems odd for the:object of choose to 
control the ,abject of the gerund phrase, while there is no 
such oddity in the case of the infinitive phrase. Further, 
consider the contrast between ready on its objective (as 
opposed to subjective or psychological) interpretation, and 
ripe: 
ix. the grass is ready for mowing 
the grass is ready to mow 
the grass is ripe for mowing 
*the grass is ripe to mow 
(See Note 14 of the last chapter.) With object-deletion, the 
infinitive phrase seems to carry an implication of some 
external influence on the state of the grass. This is seen 
in the difference between the two ready examples. Ripe, 
precluding such an implication, since it describes an inher- 
ent state, does not allow an infinitive complement. Actual- 
ly, there are further complications, but such data indicate 
that there are subtle differences in the interpretation of 
gerunds and infinitive phrases in these contexts, and these 
may ultimately be seen to prhvide an explanation for the 
contrast between (21) and (22) , on the one hand, and (i) and 
(ii) on the other. 
3. There is an interesting argument to support our struc- 
tural proposal for the gerunds that occur as objects of 
purpose for-phrases. We have seen that the Theme-controlled 
- 
NP in infinitival purpose clauses can be generated in sub- 
ject position as well as object position: 
i. I bought the cati to catch mice with 
- 
ii. I bought the cati 
- i to catch mice 
We have also seen that a Theme-controlled NP can be gener- 
ated in an object position in gerundive purpose phrases, as 
in 
iii. I bought the cati for catching mice with 
- 
Notice, however, that in the following example, the cat is 
not understood as the subject of the gerund: 
iv. I bought the cat for catching mice 
Consider these further examples: 
v. Blind meni use seeing-eye dogs 
- 
to get them- 
selves across the street 
vi. Blind men use seeing-eye dogsi j - i to get them j 
across the street 
vii. Blind men use seeing-eye dogs for getting them- 
selves across the street 
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viii. *Blind meni use seeing-eye dogs for getting themi 
across the street 
The contrast between (vi) and (viii) shows that seeing-eye 
dogs is not the subject of the gerund in (viii). This con- 
trast is explicable if the infinitive phrases are analyzed 
as sentences and the gerund phrases as VPrs: There is no 
possibility of generating a Theme-controlled NP in subject 
position in the gerund phrases because there is no subject 
-
position. 
Note that the reflexive themselves which is coref- 
erential with blind men presents no prablem here. The 
gerund phrase designates an actkvity which is engaged in 
by the NP which exercises control over the object of use, 
-
namely the matrix xubject. Thus, the subject of the sen- 
tence is designated as the Agent of the purpose phrase. In 
the case of purpose infinitives, this serves to determine 
a coreference relationship between the subject of the infini- 
tive-complement and the matrix Agent, but Agent-assignment 
is independent of complement subject interpretation, as we 
see from cases of indirect Agency. By contrast, for (viii) 
to be grammatical, there would have to be an empty subject 
position in the gerund phrase to serve as coreferent of the 
object of use, and the fact that (viii) is not grammatical 
-
shows, therefore, that there simply is no subject position. 
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4. Sentential gerunds do not have a factive interpretation 
in all contexts. In fact, the whole matter of the interpre- 
tation of sentential gerunds is very complicated and needs 
further study. Let me just mention one aspect of the problem 
which I find particularly fascinating. Consider the sentence 
i. Penny talked about quitting her job 
(i) is ambiguous; the gerund can be interpreted as hypo- 
thetical or as descriptive of an actual state of affkirs; 
iile., Penny can either be talking about the possibility or 
the fact of quitting her job, If the gerund has a specified 
subject, only the factive interpretation is possible: 
ii. Penny talked about her/Sallyls quitting her job 
Now consider the following: 
iii. Penny talked to Ray about quitting her job 
iv. Penny talked to Ray about quitting his job 
The gerund in (iii) has either a hypothetical or factive 
interpretation, while the gerund in (iv) has only a hypothe- 
tical interpretation. This is shown if we add a past time 
adverbial or the perfective aspect to bring out the.actua1- 
ized interpretation of the gerund: 
v.  Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray about  q u i t t i n g  her  job 
yes t e rday  
- . Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray about having q u i t  her job 
(yes t e rday )  
v i .  *Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray about q u i t t i n g  h i s  job p e s t e r -  
day 
*Penny t a l k e d ,  t o  Ray about  having q u i t  h i s  job 
yes t e rday  
( O f  course ,  t h e  p e r f e c t i v e  a s p e c t  i s  no t  i n  gene ra l  incompat- 
i b l e  w i th  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  gerund,  a s  
can be seen from examples l i k e ,  Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray about 
having gone t o  c o l l e g e  be fo re  he would be f o r t y .  The ex- 
c l u s i o n  of t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  read ing  wi th  t h e  in t roduc t ion- )of  
t h e  p e r f e c t i v e  a s p e c t  depends on c o n t e x t ,  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
v e r b  a t  t h e  head of t h e  gerund,  and t h e  presence of c e r t a i n  
a d v e r b i a l  m o d i f i e r s . )  Note f u r t h e r  t h a t  a  f a c t i v e  i n t e r p r e -  
t a t i o n  of t h e  gerunds i n  ( v i )  i s  p o s s i b l e  i f  we inc lude  
s p e c i f i e d  s u b j e c t s  f o r  t h e  gerunds:  
v i i .  Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray about h i s  q u i t t i n g  h i s  job 
yes t e rday  
Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray about  h i s  having q u i t  h i s  job 
yes t e rday  
Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray about  t h e i r  q u i t t i n g  t h e i r  
jobs  yes te rday  
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v i i .  Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray a b o u t  t h e i r  having q u i t  
t h e i r  jobs  y e s t e r d a y  
I t  seems t o  b e  t h e  c a s e ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  i n  c o n t e x t s  l i k e  ( v ) ,  
t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  gerund i s  o b l i g a t o r i l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by Penny 
i f  t h e  gerund h a s  a f a c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  On t h e  hypo- 
t h e t i c a l  r e a d i n g  of t h e  ge rund ,  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  gerund sub- 
j e c t  i s  f r e e ,  a s  (iii) and ( i v )  show. I n  f a c t ,  Penny and 
Ray can  " s h a r e "  c o n t r o l  on t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n :  
-
v i i i .  Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray a b o u t  q u i t t i n g  t h e i r  jobs  
( v i i i ) ,  of  c o u r s e ,  does  n o t  have a  £ac t ive -ge rund  i n t e r p r e -  
t a t i o n .  
i x .  *Penny t a l k e d  t o  Ray a b o u t  having q u i t  t h e i r  
jobs  y e s t e r d a y  
There i s  some i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  f a c t s  we have j u s t  noted  
a r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  a  more g e n e r a l  phenomenon. Consider :  
x .  Ramsey C l a r k  t a l k e d  a b o u t  a  t r e k  th rough  t h e  
j u n g l e  t o  Hanoi 
I want t o  f o c u s  a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h i s  sen- 
t e n c e  where t h e  o b j e c t  of  a b o u t  i s  unders tood  a s  d e s c r i p t i v e  
of  a n  a l r e a d y  accompl ished a c t i v i t y .  O n  t h i s  r e a d i n g ,  we 
~ a ~ u n d e r s t a n d  t h e - s e n t e n c e  t o  mean t h a t  Ramsey C l a r k  him- 
s e l f  made t h e  t r e k .  There  is a n o t h e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  on 
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which the object of about reppesents a hypothetical, un- 
realized, intended action which Clark is understood to be 
considering. These interpretations seem parallel to the 
interpretation of (i). Consider now the following: 
xi. Ramsey Clark talked to reporters about a trek 
through the jungle to Hanoi 
On the hypothetical reading of the object of about, Ramsey 
Clark can be understood to be proposing that he himself make 
the trek, or thqt the reporters make the trek, or that he 
and the reporters make the trek. However, on the interpreta- 
tion where the about-phrase object is understood as a fait 
accompli, Ramsey Clark but not the reporters can be under- 
stood to have undertaken the trek. This is again parallel 
to the interpretation of the gerund phrases, as (v) and (vi) 
show. 
Incidentally, in (x) and (xi) on both readings, there 
is also the possibility of interpreting the subject of trek 
as unspecified.  his unspecified~:sub~ect interpretation is 
not possible for the gerund phrases discussed above, and 
this contrast is precisely of the type analyzed by Wasow and 
Roeper in the paper cited above. That is, the possibility 
of the unspecified subject interpretation in (x) and (xi) 
is a function of the optionality of the subject position in 
NP's as opposed to the obligatoriness of the subject position 
in sentential gerunds. We do, however, find sentences like, 
Penny talked (to Qay) about quitting one's job. But notice 
that the interpretation of the gerund in this example is 
distinct from the interpretation of the gerunds in (i), 
( i ,  and (v). The gerund here lacks the element of 
possibility and intentionality khat is characteristic of 
the earlier examples. The sentence can be paraphrased 
roughly as, Penny talked (to Ray) about the business/ the 
matter of quitting one's job. On the Postal-Wasow-Roeper 
theory, we wsuZd derive the sentence from-, Penny talked 
(to Ray) about one('s) quitting one's job. However, as I 
have suggested previously, such a derivation does not seem 
in tune with the semantics of the alleged variants. For 
example, consider the factive element in the interpretation 
of (xii) . 
xii. Penny talked (to Ray) about one's usually quit- 
ting one's job in this place after only three weeks 
*Penny talked about usually quitting one's job in 
this place after only three weeks 
Also, consider contrasts like, John talked about living high 
on the hog, in Amsterdam vs. John'talked about one's living 
-- 
high on the hog in Amsterdam. The subjectless gerunds in 
these cases describe abstraot activities or experiences, 
while the gerunds with one as their subject describe actual 
-
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s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s .  Thus, t h e s e  p a r t i c u l a r  s u b j e c t l e s s  g e r -  
unds a r e  i n  a  c l a s s  by themse lves  and a r e ,  on o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  
v e r b a l  ge runds  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of  VP's. Observe 
t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a s t  between ( x i i )  and ( x i i i )  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t s  
t h i s  a n a l y s i s :  S i n c e  u s u a l l y  i s  a  s e n t e n t i a l  adverb ,  it i s  
prec luded  from t h e  VP-verbal gerund i n  ( x i i i ) .  ( A s  I r e -  
c a l l ,  s i m i l a r  c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  r eached  i n  Wil l iams (1971) .) 
I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  n o t e  t h e  good, s h e  t a l k e d  a b o u t  u s u a l l y  q u i t -  
t i n g  h e r  j o b  a f t e r  a b o u t  o n l y  t h r e e  weeks. 
CHAPTER IV 
REMARKS ON OBJECT DELETION 
1. "Object deletion" and the internal structure of purpose 
clauses. 
There are a number of reasons for analyzing purpose 
infinitives as sentential complements. For examples, we 
have seen that the entire infinitive phrase can serve as the 
postcopular focus constituent in pseudo-cleft and cleft 
sentences: 
1. what he bought the piano for was for Jane to 
practice on 
it was for Jane to practice on that he bought the 
piano 
Furthermore, the infinitive phrase, including the for NP, 
-- 
behaves as a semantic unit. Consider examples like the 
following: 
2. a. he bought the piano more for Jane to practice on 
than for anything else 
b.*these problems were more difficult for the teach- 
ers to invent than for the students to solve 
c. he bought the piano especially for Jane to prac- 
tice on 
2. d. this prdblem was especially difficult for Bill 
to solve 
In (2a), the terms of comparison or contrast are for Jane 
to practice on and ~ - for anything else. This is possible 
because for Jane to practice on is interpretable as a 
semantic unit. Note that this contrasts with (2b): In 
(2b), for the teachers to invent and for the students to , 
solve are not permissable terms of comparison, because 
they are not semantic units. It has been argued by several 
linguists (including Joan Bresnan and Lasnik and Fiengo) 
that the for NP VP sequence in a sentence such as (2b) 
must be analyzed as a dative - for-PP followed by a VP rather 
than as a sentential c~mplement. Since, on this analysis, 
there is no node which dominates the for NP VP sequence 
exclusively, the analysis predicts that it cannot be inter- 
preted as a semantic unit. This contrast also shows up in 
(2c, d) . In (2c) , especially can modify the whole infini- 
tive phrase inclusive of for Jane; otherwise put, the adverb 
especially can modify the entire purpose clause, for Jane to 
practice on. By contrast, in (2d), especially can modify 
either for Bill-70r to solve, but not the sequence including 
both: 
3. this problem was especially difficult for Bill to 
solve -- but not so much for the rest of the class 
3. this problem was especially difficult for Bill 
to solve, though he had very little trouble formu- 
lating it 
*this problem was especially difficult for Bill to 
solve, though not so much for his teacher to formu- 
late 
It appears that an adverb like especially, exclusively, 
principally, particularly, etc., can modify only semantic 
units. If we analyze the for NP VP sequence in the purpose 
clause example (2c) as a sentence, it will clearly function 
as a semahtic unit, allowing the interpretation available 
in (2c) which is not available in (2d), where the for NP VP 
sequence, being analyzed as a PP VP sequence, does not 
function as a semantic unit. 
We can approach this another way. Consider the follow- 
ing : 
4. a. *I built this harpsichord more for Alice to prac- 
tice on than for Bill 
b. these problems were more diffi~ul~t for the 
teachers to solve than for the students 
c. *I built this harpsichord especially for Alice 
to practice on and not so much for Bill 
d. these problems were especially difficult for 
the teachers to solve, but not so much for the 
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4. d. students 
(I use upper case letters to indicate contrastive stress.) 
In (4a) and (4c), the sequence for Alice cannot function as 
a term of contrast, whereas in (4b) and (4d), the se- 
quence for the teachers can. (The judgments are not very 
clearcut.) This contrast is immediately accounted for if 
for c lice is not a constituent while for the teachers is 
analyzed as a PP. For Alice could be either a COMP NP 
- 
sequence or Alice could be the subject of the sentential 
object for. (See below.) Then, only for the teachers 
-
is interpreted as a semantic unit and hence is a permissable 
term of contrast. The oddity of (4a, c) is analagous 
to the oddity of an:example such as 
5. *I wanted more for Bill to come than for Harry 
*I especially hoped for Bill to come, though not 
so much for Harry 
where for Bill is a COMP NP sequence rather than a for-PP. 
- 
Another fact which testifies to the sentence hood of 
purpose clauses is that the subject of the purpose clause 
is one of the possible syntactic positions of the Theme- 
controlled NP, as in 
6. I borrowed Fidoi 
- 
to watch over my children for i 
the afternoon 
Given that purpose clauses are sentential complements, 
there would appear to be an immediate problem for any analy- 
sis that attempts to account for the anaphoric relationship 
in a sentence like (7) in terms of a rule which relates the 
two NP's by deletion or interpretation; i.e., a.rule which 
crucially involves the controlling NP and the variable NP 
inside the purpose clause. 
7. I bought the cari for Sam to drive around in - 
Any such rule would be in clear violation of Chomsky's 
(1973) Specified Subject Condition, since - Sam is the speci- 
fied syntactic subject of the purpose clause. The Speci- 
fied Subject Condition (SSC) is stated in (8): 
8. No rule can involve X I  Y in the structure 
. . . x . . . [ . . . z . . . -wuv . . . 1 . . * 
OQ' 
where Z is the specified subject of WYV 
Noam Chornsky (personal communication) has suggested to 
me that there would be no problem here if the structure of 
the for-phrase in (7) were analyzed as in (9). 
- 
9. I bought the cari:[pp for [ Sam to drive around 
'red 
'red is what Chomsky calls "reduced sentence", which figures 
in the base rules as follows: 
S .-j COMP 
'red 4 N P  AUX VP 
Given thatocin (8) is a cyclic category and that Chomsky's 
analysis assumes that S, rather than Sred is the domain of 
cyclic rules, it follows that the Specified Subject Condi- 
tion does not apply in the case of (7) assuming (9) to be 
the correct structural analysis .'I * 
Following Chomsky's suggestion, we hypothesize that PP 
can have the expansion indicated in (11). 
Rule (11) provides the internal structure of purpose clauses 
and, presumably, of the - for-phrase complements of adjectives 
like ready. 3 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to remarks on 
other constructions that manifest complement object dele- 
tion. We will first consider tough-predicates and then move 
on to an analysis of too and enough constructions. 
-
2, Remarks on tough-class predicates. 
Interest in the tough-predicates began with the problem 
of accounting for the difference between: 
1. John is easy to please 
2. John is eager to please 
John is the understood object of please in (1) but the under- 
stood subject of please in (2). The traditional generative 
analysis posits a movement rule which derives (1) from, 
it is easy to please John by promoting the ~bject Jdhn to 
-
the position of matrix subject. Lasnik-and Fiengo (1973) 
(henceforth L & F), who challenge the traditional movement 
analysis for (I), account for the difference as follows: 
(see their paper fox a summary of the issues): (1) There is 
a rule of Object Deletion (OD) which deletes the objects 
of infinitive complements under identity with some NP in 
the matrix sentence. (2) OD is subject to~the Specified 
Subject Condition -- more specifically, the 'strong' form of 
the condition, according to which the complement subject is 
specified unless it is controlled by the NP containing the 
term X in (8): (3) OD is obligatory in VP complements and 
optional in S complements. ( 4 )  Predicates like easy, hard, 
-- -
etc. take VP complements, a fact of subcategorization. (5) 
Eager takes a sentential complement, and OD, which is 
optional in this case, is prohibited from applying by the SSC. 
Consider the following examples: 
3 .  John is easy for Max to live with 
4. *John is eager for Max to live with 
5 .  John is eager for there to be books about him 
6. *John is easy for there to be books about him 
7 ,  *John is eager for there to be books about 
8. *John is easy for there to be books about 
(3) is grammatical; the complement of - easy is interpreted as 
a PP VP sequence, and OD applies obligatorily into the VP 
complement. (4) is excluded, since eager takes a sentential 
complement, and the application of OD is prohibited by the 
SSC. (5) is perfectly good, with eager taking a sentential 
complement with no application of OD. (6) is excluded, since 
the application of -- There-Insertion requires a sentential an- 
alysis of the comDlement, while easy is subcategorized for 
a (PP) VP complement. (7) is out for the same season as 
( 4 1 ,  and (8) is out both because the subcategorization of 
easy does not allow for a sentential complement and because 
the rule of OD has applied over a specified subject. 
Given the analysis of - for-phrases developed in this the- 
sis, the deviance of (4) and ( 7 )  has an alternative descrip- 
tion. Eager, like other psychological predicates, takes a 
i for-phrase complement. It might therefore seem possible for 
- 
(4) to be generated with the structure shown in ( 9 ) .  
9. John is eager [pp for [ Max to live with PRO] ] 
'red 
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Given such a  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  OD r u l e  would n o t  be blocked by 
t h e  SSC. But r e c a l l  t h a t  we argued i n  Chapter I1 t h a t  t h e  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of t h e  r u l e  e f f e c t i n g  OD i s  s u b j e c t  t o  condi- 
t i o n s  on t h e  semantic r e l a t i o n  between t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  N P  
and t h e  - for -phrase .  I n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of ready and r e l a t e d  
p r e d i c a t e s ,  it was observed t h a t  psychologica l  p r e d i c a t e s  
do no t  mark a  semantic r e l a t i o n  between t h e i r  s u b j e c t s  and 
for -phrase  complements t h a t  c o r r e l a t e s  wi th  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
- 
of OD. Therefore ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  r u l e  i n  ( 9 )  i s  
blocked by semantic c o n d i t i o n s ,  and ( 4 )  i s  o u t .  C l e a r l y ,  
we cannot  a s s i g n  ( 3 )  a s t r u c t u r e  analogous t o  ( 9 ) .  Tough- 
p r e d i c a t e s  do n o t  t a k e  for -phrase  complements. 4 
- 
There i s  a good d e a l  of p l a u s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  
t h e  i n f i n i t i v e  complements t o  tough-pred ica tes  t h a t  have 
miss ing o b j e c t s  a r e  VP's r a t h e r  than  sen tences .  For i n s t a n c e ,  
it has been shown i n  Bresnan (1971) t h a t  t h e  fo l lowing  kind 
of sen tence  i s  ambiguous: 
1 0 .  it would be good f o r  John t o  p lay  wi th  S a l l y  
( 1 0 )  can be bracketed i n  two ways, a s  fo l lows:  
11. a .  it would be good [ f o r  John] [ t o  p lay  wi th  S a l l y ]  
b.  it would be good [ f o r  John t o  p l ay  wi th  S a l l y ]  
I n  ( l l a ) ,  f o r  John i s  a  PP func t ion ing  a s  a  d a t i v e  complement 
t o  - good, whi le  i n  ( l l b ) ,  f o r  John t o  p l ay  wi th  S a l l y  i& a 
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sentential complement. The two possible readings of (10) are 
clearly distinguished in the two possible unextraposed ver- 
sions of that sentence: 
12. a. to play with Sally would be good for John 
b. for John to play with Sally would be good 
As is well known, good is one of the tough-predicates which 
allows a-missing complement object, as in (13). 
13. Sally would be good for John to play with 
- 
But, in this kind of example, the only possible bracketing 
is of the-type where for John is a PP: 
14. a. Sally would be good [for John] [to play with 1 
-
b. *Sally would be good [for John to play with ] 
-
As evidence for this, consider the following: When good 
takes a sentential complement, as in (llb), it can also 
take a for-PP dative complement, as in (15). 
- 
15. it would be good - for the family - for John 
to play with Sally 
Notice, however, that there is no grammatical "missing object" 
version of (15) : 
16. *Sally would be good for the family for John to 
play with , 
- 
The presence of the - for-phrase for the family forces us to 
construe John as the syntactic subject of the infinitfve 
complement; and, under these circumstances, the hypothetical 
object-deletion or object-promotion rule is prohibited from 
applying. 
Further ,.-mote '.&hat,. the object of the - f or-PP dative 
complement of good is restricted to nouns that can be 
animately conceiized. Thus, in a sentence like 
17. it would be good for the chalk to stick to the 
blackboard 
we would normally coqstrue the chalk as the syntactic sub- 
ject of the infinitive phrase: 
18. a. for the chalk to stick to the blackboard would 
be good 
b. *to stick to the blackboard would be good for the 
chalk 
(Compare (18b) withfGto stick to the point would be good for 
John.) Observe now that (19) is odd in exactly the same way 
as (18b). 
19. *the blackboard would be good for the chalk to 
stick to 
- 
This fact shows that, as in (18b), for the chalk is analyzed 
as a dative - for-FP complement in (19). The oddness of 
these examples is due to the fact that the chalk does' not 
satisfy the selectional restrictions on the object of the 
dative for-PP. 
- 
It would be plausible at this point to follow Bresnan 
and suggest that the transformation operates only into VP 
complements and, therefore, that the infinitive phrase in 
(13) is a VP rather than-an S : 
20. Sally would be good ipp  for John1 LVp to play with 
-1 
However, there is clearly at this point an alternative. No- 
tice that our evidence really shows only that when the ob- 
ject of the infinitive complement of a tough-predicate is 
missing, a - for NP sequence appearing after the adjective 
head must be construed as a dative 'for-PP complement rather 
- 
than as a complementizer followed by the syntactic subject 
of the infinitive. One could propose that the infinitive 
phrase to play with in (13) is a~sehtence with a syntacti- 
cally empty subject (interpreted as coreferential with the 
object of the dative for-PP) and formulate the objeet-dele- 
- 
tion or object-promotion rule so that it will block if the 
subject of the infinitive phrase is filled. To illustrate, 
we could formulate OD roughly as follows: 
21. NP Pred (PP) V* (P) NP 
1 2 3 4 5 6 + 1 2 3 4 5 $  
In (21), V*-represents an arbitrarily long string of verbs 
(see Bresnan (19713266, 276) ) . Note that (14b) and (16) 
do not satisfy the structural description of the Yule (21) 
and are consequently excluded. Suppose we analyze (13) as 
follows: 
Sally would be good for John [ S  for PRO 
[VP to play with NP] 1 
Nohice that (22) could satisfy the structural description of 
(211, if we assume that Equi deletes7COMP NP and that it is 
ordered before OD. However, assuming a rule like OD or 
Bresnan's Object Shift (an object-promotion alternative), 
the application of (21) in (22) would still be blocked by 
the strong form of the SSC, because Sally, the antecedent 
of the object of with, does not control the complement sub- 
ject. (Incidentally, the assumption that Equi would apply 
before OD is natural if the complement structure of good is 
dominated by the AP node and the AP node is cyclic.) 
There are certain facts which may indicate that a 
promotion rule rather than>a deletion rule is involved, 
contrary to L & F's claims. On p. 24 of their paper, L & F 
contrast the examples 
23.  a .  *prime numbers a r e  easy  t o  prove E u c l i d ' s  
theorems about 
b. prime numbers a r e  easy  t o  prove theorems 
about  
The c o n t r a s t  between t h e s e  examples i s  supposed t o  i l l u s t r a t e  
t h e  workings of t h e  Spec i f i ed  Sub jec t  Condi t ion:  OD i s  
blocked i n  (23a) because t h e  NP-containing t h e  o b j e c t  t o  be 
d e l e t e d  has a s p e c i f i e d  s u b j e c t ,  Euc l id .  But c l a a r l y  t h i s  
misses  t h e  p o i n t .  Observe t h a t  i n  ( 2 3 b ) ,  prove theorems 
must be analyzed a s  a phrase ,  equ iva l en t  t o  t h e o r i z e .  
2 4 .  prime numbers a r e  easy  to [prove theorems] 
about  
prime numbers a r e  easy  t o  t h e o r i z e  about  
(23b) cannot paraphrase ,  theorems about  prime numbers a r e  ea- 
s y  t o  prove; i . e . ,  it cannot have t h e  s t r u c t u r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  
( 2 5 ) .  
25 .  *prime numbers a r e  easy t o  prove [theorems 
about]  
Note t h a t  i f  w e  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  prove a ve rb  t h a t  cannot form 
a phrase  wi th  theorems, t h e  sen tence  i s  ungrammatical. 
2 6 .  a .  *prime numbers a r e  easy t o  comprehend theorems 
about  
b. theorems about  prime numbers a r e  easy  t o  compre- 
hend 
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Consider further the differences between the a- and b- 
examples of (27) and (28) .. 
27. a. Bill is hard to take pictures of 
b. *Bill is hard to look at pictures of 
28. a. this topic would be difficult to write a book 
about 
b. *this topic would be difficult to read a book 
about 
Take pictures and write a book are taken as phrases in (27a) 
and (28a) respectively, while look at pictures and readba 
book in (27b) and (28b) cannot be taken as phrases. 
29. a. Bill is hard fo.>[take pictures] of 
b. *Bill is hard to look at [pictures of] 
30. a. this topic would be difficult, to [write a 
book] about 
b. *this topic would be difficult to read [a book 
about] 
The data indicate that the rule involved here is subject 
to the A-over-A condition. We would consequently not need 
to appeal to the SSC to account fox the ungrammaticality of 
(23a). This observation would seem to favor a movement 
rule over a deletion rule. For examfple, if, corresponding 
to (29b) , we had the underlying form, 
31. Billi be hard [Vp to look at [Np pictures 
assuming a deletion analysis, the most inclusive NP in- 
side the VP complement to which the rule could apply is 
the object of pictures of. Thus, the A-over-A Condition 
would not block the application of the deletion rule, 
predicting that (29b) should be grammatical. 
On the other hand, on a movement Alternative, the 
underlying form corresponding to (29b) would be (32) . 
32. be hard LVp to look at [Np pictures of 
The most inclusive NP to which the movement rule can apply 
in (32) would be pictures of Bill. Therefore, from (32), 
only (33) would be generated, and (29b) would be excluded. 
33. pictures of Bill are hard to look at 
The evaluation of this argument is complicated by the 
fact that the relevant observations are related to facts 
about the distribution of indefinites like someone, some- 
thing. For example, compare the a- and b-examples of (34) 
and (35). 
I 
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34. a. he was working through (Euclid's) proofs about 
trianales 
b. *he was working through (Euclid's) proofs about 
something 
35. a. he was proving theorems about triangles 
h .  he was proving theorems about something 
The examples indicate that when the about-phrase forms a 
phrase with proofs, the object of about cannot be un- 
stressed indefinite something. Notice that in (35b), 
proving theorems must be a phrase. Compare, *he was memor- 
izing theorems about something. 
A proponent of the deletion alternative for tough-pred- 
icates could argue that the delet@d object is PRO in 
underlying structure and that the distribution of P R O  is tied 
to the distribution of indefinites like someone, something. 
In this case, (31) would be revised to (36). 
36. Bill be hard L V p  to look at [Np pictures of 
P R O ]  I 
The deletion rule would make PRO coreferential with the sub- 
ject of hard and delete it. The ungramaticality of (29b) 
on this alternative would be accounted for in terms of con- 
straints on the distribution of P R O  related to constraints 
on the distribution of indefinites like someone, ~omething.~ 
(See Oehrle (1974) for relevant discussion.) 
Too and enough constructions. 3 -  -
At this point, I would like to turn our attention to 
too and enough constructions, with the aim of attempting to 
determine whether or not the infinitive complements to 
these degree modifiers are sentential. Notice that - too and 
enough are subcategorized for - for-phrase complements. 
1. this music is too slow for modern dancing 
Nixon is too right-wing for my vote 
Fifivwas not good enough for first prize 
he's too short for a Watusi 
the dean considered her- intelligent enough for a 
full scholarship 
This raises the possibility that the infinitive complements 
to these detree modifiers are - for-phrases with reduced sen- 
tential objects. (See rule (11) of section one.) 
Let's consider the nature of the rule effecting object 
"deletion". Consider the following examples. 
2. the statuei was too small 
-i to attract attention 
3. the statuei was too small for anyone to notice - 
It has been proposed that the deletion rule operating in (2) 
is distinct from the one operating in ( 3 ) :  for (22, there 
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would be a rule of Equi-NP deletion deleting the subject of 
the infinitive complement under identity with the subject of 
the matrixxsentence, while for ( 3 ) ,  the object of notice 
would be deleted by a rule df OD, as in the analysis out- 
lined by L & F. The distinctness of the two rules is ob- 
servable from the fact that OD operates only when the de- 
gree modifier modifies a predicative, while the Equi rule is 
indifferent to whether the degree modifier modifies a pred- 
icative, an adverb, or a bare Q like Much. (Cf. Bresnas 
1972). 
4.  the statuei was too obviously obscene - p:to at- 
tract attention 
5. *the statuei was too obviously obscene for anyone 
to take notice of - 
6. Maryi runs too fast 
-- to see what's happening 
around her 
7. *Maryi runs too fast for me to keep up with - 
8. Homer eats too much i -- to lose any weight 
9. *Homeri eats too much for Jim to keep up with - 
Notice that for (5) , (7) , and (9) , if we have full pronouns 
instead of the deletion sites, the sentences are grammatical. 
10. the statuei was too obviously obscene for anyone 
to take notice of iti 
11. Maryi runs too fast for me to keep up with heri 
12. Homeri eats too much for Jim to keep up with himi 
, .r 
Also, with regard to ( 7 ) ,  if fast is an adjective, OD is 
possible: 
13. when it comes to running, Maryi is too - fast for 
me to keep up with 
While these observations are correct as far as they go, the 
facts are actually slightly more complicated. The problem 
is that, in the examples considered above, the subject of the 
AP is the subject of the matrix sentence. In sentences 
where the subject of the AP is a constituent of the VP, ad- 
ditional relevant observations come to light. 
14. Mary made the statuei too small - to attract 
attention 
15. Mary made the statue too small - to attract i 
attention 
16. Mary made the statuei too small for anyone to 
take notice of - 
17. *Maryi made the statue too small for anyone to take 
notice of 
18. Maryi made the statue too small for anyone to no- 
tice heri 
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From (14) and (15), we see that-there are two possibilities 
for the deletion of the complement subject: It can be con- 
trolled either by the subject of the, AP or by the subject of 
the matrix sentence. Further, if OD applies, neither the 
subject of the AP nor the subject of the matrix sentence can 
control the complement subject. In the sentence, 
19. Mary made the statuei too small to notice - 
the subject of the infinitive is unspecified. If OD does not 
apply, the subject of the infinitive can be controlled by 
the matrix subject, as in 
20. Maryi made the statue too small j - to notice it j 
These examples point up a difference between - too and 
enough constructions and tough-predicate constructions: 
only in the former is it possible for the subject ofthe AP 
to control the complement subject. Corresponding to (2) 
and (14), we do not find any sentences like 
21. *the statuei is hard - to attract attention 
*Mary made the statuei hard to attract 
attention 
In accsun4ing for this, we could adopt L & F's suggestion 
that there are two alternative subcategorizations for - too 
and enough. That is, they can take full sentential comple- 
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ments or (PP) ;VP complements. When the complement is sen- 
tential, we have ~complenlent subject deletion, as in (2), 
( 4 ) ,  ( 6 ) ,  ( a ) ,  (14), and (20). When the complement has a 
(PP) VP structure, we get complement object deletion (OD). 
For tough-predicate constructions, only the latter type of 
subcategorization is available. Hence, only OD is possible. 
Now notice that there seems to be a generalization con- 
cerning the deletion of the complement subject and the de- 
letion of the complement object in - too and enough construc- 
tions. We saw above that OD could not apply if - too and 
enough did not modify a predicative. Thus, (22a) is im- 
possible. 
22. a. *Mary made the statuei too slowly for any- 
one tonotice 
- 
b. Mary made the statuei too slowly for any- 
one to notice iti 
But it is significant that the statue is also prohibited 
from controlling the complement subject as well, when - too 
does not modify a predisative. Thus, compare (14) and (15) 
with 
23. *Mary made the statuei too slowly to at- 
tract attention 
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24. Mary made the statue too slowly i -a to attract 
attention 
Quite clearly, then, the subject of the AP can control 
either the subject or the object of the complement of too 
-
and enough. That is, when the infinitive complement is 
part of a predicative expression, the complement subject or 
object is controlled by the NP which is the subject of the 
predicative expression. (22a) and (23) do not work because 
Adverbial Phrases are not predicative. (24) is grammatical 
because there is an Equi rule which assigns control of the 
complement subject to the matrix subject. This Equi rule 
operates when the infinitive complement is not part of the 
predicative expression, as in (15) and (20) . It does not 
operate in (19) because the infinitive phrase of that ex- 
ample is part of the predicative expression. 6 
In the light of these facts, it would seem plausible 
to consider-"an alternative to L & F's proposal. The gen- 
eralization noted between complement subject deletion and 
complement object deletion can be accounted for if it is 
assumed that when the infinitive complement is part of the 
predicative expression, it has the internal structure given 
by rule (11) of the first section. On this analysis, the 
structures of (14) and (16) would be as given in (25) ahd 
(26) , respectively. 
25. Mary made the statuei too small [pp  for [ - 
'red i 
to attract attention]] 
26. Mary made the statuei too small [pp for [ any- 
'red 
one to take notice of - 1 1  
An obligatory rule of pronominalization makes the subject 
of the predicative expression coreferential with the sub- 
ject of the complement in (25), and with the object of the 
complement in (26). Given such an analysis, the applica- 
tion of this rule in (26) would not violate the SSC. 
The two major arguments that L & F adduce against a 
sentential analysis for such complements involve the fact 
that two transformations, Passive and  here-Insertion, 
which operate only on sentences, are prohibited from ap- 
plying to the complements of - too and enough if OD applies. 
Thus, the following examples are ungrammatical: 
27. *John is not famous enough for there to be a book 
about - 
28. *John is too disoriented for the parade to be led 
by - 
It is not at all clear, however, that the unacceptability 
of such examples is due to syntactic violations. For ex- 
ample, as Roger Higgins pointed out to me, examples like the 
first sentence of (27) must be exc3rrded even if There--.-!- 
Insertion does not apply: 
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28. *John is not famous enough for a book to be about 
Or consider pairs like the following: 
29. a. *$his garden is not big enough for there to be 
people in 
b. *this garden is not big enough for people to be 
in 
(29b) is out, even though for people qualifies as a dative 
for-phrase, since its object is animate. 
- 
It seems, in fact, quite likely that sentences like - -  
those in (27)-(29) are to be excluded on semantic grounds. 
Purpose clauses in many cases manifest the same resistance 
to There-Insertion: 
pm " 
30. a. I wrote this play for Kazin to review 
b. *I wrote this play for there to be reviews of 
31. a. I bought this cottage for my guests to stay in 
b. *I bought this cottage for there to be guests in 
Note, however, that certain verbs like pick and choose do 
allow There-Insertion complements: 
32. I chose this play for there to be review of 
I picked this topic for there to be debates - ,  
about 
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Much the same situation holds for Passive. Sentences 
like the following are not acceptable: 
33. "Socrates is intelligent enough for us to be 
convinced by 
*the police are too stupid for Bonnie to be cap- 
tured by 
*this music is too cacaphonous for me to be put 
to sleep by 
However, it is possible to find passive examples of OD corn? 
plements to - too and enough. 
34. this word is too short for the stress to be , '  
place on 
this stuff is not nutritious enough for a baby 
to be weaned on 
Such examples as in (34) seem quite acceptable. 7 
Concerning purpose clauses, there are many cases where 
a passive infinitive complement is not acceptable, depen- 
ding on the matrix verb, the content of the infinitive phrase , 
etc. While (35b) is out, (36b) seems perfect19 )acceptable: 
35. a. we needed Billi 
- i to lead the parade 
b. *we needed Billi for the parade to be led 
by -i 
36 .  a .  w e  chose B i l l i  
-i t o  l ead  t h e  parade 
b. we chose B i l l i  f o r  t h e  parade t o  be l e d  by - 
A s  we saw wi th   here-Insertion, choose imposes fewer r e s t r i c -  
t i o n s  on i t s  purpose c l a u s e  complements than  o t h e r  mat r ix  
ve rbs .  Verbs t h a t  t a k e  purpose c l a u s e  complements impose 
d i f f e r e n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  r o l e  t h a t  t h e  pur- 
pose c l a u s e  can c h a r a c t e r i z e .  For i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  o b j e c t  of 
u se  cannot  c o n t r o l  t h e  o b j e c t  of t h e  complement, bu t  t h e  
-
o b j e c t  of buy can : 
a .  I used t h e s e  g l a s s e s i  t o  read  wi th  - 
b. I bought t h e s e  g l a s s e s  t o  read  wi th  i -i 
38 .  a .  *I used t h i s  noveli  t o  read  
- on t h e  t r a i n  
b. I bought t h i s  noveli  t o  reqd - i on t h e  t r a i n  
I t  seems t o  m e  t h a t  (38a) i s  unacceptab le  simply because it  
i s  no t  proper  t o  speak of a novel  a s  being used i n  t h e  a c t  
of read ing  when it i s  being r ead .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, when 
one r e a d s  wi th  a p a i r  of g l a s s e s ,  it i s  p e r f e c t l y  proper t o  
speak of u s ing  t h e  g l a s s e s  i n  t h e  a c t  of r ead ing .  
Returning f o r  a moment t o  There- Inser t ion ,  n o t i c e  
t h a t   here-Insertion complements a r e  compat ible  wi th  eager  
( t h e  p r e d i c a t e  t h a t  L & F c o n t r a s t  wi th  t h e  tough-pred ica tes )  
bu t  o f t e n  no t  wi th  ready.  Compare: 
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39. a. I am eager for there to be books about me 
b. ?I am ready for there to be books about me 
40. a. I am eager for there to be guests in my home 
b. *I am ready for there to be guests in my home 
The contrasts in (39) and (4) ) do not involve object dele- 
tion at all. Passive complements contrast with ready and 
eager in a similar way: 
41. a. I am eager for John to be arrested by the police 
b. ?I am ready for John to be arrested by the police 
The following, however, seem equally good: 
42. a. I am eager for my film bo be shown on television 
b. I am ready for my film to be shown on television 
Thus it seems clear that There-Insertion and Passive can 
interact in (sometimes subtle) ways with the interpretation 
of the complement to diminish acceptability. It seems 
likely that the violations represented in (27) and (33) 
are of this type. The fact that judgments in this area 
are often so delicate and change with the lexical content 
of the infinitive complement suggests that the violations 
are not of a general structural sort, as L & F's OD anal- 
ysis claims. 
We are led now to consider the question whether there 
are any arguments in favor of analyzing OD complements of 
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t o o  and enough a s  s e n t e n t i a l .  C e r t a i n  f a c t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
-
t h e  f o r  NP sequence of t h e  OD complements of - t o o  and enough 
do no t  behave a s  d a t i v e  - for -PP ' s .  For example i n  tough- 
p r e d i c a t e  c o n s t r u c t i o n s ,  t h e  - for-PP i s  semant ica l ly  a  
d a t i v e  complement and i t s  o b j e c t  NP i s  l i m i t e d  t o  N P ' s  which 
can be animately  conceived.  However, t h e r e  i s  no such r e -  
s t r i c t i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e  of - t o o  and enough. Thus, cons ider  
t h e  fol lowing examples: 
4 3 .  a .  t h e  s u r f a c e  was no t  pDrous enough f o r  t h e  cha lk  
t o  adhere  t o  
b. t h e  s a l t  c r y s t a l s  were t o o  l a r g e  f o r  t h e  water  
t o  break down 
c .  t h e  l i q u i d  was t o o  v i scous  f o r  t h e  sponge t o  
absorb  
4 4 .  a .  * t h e  s u r f a c e  would no t  be easy  f o r  t h e  cha lk  
t o  adhere  t o  
b .  * t h e  s a l b  c r y s t a l s  would be u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  water  
t o  breqk down 
c .  * t h e  l i q u i d  would be dangerous f o r  t h e  sponge t o  
absorb 
N a t u r a l l y ,  f o r  t hose  tough-pred ica tes  which a r e  a l s o  subcat-  
egor ized  f o r  s e n t e n t i a l  i n f i n i t i v e  complements, t h e r e  i s  
no animacy r e s t r i c t i o n  on t h e  complement s u b j e c t  N P :  
45 .  a .  it would be u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  water  t o  break 
down t h e s e  c r y s t a l s  
b.  it would be dangerous f o r  t h e  sponge t o  absorb 
t h i s  l i q u i d  
Furthermore,  i f  t h e  under l ined  N P ' s  i n  ( 4 4 )  a r e  rep laced  by 
animates ,  t h e  sen tences  analogous t o  ( 4 4 )  become gramrna- 
t i d a l ,  and t h e  ones analogous t o  ( 4 5 )  become ambiguous: 
4 6 .  a .  t h i s  s u r f a c e  would no t  be easy  f o r  a f l y  t o  
s t i c k  t o  
b. t h e s e  subs tances  would be u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  l i v e r  
t o  break down 
c. t h i s  chemical  would be dangerous f o r  t h e  c e l l s  
t o  absorb  
4 7 .  a. it would be u s e f u l  f o r  t h e ' l $ v & r ~ t o ' b r e a k  down 
t h e s e  subs tances  
1. t o  break down t h e s e  subs tances  would be use- 
f u l  f o r  t h e  l i v e r  
2 .  f o r  t h e  l i v e r  t o  b ~ e a k  down t h e s e  subs tances  
would be u s e f u l  
b. it would be dangerous f o r  t h e  c e l l s  t o  absorb  
t h i s  chemical 
1. t o  absorb  t h i s  chemical  would be dangerous 
f o r  t h e  c e l l s  
2 .  f o r  t h e  c e l l s  t o  absorb  t h i s  chemical would 
be dangerous 
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Second, as we observed before, contrary to what L & F 
suggest, it is possible to find some examples of passive con- 
structions in OD complements of - too and enough where, 
moreover, the sentences are synonymous with their active 
counterparts. 
48. a. this product is not nutritious enough for a baby 
to be weaned on 
b. this product is not nutritious enough to wean 
a baby on 
49. a. this word is too short for the stress to be 
placed ;on 
b. this word is too short to place the stress on 
Compare these examples with ones like the following. 
50. a. it could be dangerous to wean a baby on this 
product 
b. it could be dangerous for a baby to be weaned 
on this product 
The sentences of(5B) are synonymous only when the complement 
of (50b) is construed as a sentence. If for a baby is 
analyzed as a PP complement, there is a direct implication 
of danger to the baby, which is lacking in (50a). Thus, the 
facts indicate that active/passive synonymy holds only if a 
- 
baby is taken to be the syntactic subject of be weaned on. 
2 0 1  
S ince  t h i s  i s  no t  p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  OD analog t o  ( 5 0 b ) ,  we - 
would p r e d i c t  t h a t  (51b) i s  no t  synonymous wi th  (51a) , t h e  
OD analog t o  (50a ) .  This  p r e d i c t i o n  i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  c o r r e c t .  
51. a .  t h i s  product  could be dangerous t o  wean a baby 
b. t h i s  product  could be dangerous f o r  a baby t o  
be weaned on - 
Since  i n  ( 5 1 b ) ,  f o r  a baby must be cons t rued  a s  a d a t i v e  com- 
plement, we i n f e r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  danger f o r  t h e  baby i t s e l f .  
There i s  no such i n f e r e n c e  from ( 5 1 a ) ,  From t h e s e  consider-  
a t i o n s ,  we conclude t h a t  t h e  a c t i v e / p a s s i v e  synonymy of t h e  
examples i n  ( 4 8 )  and ( 4 9 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  f o r  NP sequences 
are  no t  d a t i v e  complements. 
One f u r t h e r  argument has t o  do wi th  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
uns t r e s sed  i n d e f i n i t e  someone, anyone. Some of t h e  tough- 
p r e d i c a t e s  a r e  a f f e c t i v e ,  i n  Kl ima 's  sense  (Klima ( 1 9 6 4 ) ) ;  
t hey  a l l ow f o r  uns t r e s sed  - any i n  t h e i r  i n f i n i t i v e  comple- 
52. it would be hard t o  f o r c e  anyone t o  come 
it would be hard t o  f o r c e  someone t o  come 
it would be dangerous t o  f o r c e  anyone t o  come 
it would be dangerous t o  f o r c e  someone t o  come 
The sen tences  of (52)  and t h e  sen tences  of (53) a r e  equa l ly  
good, bu t  d i f f e r e n *  i n  meaning. 
These p r e d i c a t e s  do no t  a l low f o r  t h e  presence of anyone 
a s  t h e  o b j e c t  of t h e i r  d a t i v e  - for-PP complements. 
54. a .  it would be hard f o r  someone t o  f o r c e  B i l l  
t o  come 
b. * i t  would be hard f o r  anyone t o  f o r c e  B i l l  t o  
come 
55. a .  it  would be dangerous f o r  someone t o  f o r c e  
B i l l  t o  come 
b. it would be dangerous f o r  anyone t o  f o r c e  B i l l  
t o  come 
Since  hard does no t  t a k e  a s e n t e n t i a l  complement, (54b) i s  
ungrammatical and (54a) i s  unambiguous. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
(55b) i s  accep tab le  i f  anyone i s  taken a s  t h e  s y n t a c t i c  sub- 
j e c t  of t h e  i n f i n i t i v e  ph ra se ,  s i n c e  dangerous can t a k e  
s e n t e n t i a l  camplements. 
56. a .  * f o r  anyone t o  f o r c e  B i l l  t o  come would be hard 
* t o  f o r c e  B i l l  t o  come would be hard f o r  anyone 
b. f o r  anyone t o  f o r c e  B i l l  t o  come would be dan- 
gerous  
* t o  f o r c e  B i l l  t o  come would be dangerous f o r  
anyone 
(55a) seems t o  m e  t o  be ambiguous; someone can be construed 
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as the object of the preposition - for, or as the syntactic 
subject of the infinitive phrase. The distributional pat- 
tern for unstressed someone, anyone is shown in the follow- 
ing examples. 
57. a. it would be .[haPd for someone] to adhere to 
such a diet consistently 
b. +it would be [hard for anyone] to adhere to 
such a diet consistently 
58. a. it would be [dangerous for someone] to contract 
this disease 
b.  it would be [dangerous for anyone] to contract 
this disease*. 
c. it would be dangerous [for someone to contract 
this disease] 
d. it would be dangerous [for anyone to contract 
this disease] 
59. a. this diet would be [hard for someone] to ad- 
here to consistently 
b. *this diet would be [hard for anyone] to ad- 
here to consistently 
60. a. this disease would be [dangerous for someone] 
to contract 
b. *this disease would be [dangerous for anyone] 
to contract 
In conclusion, the relevant observation is that the a£- 
fective tough-prediaates allow for the occurrence of un- 
stressed anyone only within the infinitive complement. In 
particular, anyone in the above examples must be analyzed 
as the syntactic subject of the sentential infinitive comple- 
ment and not as the object of a dative - for-PP. 
Now, sbserve that - too (but not --*. enough) is also affec- 
tive: 
61. a. he's too cheap to carry some/any money 
b. he's smart enough-to carry somej*any money 
Notice that unstressed anyone can occur?, after - for in too- 
-
constructions: 
62. a. the statue was too small for anyone to notice 
b. the problem was too intricate for anyone to 
solve 
c. *the problem was simple enough for anyone to , 
solve 
On the basis of the distributional facts that we have observed 
above, the data of (62) argue that anyone is the syntactic 
subject of the infinitive complement of - too. Notice that 
if we postpose the for NP in such examples, forcing a PP 
analysis, the resulting sentences are ungrammatical. (I do 
not mean to imply that khere is any postposing transformation 
a t  work he re . )  
63 .  a .  * the  s t a t u e  was t o o  smal l  t o  n o t i c e ,  f o r  anyone 
b. * t h e  problem was t o o  i n t r i c a t e  t o  so lve ,  f o r  
anyone 
To make t h e  examples of ( 6 3 )  a ccep tab le ,  we would have t o  add 
another  a f f e c t i v e  element t o  a l l ow f o r  anyone a s  t h e  o b j e c t  
of f o r :  
-
6 4 .  a .  t h e  s t a t u e  wasn ' t  t o o  smal l  t o  n o t i c e , ,  f o r  any- 
one 
b. t h e  problem wasn ' t  t o o  i n t r i c a t e  t o  s o l v e ,  f o r  
anyone 
c .  it was s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  problem was t o o  
i n t r i c a t e  t o  s o l v e ,  f o r  anyone 
I n  conc lus ion ,  t h e  d a t a  examined above seem t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
t o o  can t a k e  a  ( reduced)  s e n t e n t i a l  fo r -phrase  complement 
- - 
when t h e  complement has  a  miss ing o b j e c t .  
FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER IV 
1. I had been assuming that the underlying structure of (7) 
was 
- i. I boaght the cari Lpp for [S Sam to drive around 
in - i I 1  
with the preposition - for being ultimately deleted (see 
Bresnan (1972)). The only reason for this assumption was 
that a full sentence complement appeared to show up in the 
pseudo-cleft sentence, what,I bought the car for was for Sam 
to drive around in. But Chomsky pointed out to me the 
acceptability of sueh a pseudo-cleft sentence as, what I 
bought the car f o ~  was for pleasure trips, - - with a - for- 
phrase in focus position. (Compare, what I bought the car 
for was pleasure trips.) Thus, it would seem possible to 
analyze the infinitive phrase in focus position as a full : 
for-phrase rather than a simple sentential complement. 
- 
Therefore, pseudo-cleft sentences provide no argument against 
the structural analysis in (9). 
2. Gilbert Harman (personal communication) pointed out a 
A possible problem with this suggestion. If a purpose clause 
has the structare-indicated in (9), the application of the 
r u l e  of ~ a c h - I n s e r t i o n  i n t o  purpose c l a u s e s  should no t  be 
- 
blocked. But cons ide r :  
i. a.  John and B i l l  each bought a  few of Sam's books 
f o r  S a l l y  t o  read  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
b. *John-and B i l l  bought a  few of Sam's books f o r  
S a l l y  t o  read  t o  each o t h e r  
C l e a r l y ,  ( i b )  cannot  be de r ived  from ( i a ) .  The ungrammatica- 
l i t y  of (ib) i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  SSC a p p l i e s  t o  movement i n t o  
purpose c l a u s e s  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  ( 9 )  i s  n o t  t h e  c o r r e c t  
s t r u c t u r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of ( 7 ) .  
Th is  argument i s  dubious ,  however. Compare ( i i a )  
and ( i i b )  . 
ii. a .  John a n d . B i l l  each bought a  few of Samrs books 
t o  read  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
b. John, alid B i l l  bought a  few of Sam's books t o  
r ead  t o  each o t h e r  
These two sen tences  a r e  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  i n  meaning, and it 
i s  h igh ly  doub t fu l  t h a t  ( i i b )  i s  de r ived  from ( i i a ) .  I f  
t h i s  is s o  Bach-Inser t ion must be p roh ib i t ed  from applying 
i n t o  purpose c l a u s e s  independent ly  of t h e  SSC. There- 
f o r e ,  t h e  ungrammatical i ty  of ( i b )  does no t  provide ev i -  
dence a g a i n s t  ( 9 )  . 
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3 .  Furthermore,  because of our  obse rva t ions  about gerunds 
i n  Chapter 111, we w i l l  r e q u i ~ e  t h e  r u l e s  
i. PP+P N P  
ii. NP-+VP 
t o  prov ide  t h e  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of gerundive purpose - f o r -
phrases ,  a s  i n  
iii. John bought it Eor.hun$ing sna rks  wi th  
which would be analyzed a s  
i v .  John bought it [pp f o r  [ NP [VP hunting sn3rks  . 
1 .  
with]  1 ] 
4 .  Consider i n  c o n t r a s t  what I w i l l  c a l l  e v a l u a t i v e  predid  
c a t e s .  Eva lua t ive  p r e d i c a t e s  a r e  a c l a s s  of p r e d i c a t e s  
( i nc lud ing  some of the .  tough-pred ica tes )  which e x h i b i t  
" o b j e c t  d e l e t i o n "  i n  t h e i r  complements bu t  which e n t e r  i n t o  
c o n s t r u c t i o n s  which a r e  formal ly  d i s t i n c t  from tough-predi- 
c a t e  c o n s t r u c t i o n s .  Some examples a r e  good, a p p r o p r i a t e ,  
a ccep tab le ,  and u s e f u l .  
i. t h i s  g i f t i  wouldn ' t  be accep tab le  f o r  a man t o  
g i v e  - t o  a woman i 
ii. such musici only  seems good f o r  teeny-boppers t o  
dance t o  
- 
, - 
iii. these toysi are useful for exhausted parents to 
keep their children amused with - 
Evaluative predicates are subcategorized for - for-phrase com- 
plements. 
iv. this gift wouldn't be acceptable for a bar mitz- 
vah 
v. such music only seems good for slow dances 
vi. these toys are useful for educational purposes 
Observe the similarity in interpretation of these - for-phrases 
and purpose - for-phrases. 
vii. I purchased this gift for the bar mitzvah 
viii. this music was only intended for slow dances 
ix. the manufacturer designed these toys for educa- 
tional purposes 
Compare the following with (i-iii) : 
x. such thingsi were meant for men to give - .i 
to women 
xi. I bought this new recordi for all of us to ' 
dance to - 
xii. we borrowed our neighbor's toysi to keepdzour 
children amused with - 
2 1 0  
I t  seems, t hen ,  t h a t  t h e  i n f i n i t i v e  complements i n  
(i-iii) a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  as purpose c l a u s e s ,  l i k e  t h e  comple- 
ments i n  ( x - x i i ) .  Semant ica l ly ,  e v a l u a t i v e  p r e d i c a t e s  
e v a l u a t e  t h e i r  s u b j e c t s  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  purpose o r  
f u n c t i o n  dep ic t ed  by t h e  - fo rcphrase  complement: 
x i i i .  a s p i r i n  i s  good f o r  a r t h r i t i s  
d o c t o r s  o f t e n  p r e s c r i b e  a s p i r i n  f o r  a r t h r i t i s  
a s p i r i n  i s  o f t e n  used f o r  a r t h r i t i s  
a s p i r i n  i s  f o r  a r t h r i t i s  
x i v .  such an ins t rument  i s  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  p l ay  c l a s -  
s i c a l  music on 
she  bought t h i s  expensive ins t rument  t o  p lay  
c l a s s i c a l  music on 
t h i s  ins t rument  has  never been used t o  p l ay  
c l a s s i c a l  music on 
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  proper s t r u c t u r a l  an- 
a l y s i s  f o r  a  sen tence  l i k e  ( i) i s  roughly a s  given below. 
xv. t h i s  g i f t i  wouldn ' t  be [ADJ accep tab le ]  
L p p  f o r  [ a man t o  g i v e  t o  a  woman] ] .. 
'red - 
Rate  t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  ( accep tab le f  seems t o  be an excep- 
t i o n ) ,  t h e  purpose c l a u s e  complement of t h e  e v a l u a t i v e  pred i -  
c a t e  can be pseudo-clef ted:  
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xvi. what this kind of music is good for is for 
teeny-boppers to dance to 
what these toys are use=.lul for is for exhausted 
parents to keep their children amused with 
Also, as we would expect, there are cases where the subject 
of the evaluative predicate controls the complement subject: 
xvii. Johni was not deemed acceptable - i to lead 
the parade 
aspirin is useful i to reduce pain and i 
swelling 
marijuana is good i -i to ease nervous tension 
In addition, the - for-phrase complements of evaluative predi- 
cates can be gerundive, as in 
xviii. chantersi are useful for practicing on i 
ovens are good for baking cakes in i 
this refrigeratori isn't fit for keeping fresh 
food in 
- 
~hus, evaluative predicate constructions provide us 
with a further example of "object deletion" into reduced 
sentential complements. The OD rule operates obligator- 
ily, as with purpose clauses. 
xix. *this gifti wouldn't be appropriate for a guy 
to give iti to a girl 
*such music i only seems good for teeny-boppers to 
dance to iti 
*these toysi are useful to keep children amused 
with themi 
Observe that a sentence like, this music is good for 
people to dance to, is ambiguous between a-(tough-predicate 
and evaluative-predicate interpretation: 
xx. a. this music is good t p p  for people] IVP to 
dance to - 1
b. this music i s  good Ipp  for [ S  people to 
red 
dance to - 1 1 
The pseudo-cleft sentence, what this music is good for 
is for people to dance :to isolates the evaluative-predi- 
cate reading. 
5. Notice that while, *he was looking at Bill's pictures of 
someone is impossible, he was looking at pictures of someone 
(where pictures of someone is a phrase) is as acceptable as, 
he was taking pictures of someone. It would seem, then, that 
the ungrammaticality of sentences like, *Bill is fun to look 
at pictures of cannot be accounted for in terms of the distri- 
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bu t ion  of i n d e f i n i t e s .  However, such c a s e s  seem t o  be 
i s o l a t e d .  
6 .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  
i n f i n i t i v e  i n  ( 1 9 )  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  unspec i f i ed  w i l l  r e -  
q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  i n f i n i t i v e  phrase  be analpped a s  a VP.  
That  i s ,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of ( 1 9 )  i s ,  
unde r ly ing ly ,  
i. Mary made t h e  s t a t u e i  t o o  smal l  [pp f o r  [Vp t o  
n o t i c e  
- i 1 I 
r a t h e r  t han  
ii. Mary made t h e  s t a t u e i  t o o  smal l  [pp f o r  ' 
[ s A t o  n o t i c e  - I 1  
r ed  
wi th  A i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  unspec i f i ed .  What i s  a t  i s s u e  he re  i s  
whether o r  no t  t h e r e  i s  a  r u l e  t h a t  would i n t e r p r e t  b a s  
unspec i f i ed  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  provided i n  ( i i) .  
7.  L & F a rgue  t h a t  t h e  complement of t r y  must be a  VP 
-
r a t h e r  t han  an S f  s i n c e ,  on t h e i r  a n a l y s i s ,  OD i s  p roh ib i t ed  
f r  d m apply ing  i n t o  sen tences  and y e t  examples l i k e  (i) 
grammatical:  
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i. the problem was too intricate for John to try 
tq solve 
- 7  
However, it is well known that - try can have passive comple- 
merits as in, I tried to be arrested by the police. Thus, 
if - try takes a VP complement, Passive is not restricted 
to sentences and L & F's argument is vitiated. Otherwise, 
try must take sentential complements, and their entire 
-
OD analysis is flawed. 
REFERENCES 
Bresna0,-'J. 1971. Sentence stress and syntactic trans- 
formations. Language 47.257-281. 
Bresnan, J. 1972. Theory of Complementation in English 
syntax. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, M.I.T. 
Chomsky, N. 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 
Chomsky, N. 1973. Conditions on transformations. A 
festschrift for Morris Halle, ed. by S. Anderson 
and P. Kiparsky, 232-286. New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
Emonds, J. 1970. Root and structure-preserving trans- 
formations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
M.I.T. 
Faraci, R. 1971. A preliminary examination of -- for to 
purpose clauses in ~nglish. Unpublished paper, 
M.I.T. 
Faraci, R. 1973. - Use-constructions revisited. Uppub- 
lished paper, M.I.T. 
Gruber, J. 1965. Studies in lexical relations. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, M.I.T. 
Higgins, F.R. 1973. The pseudo-cleft construction in Eng- 
lish. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, M.I.T. 
Jackendoff, R. 1972. Semantic interpretation in generative 
grammar. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 
Jespersen, 0. 1927. A modern English grammar1 on histori- 
cal principles. 7 vols. London: George Allen and 
Unwin. 
Klima, E. 1964. Negation in English. The structure of 
language, ed. by J. Fodor and J.Katz, 246-323. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Lakoff, G. 1968. Instrumental adverbs and the concept of 
deep structure. Foundations of Language 4.4-29. 
Lasnik, H., and R. Fiengo. 1973. Complement object 
deletion. Unpublished paper, M.I.T. 
Oehrle, R. 1974. Some remarks on the painting of Rembrandt. 
Unpublished paper, M.I.T. 
Ross, J.R. 1967. Constraints on variables in syntax. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, M.I.T. 
Wasow, T., and T. Roeper. 1971. On the subject of gerunds. 
Unpublished paper, M.I.T. 
Williams, E. 1971. Small clauses in English. Unpublished 
paper, M.I.T. 
. - ~- . I . . . . . !  , . . I  I I - . I , .  - -- 
217 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
The author was born in Brooklyn, New York, on April 28, 
1948. In 1958, he moved with his family to a small town on 
Long Island. He did his undergraduate work in Spanish and 
Russian literature at the State University of New York at 
Stony Brook and received his bachelor's degree in June of 
1969. From the fall of 1969 to the present time, he has 
been a graduate:student in linguistics at M.I.T. Starting 
in the fall of 1974, he will spend a year as Visiting 
Lecturer in linguistics at Princeton University. 
